

originates in minds that pursue profit; for that reason, a virtuous man sees this as worse than making a hole in another's fence in order to break into his property: even this is not justified, much less so is the action of one who performs evil and pursues only profit. Therefore, a student should not possess even the tiniest mind of pursuing profits. In ancient times, people striving to feed their parents did not hesitate to peddle and borrow rice from others. Nevertheless, their minds were so unperturbed and pure that profits could not taint them. However, these days scholars cannot avoid the mind that pursues profit, even though they may read the books of the great sages all day long. How can this not be regretful? Although one's family exists in such poverty that he must engage in some business to feed it, he should not allow the mind of pursuing profit to sprout. In matters of refusing, accepting, taking, and giving things, it is imperative that one investigate whether it is proper. Always question if it is correct in the sight of gain and do not be indulgent, so that even a small incident will not be transgressed inappropriately.

Please note: This article has been superseded in my publication of the full length book on the topic: *Korea's Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Chŏng Tojŏn (Sambong) and Hamhŏ Tok'ong (Gihwa)*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015.

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The Great Confucian-Buddhist Debate

Charles Muller

A prominent characteristic of Korean religious and philosophical thought is its proclivity for sustained and open intellectual debate regarding fundamental principles—especially phenomenological issues that deal with the origins and manifestations of evil and goodness, soteriology, ethics, and so forth. Although Korean religious debates were never institutionalized in a formal manner comparable to a tradition like that of the Tibetan Gelukpa school of Buddhism, to which the Dalai Lama belongs, it can still be said that such debates assume a distinctive measure of importance in Korean history. For example, when one begins to study Buddhism and Confucianism in the context of Korean intellectual history, one will notice quickly that religious practice was framed in terms of such seminal debates as the Buddhist “sudden-gradual” and “doctrine-meditation” debates, the Confucian “four-seven” debate, and so forth. It can further be observed that this Korean proclivity for religious debate tends to be delimited by a well-defined and distinctly repeated pattern of discourse: that of essence-and-function (*ch'e-yong*).

Essence-and-function is a traditional East Asian approach toward interpreting the spiritual and material aspects of human existence, which understands all phenomena to have two contrasting, yet contiguous, aspects: (1) an underlying, deeper, more fundamental, hidden aspect, called “essence” (Kor. *ch'e*), and (2) a visibly manifest, surface aspect, called “function” (Kor. *yong*). This pair has many analogues in East Asian thought, one of the earliest and most readily apprehensible being the “roots and branches” paradigm taught in the *Great Learning*. The essence-function paradigm is applied as an interpretive tool to articulate a wide range of situations in human behavior and society at large, but its most common application is seen when classical East Asian philosophers are attempting to describe the complex relationship of the substance of the human mind as juxtaposed with people's manifest (moral) behavior and physical appearance.

While there are a few notable exceptions, the pervasive view regarding the human being that developed within the classical East Asian tradition is that despite

all the obvious evil and suffering in the world, the human mind is, at its most fundamental level, something good and pure. This notion is expressed in the "humaneness" (Kor. *in*; Ch. *ren*) of Confucius, the "four beginnings" of Mencius, as well as such images as the "un-carved block," "newborn babe," and so on, of the *Daodejing* (*The Way and Its Power*), as well as the "buddha-nature" in East Asian Buddhism. As a rule, people's minds (interpreted as the "essence" of human beings) are presumed to be basically good. But whether or not this goodness actually ends up being reflected in their day-to-day activities, and if so, to what extent, depends on a wide variety of factors, including the degree of one's own effort/attention, along with contingent factors—especially the quality (or "orthodoxy") of the religious instruction with which one has been inculcated. This basic essence-function approach is followed and elaborated upon by generation upon generation of scholars and commentators in the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist systems in China, Korea, and Japan.

The articulation of this paradigm and its analogues first appears in classical Chinese philosophical works. But the close geographic proximity of Korea, along with the concomitant extensive and continuous exchange of commodities and ideas, enabled Koreans to participate in the Chinese philosophical world at a relatively early period—and even to make serious contributions to the greater East Asian religious discourse, as many Korean thinkers traveled to the Tang and Song Chinese centers of learning and made their own mark. Thus, Koreans learned Chinese religion and philosophy well and, bringing it back to their homeland, made their own enhancements and even took off in some novel directions of their own. One of these enhancements or divergences is an even stronger degree of attention paid to the essence-function paradigm, and this is coupled, as mentioned earlier, with a pronounced affinity for open philosophical confrontation.

Philosophical confrontation becomes a notable dimension within Korean Buddhist practice, especially in the context of the development of the Sŏn (Ch. Chan; Jpn. Zen, or "Meditation") school. The advent of this school in Korea led to an ideological conflict between the older, established, doctrinal schools of Buddhism and the newly imported Meditation school, whose adherents regularly opined that textual studies were an impediment to the attainment of the Buddhist goal of enlightenment.

In Korea, the relation between the doctrinal teachings of Buddhism and meditation practice was an issue that has been debated in almost every generation, including the current one. The arguments for the pro-meditation group were initiated by early Sŏn teachers, and such positions are still expressed in Korean Sŏn Buddhism today. What eventually became more common in Korean Sŏn, however, was a discourse from within the tradition that sought a middle ground, advocating an approach to cultivation that included both meditation and textual study in a balanced format. This sort of position was advocated through the centuries by numerous leading Buddhist figures, including Kyunyo (923–73), Ŭichŏn (1055–1101), Chinul (1158–1210), Kihwa (1376–1433), and Hyujŏng (1520–1604).

A roughly parallel Korean intra-Buddhist debate—which involved many of the same participants as in the doctrine-versus-meditation debate—can be seen in the controversy regarding whether enlightenment was something that is attained suddenly or gradually. Again, this argument also has its roots in China, but after fading away on the continent, it was taken up with fervor in Korea, where it has continued to spur debate within the Korean Chogyŏ school of Sŏn down to the present day.

The greatest of the Korean debates regarding the nature of the mind, strikingly analogous to the previously-introduced Buddhist doctrinal-meditative and sudden-gradual oppositions, is the Neo-Confucian question of the precise character of the relation of the "four beginnings" (four good qualities of the mind that Mencius understood as being latent in all people) and seven feelings (seven kinds of mixed-quality emotions that arise secondarily to the four beginnings), which was first taken up between the Neo-Confucian scholars Yi Hwang (Toegye; 1501–70) and Yi Yi (Yulgok; 1536–84), and later rejoined by their disciples.

All three of the preceding debates are framed by a clear thematic pattern: (1) the degree to which the goodness, purity, or enlightenment that exists within the human mind can be said to be innate, or even originally complete; (2) based on this innate purity, what specific factors (if any) are necessary to bring about its completion; and (3) what the relationship is between the innate (good, enlightened, pure) nature of the mind, and the discordance, affliction, and evil that we see appearing in everyday human activity. No matter what the degree of divergence in the interpretation of the various aspects of the previously-expressed pattern, the soteriological discourses of the mainstream early and classical period Korean philosophical/religious systems operate within this framework. They all basically agree on the point that the fundamental nature of the mind is good, and that there is a problem somewhere that leads that fundamental nature not to manifest itself properly—that is, to function discordantly. Thus, it is a problem that can be identified as lying within the conceptual framework of essence-function.

The Buddhist-Confucian Debate

In this chapter, we will read representative selections from another significant debate that occurred in the Korean philosophical arena—that which occurred between the Neo-Confucians and the Buddhists in the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn periods. This also happens to be a debate that is wholly grounded in the core points of the issues introduced earlier. We will look at the two most important, roughly contemporary, representative works that emerged from each side. These are the *Pulssi chappyŏn* (Array of Critiques of Buddhism) by the Neo-Confucian scholar Chŏng Tojŏn (Sambong; 1342–98), and the *Hyŏnjŏng non* (Articulation of Orthodoxy) by the Buddhist monk Kihwa (Hambŏ Tŭkt'ong; 1376–1433).

These two treatises do not actually constitute a direct, ongoing dialogue be-

tween contemporaries as does the four-seven debate, since Kihwa probably wrote his piece sometime after Chōng's death. But since the *Hyōnjong non* is clearly written as a direct response to the *Chappyōn*, as well as a response to the entire gamut of critiques lodged by Confucians against Buddhists since the dawn of their conflicts, the juxtaposition of the two texts can certainly be seen as one of the major philosophical debates of the Korean tradition. This case is especially interesting, since, even though the argument was ostensibly conducted between two distinct, competing philosophical/religious traditions, the degree to which both sides automatically ground their basic arguments in the structure of essence-function makes an even clearer point about the role of that structure as an a priori framework of classical Korean philosophical debate.

As a philosopher, Chōng Tojōn was the product of a long-developing Neo-Confucian tradition, which started in China and worked its way into Korea, and which had as a major part of its *raison d'être* the project of exposing the harmful nature of the Buddhist teachings to both the moral well-being of the individual and the stability of society in general. Although Confucian criticisms of Buddhism start as far back as the Tang dynasty with the Chinese literatus Han Yu (768–824), it is in the works of the Song Neo-Confucian masters, most importantly the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao [1032–85] and Cheng Yi [1033–1107]) and Zhu Xi (1130–1200), that the critique takes on its mature philosophical form. The target of the Song Neo-Confucian critique was particularly Chan (Sōn) Buddhism, the school that had distinguished itself for its ostensive rejection of book learning and societal norms.

During the two centuries after Zhu Xi, a roughly analogous confrontation between the Neo-Confucians and Buddhists developed in Koryō dynasty Korea, but with some important distinctions. One of the most critical differences between the two scenarios was the markedly greater degree to which the Korean Buddhist establishment was embedded into the state power structure as compared with the situation in Song China. Leaders of the Buddhist establishment owned large tracts of tax-free territory, traded in slaves and other commodities, and were influential at all levels of government. There were too many monks who were ordained for the wrong reasons, and corruption was rampant. Thus, the ideological fervor with which Neo-Confucianism arose in Korea had a special dimension, since the ire of the critics of Buddhism not only was fueled by the earlier philosophical arguments of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi but was exacerbated by the extent of the present corruption. There was a decadent, teetering government in place, inextricably wrapped up, in the view of these critics, with a dissolute religious organization.

With this less-than-exemplary Buddhist establishment as its target, the Korean Neo-Confucian anti-Buddhist polemic grew during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, reaching its zenith at the end of the fourteenth century when, with the 1392 coup d'état directed by the Confucian-backed general Yi Sōnggye (1335–1408), which led to the founding of the Chosōn dynasty (1392–1910), the Bud-

dists were pressed out of the seat of political power. The Buddhists over time lost much of their influence with the government, becoming far less visible in the metropolitan areas. The final polemical push for the Buddhist purge came in the form of the essays of Chōng Tojōn, Yi Sōnggye's main political adviser, who would play a major role in the development of the political structure of the new Chosōn dynasty. Chōng wrote a few philosophical essays that were critical of Buddhism, but his final and most directly anti-Buddhist polemical work (completed shortly before his assassination in 1398) was the *Pulssi chappyōn*.

The Confucian Attack: The *Pulssi Chappyōn*

In his *Array of Critiques of Buddhism*, Chōng focused on comparisons of Buddhist and Confucian positions on issues of doctrine and practice, with the main intention of demonstrating that Buddhist doctrine was internally contradictory and even deceptive. In Chōng's view, it was not only necessary to restrain the Buddhist establishment at the present moment: it was desirable to seriously curtail and, if possible, permanently put a stop to the activities of this dangerous belief system. His critique is extensive, covering every aspect of the Buddhist tradition as it was generally understood at the time. Given the composition of Korean Buddhism at this time, the primary object of his criticism was the Sōn school, which the Neo-Confucians perceived as being nihilistic, denying the importance of human relationships, denying respect for the state, and even denying Buddhism's own principle of cause and effect.

The Arguments of the *Pulssi chappyōn*

Chōng starts off, in the first two chapters of the treatise, with a critique of the Indian notions of karma and transmigration, arguing against these "foreign" Indian paradigms, favoring instead Chinese cosmological schema that were developed in connection with the *Yijing* (*Book of Changes*) and its commentaries: *yin/yang*, the five phases (*wuxing*), the material (*hun*) and spiritual (*po*) souls, and so forth. He points out that, when it comes to such practical matters as healing disease, virtually all people, Buddhists included, rely on Chinese *yin/yang* cosmology in the form of traditional medicinal practices—a tendency that is still evident in East Asia today.

In the third through fifth chapters, Chōng moves into the core of his philosophical argument, attacking Buddhism at one of its traditional weak points: that of the contradictory character of its discourse on the nature and the mind. He cites passages from the *Sūramgama-sūtra* and from the writings of the Koryō scholar-monk Chinul that show a wide range of inconsistency between the various accounts of the relation between the mind (*xin*) and the nature (*xing*). As Chōng leads us through these citations, in one Buddhist text, the nature is said to

be equivalent to the mind; in another, it is an aspect of the mind; then it is a principle contained in the mind; and then, in another text, a function of the mind. This line of criticism is carried into chapter 6, where the focus comes to be placed directly on the relationship between the mind and its external, functional manifestations. To clarify the Confucian position (which Chŏng claims is consistent, both rationally and metaphysically), he cites the Mencian "four beginnings" that are innate to humans, along with their four associated functions of humaneness, propriety, justice, and wisdom.

Chŏng's argument continues on through several more chapters, addressing issues such as the Buddhists' abandonment of societal obligations, their perverted application of the notion of "compassion," criticism of the Buddhist idea of two levels of reality, the practice of begging, and, most of all, the escapist/nihilistic views of Sŏn. All can be summarized in his view that the components of Buddhist doctrine are disconnected from each other and incongruous. They are conveniently used for excusing responsibility, the converse of providing a viable system of values. Confucianism, by contrast, is completely aligned between essence and function, is unitary and without contradictions, teaches a concrete system of values, and articulates a clear relationship between inner and outer.

The Buddhist Response: The *Hyŏnjŏng Non*

Kihwa, born in 1376, was thirty-four years Chŏng's junior. The son of a diplomat, he was considered to be one of the brightest young scholars of his generation, excelling at the recently established national academy of Confucian studies, the Sŏnggyun'gwan—where Chŏng also was on the faculty for a time—quite likely even during the period that Kihwa was enrolled as a student. During the course of his studies there, however, Kihwa was continually attracted by the Buddhist teachings, passing through a phase during which he was confused about which course he should follow. (Kihwa describes this period of his life and how he came to his final decision in a passage from the *Hyŏnjŏng non* that is translated later in this chapter.)

When Kihwa was twenty-one, the trauma he experienced at the death of a close friend finally tilted the scales irreversibly in the direction of Buddhism, and he joined the order. He eventually became the disciple of the leading Sŏn master of his generation, Chach'o (Muhak; 1327–1405), under whose tutelage he learned the approach to *kongan* (Sŏn cases) training derived from the Imje (Ch. Linji; Jpn. Rinzai) school of Sŏn. Yet at the same time, despite this affiliation with the ostensibly "antitextual" Imje tradition—due, no doubt, to the influences of his literary training—Kihwa went on to become one of the most prolific Buddhist writers of his period, exerting significant influence on the subsequent character of Korean Sŏn, most notably through his commentaries to the *Perfect Enlightenment Sūtra* and the *Diamond Sūtra*.

Kihwa's life span was almost exactly divided between the years prior to and after the dynastic transition from the Koryŏ to the Chosŏn, during the course of which the Buddhists were ejected from their long and intimate relationship with the rulership. During his career as a Sŏn teacher, Kihwa rose to the position of being the leading Buddhist figure of his generation. While the Confucians had succeeded in bringing enough pressure to bear to eliminate the title of National Teacher, which had for centuries been granted to the leading Buddhist figures, he was still posthumously awarded the title of Royal Preceptor, which reflects the degree of respect that Kihwa commanded, despite the changing atmosphere. This also means that Kihwa, as the leader of the Korean *sangha* during this period, was the one who ended up being faced with the primary responsibility of responding (or not) to the Neo-Confucian polemic.

He did respond, composing the *Hyŏnjŏng non*. A date of composition is not attached to the version of the *Hyŏnjŏng non* in our possession, nor is there any clear dating provided in Kihwa's biographical sketch. We do know that he had to have composed it after the time of his conversion to Buddhism in 1396–97, and we might also assume, given the strong mastery of Buddhist doctrine demonstrated in the treatise, that it would have been composed at least a few years after this conversion, and thus probably subsequent to Chŏng's demise in 1398. Therefore, strictly speaking, this text probably cannot be seen as constituting a "live debate" with Chŏng.

On the other hand, however, the *Hyŏnjŏng non* directly responds to every one of the objections raised in the *Chappyŏn*, which represented the culmination of all the Confucian arguments that had been made against Buddhism from the time of Han Yu onward. And since the Neo-Confucian tradition in both China and Korea lacks any other overview comparable to the *Chappyŏn*, it can be said that it is primarily the *Chappyŏn* to which Kihwa is making his response.

Kihwa starts off by grounding his argument in an essence-function view of the mind and its activities. Elaborating on a general Buddhist approach, Kihwa tells us that the mind is originally pure, but as it engages in situations, it tends to become entangled in affliction. For the purpose of recovering the original mind, Buddhism has a wide spectrum of practices, which range from the most expedient and superficial, to the most profound. In outlining the teachings, starting from the most profound and extending to the most superficial, he ends up with the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of the law of cause and effect. Yet no matter how superficial the Buddhist teaching of cause and effect may seem within the East Asian Mahāyāna tradition, Kihwa judges it to be one level above the typical application of the Confucian teaching, which he characterizes as the mere conditioning of people through reward and punishment on the part of the state.

The centerpiece of Kihwa's argument lies in the presentation of what he takes to be the common denominator of all three traditions of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism: a shared doctrine of "humaneness" (Kor. *in*, or "altruism"), which

is in turn linked to the shared view that the myriad living beings of the universe are fully interlinked with one another. While the expressed doctrine of the mutual containment of all things is technically Buddhist in origin, it ended up being one of the central tenets articulated by the most influential of the Song Neo-Confucian founders, especially Cheng Hao, who declared, "The myriad things and I form a single body." Kihwa points out that Buddhism and (Neo-)Confucianism share in the view that it is fundamentally wrong to harm others. Buddhists have the doctrine of *ahimsā* (non-injury) at the core of their practice of moral discipline, and this is observed fully in all Buddhist practices. Confucians, on the other hand, take humaneness to be the most fundamental component of their path of cultivation. Confucius himself continually cited humaneness as the source of all forms of goodness. Mencius said that humaneness was innate to all people, explaining its function through a variety of metaphors, the most oft-cited being that of the stranger who automatically rushes to prevent a toddler from falling into a well.

However, Kihwa argues, the Confucian literary corpus is rife with inconsistencies on this matter. For example, in one of the more famous quotations from Song Neo-Confucianism, Cheng Hao asserts that humaneness means that we form a single body with the myriad things. Nonetheless, according to Kihwa, Confucius himself went only halfway in his practice of sharing in a oneness with other living beings, as he still enjoyed the sports of hunting and fishing. For Mencius, taking the life of an animal was not problematic for the humane man, as long as he did not hear the animal's screams in its death throes. And, in general, the Confucian tradition endorsed the practices of ritual sacrifice.

The charge, then, that Kihwa lays on the Confucians is strikingly similar to the one that Chōng uses to assail the Buddhists, in that both want to show the other side to be guilty of inconsistency. There is a slight difference, however, in that, while Chōng for the most part wants to point out inconsistencies in the Buddhist doctrine itself, Kihwa centers his argument on showing inconsistencies between Confucian doctrine and the actual behavior exhibited by the tradition's adherents. Simply put, Confucians say one thing but do another.

In the closing portion of his treatise, however, Kihwa concludes that the three teachings, when properly understood, should be seen as three different expressions of the same reality. In the passage that provides the strongest justification for presuming that Kihwa was responding directly to the *Chappyōn*, he discusses two concepts of voidness and quiescence raised by Chōng in his own summation, arguing instead that the connotations of these terms are basically the same throughout all three traditions and that, at their most fundamental level, the three are equally valid approaches to the same reality.

Chōng Tojōng's *Pulssi chappyōn* is translated from the edition included in the *Sambong chip*, vol. 1 (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1977), pp. 76–85. Kihwa's *Hyōnjōng non* appears in the *Han'guk Pulgyo chōnsō* [abbreviated as HPC], vol. 7

(Seoul: Tongguk Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'ansa, 1985), pp. 217–25. Chinese source texts of both treatises, along with a complete English translation, can be found on the Internet at <http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/jeong-gihwa/index.html>.

Further Reading

For the relationship between these two texts, see Charles Muller, "The Center-piece of the Goryeo-Joseon Buddhist-Confucian Confrontation: A Comparison of the Positions of the *Bulssi japbyeon* and the *Hyeonjeong non*," *Journal of Korean Buddhist Seminar: Memorial Edition for the Late Professor Kim Chigyōn*, September 2003, 23–47; and Muller, "The Buddhist-Confucian Conflict in the Early Chosōn and Kihwa's Syncretic Response: *The Hyōn chōng non*," *Review of Korean Studies* 2 (September 1999): 183–200. The most comprehensive work that investigates the development of the Korean Neo-Confucian polemical movement against Buddhism remains John Goulde, "Anti-Buddhist Polemic in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Korea: The Emergence of Confucian Exclusivism" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1985). For further background on Chōng and his role in the birth of the Chosōn regime, see Chai-sik Chung, "Chōng Tojōn: 'Architect' of Yi Dynasty Government and Ideology," in *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, edited by JaHyun Kim Haboush and Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 59–88. For a full-length monograph that provides a total picture of the gamut of forces involved in the transition from the Koryō to the Chosōn, see John Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosōn Dynasty*, especially chap. 6, "The Ideology of Reform," which offers extensive discussion of Chōng Tojōn. Michael Kalton's book *The Four-Seven Debate: An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought* provides a detailed account of an intra-Confucian debate that shows many similarities to this one. From the Buddhist angle, for an understanding of the Sōn tradition that produced Kihwa, standard reading is the introduction to Robert E. Buswell Jr., *The Korean Approach to Zen: The Collected Works of Chinul* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), reprinted in paperback as *Tracing Back the Radiance: Chinul's Korean Way of Zen*, Classics in East Asian Buddhism, no. 2 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, A Kuroda Institute Book, 1991). Kihwa's approach to the three teachings in the context of the *Hyōnjōng non* is also discussed in Robert E. Buswell Jr., "Buddhism under Confucian Domination: The Synthetic Vision of Sosan Hyujong (1520–1604)," in *Confucianism and Heterodox Religion in Late Choson Korea*, edited by JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuschler (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 134–59. Additionally, extensive discussion of Kihwa's syncretic religious views appear in Charles Muller, *The Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment: Korean Buddhism's Guide to Meditation*. Many of these and other materials from my own articles, conference presentations, and books on topics related to Kihwa, Chōng, and Confucian-Buddhist related issues

can be found on my Web site at <http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/publications-etc.html>.

Array of Critiques of Buddhism (*Pulssi Chappyōn*)

CRITIQUE OF THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF TRANSMIGRATION

We can test this concept [of transmigration] in the case of our own bodies, in the space of a single inhalation and exhalation. When air goes out, we call it "one breath." But that which goes out in one exhalation not what is taken in with the next inhalation. In this way, then, the respiration of people is continually produced without end. The principle of the departing of that which goes forth, and the continuation of that which comes in, can be seen in this fashion. We can also test this on other living things in the world. In all kinds of vegetation, a single vital force penetrates from the roots through the trunk, the branches, the leaves, flowers, and fruits. During the spring and summer, this vital force peaks in its activity, and flowers and leaves are abundant. Reaching fall and winter, the vital force contracts, and the flowers and leaves fall away. When the spring and summer of the next year arrive, they again grow apace. But it is not the case that the fallen leaves return to their roots—back to their origin to be reborn!

When we draw water from a well each morning to boil for cooking and drinking, it is eventually boiled away. When we wash our clothes and put them out to dry in the sun, the water disappears completely without a trace. The water in the well is drawn out continuously, but it never runs out. Yet it is not the case that the water returns to its original place and is reborn. There is also the case of the grains that we farm. In the spring we plant ten bushels, and in the fall we gather one hundred bushels. We can keep going like this, multiplying the yield until we reach one hundred thousand bushels. So these grains are also produced again and again.

Now if we look at it from the point of view of the Buddhist theory of transmigration, all animate creatures come and go in fixed numbers—there is never any increase or decrease [in the total]. But if this is the case, then the creation of living beings by heaven and earth is not like the profitable work of the farmer. Also, these animate creatures do not become human beings. This being the case, then the total number of all of the birds, fish, and insects is also fixed. That means that if one increases in number, the other must decrease. Or if one decreases in number, the other must increase. It should not be the case that all simultaneously increase, or that all simultaneously decrease.

From the present point of view, however, during times of prosperity, the population of human beings increases, and at the same time, the population of the birds, beast, sea creatures, and insects also increases. During a period of decline, the population of human beings decreases, as does the popula-

tion of birds, beasts, sea creatures, and insects. This is because human beings and the myriad things are all born from the vital force of heaven and earth. Therefore, when the vital force is waxing, all things increase simultaneously. When the vital force is on the wane, all things decrease simultaneously. I have had it with the Buddhist's teaching of transmigration, which is nothing but a hideous deception to the people of the world! If we deeply fathom all the transformations of heaven and earth, and clearly examine the production of human beings, then we cannot but understand it as I have explained here. It would be best for those who share my views to reflect on this together.

CRITIQUE OF THE BUDDHIST NOTION OF KARMA

Some say, "Your criticism of the Buddhist notion of transmigration is extreme. You claim that human beings and the [myriad] creatures are born through the reception of the vital forces of yin/yang and the five phases." Well, in people there are the inequalities of wise and foolish, capable and incapable, poor and rich, noble and low-class, long and short-lived. In the case of the animals, there are those that are captured, raised as livestock, and made to suffer in labor, without respite until their death. There are some that cannot escape the angler's and bird catcher's nets, the fisherman's hook or the hunter's arrow. The large and small, strong and weak eat, or are eaten by, each other. In heaven's creation of the creatures, each receives its own lot. How can there be such a situation of inequality as this? With this in mind, are not the Buddha's teachings of the attainment of birth as a result of the good and evil actions of prior lifetimes on the mark? Those good and evil activities that one carries out in this life are called "causes." The rewards that appear at a later date are called the "fruits." Doesn't this explanation seem reasonable?

I answer this objection by saying that I have explained the matter in full in my earlier discussion on the continuous production of humans and things. Once you grasp this, one cannot but have doubts regarding the theory of transmigration. And even though the critique of the theory of transmigration is properly grasped, and the shortcomings of the theory of karma are self-evident without any special effort at making a critique, you still ask this question? I take the prerogative of not repeating my explanation from the beginning again. Now, in the activity of yin/yang and the five phases, the twists of fate and the alternations in patterns are uneven and unequal. Therefore in their related vital force, there are differences of free flow and congestion, imbalance and balance, purity and pollution, substantiality and insipidity, high and low, long and short.

And in the production of humans and animals, if the timing is right, they obtain free flow and balance, becoming humans. If they end up with congestion and imbalance, they become animals. The respective nobility and wretchedness of humans and animals is differentiated here. Furthermore, as

humans, those who attain purity are the wise and the capable. Those who end up being polluted are the foolish and the incapable. The substantial attain wealth and the insipid end up in poverty. The high are ennobled and the low are miserable. The long are long-lived and the short die young. This explanation is greatly abbreviated, yet the case is the same with the things of the natural world. The *qilin*, dragons, and phoenix are spiritual, while the tigers, wolves, and snakes are poisonous. The camellia, cassia, iris, and epidendrum are auspicious, while the crow, long-beaked birds, poisonous herbs, and cogongrass bring suffering. Although these are all in the category of the congested and imbalanced, there are still distinctions among them in terms of relative good and evil.

ON CHINESE MEDICINE

People do not become congested and out of balance of their own accord. The *Book of Changes* says: "Heaven: The Way transforms, determining the constitution of each thing." (From the main text of the first hexagram.) An earlier scholar said: "Heaven's Way is distributed to the myriad things without discrimination." The same principle can be seen expressed in the minor arts of the physicians and fortune-tellers. When the fortune-tellers determine people's ill and good destinies, they must inevitably trace back to the basis in the rise and fall of the five phases. For example, some people's destinies are determined by the phase of wood. In the spring they will flourish, and in the autumn they will decline. Their appearance tends to be green and tall, and their hearts tend to be warm and compassionate. Other people's destinies are determined by the phase of metal. They do well in the autumn and falter in the summer. Their appearance tends to be whitish and square, their minds are strong and bright. The same sort of examples can be made from the phases of water and fire—there is no place where they do not have application. Also, ugliness in appearance, and coarseness and dullness of mind, are rooted as well in imbalances in the endowments gotten from the five phases.

When physicians diagnose people's sickness, they also must investigate to the root causes of the mutual influences of the five agents. This can be seen in the fact that sicknesses related to cold will be associated with the water-based kidneys, and the sicknesses of heat will be associated with the fire-based heart. The prescriptions given for treatment are adapted to the various natures of warm and cool, cold and hot, assigning tastes of salty and sour, sweet and bitter, which are in turn categories related to the five agents. In this, there are no remedies that are not perfectly matched to the disease and personal constitution. This is what our Confucian teachers mean when they say that the production of people and things occurs based on the attainment of the vital forces through yin/yang and the five agents. This is supported by direct testimony that is beyond doubt.

If you follow the explanations of the Buddhists, then fortune and misfortune, and sickness are not related to yin/yang and the five agents, but all are made manifest as the products of karma. If this is so, why is it that not a single person has abandoned our Confucian yin/yang—five agents paradigm and adopted the Buddhist theory of karmic results when it comes to the divination of fortune/misfortune, and the diagnosis of disease? Their theories are wild, empty, and error-laden, and not worth being adopted. How can you allow yourself to be bewildered by such teachings?!

CRITIQUE OF THE BUDDHIST NOTIONS OF MIND AND NATURE

The mind is the pneuma that the human being takes from heaven at birth. It is spiritually subtle and undarkened, and takes its position as lord of a single body. The nature is the principle that the human being takes from heaven at birth. It is pure and perfectly good—the endowment of a single mind. The mind possesses both awareness and activity, while the nature possesses neither awareness nor activity. Therefore it is said that the mind is able to fathom the nature, but the nature is not able to take stock of the mind. It is also said that the mind encompasses the emotions and the nature. The mind is also said to be the abode of the spiritual luminosity, while the nature is the principle with which it is endowed. Observing this, the distinctions between the mind and the nature should be understood!

The Buddhists take the mind to be the nature. But if you examine their theory thoroughly, it does not add up. They furthermore say that delusion is none other than the mind, and that awakening is none other than the nature. They also say that "mind" and "nature" are synonymous, just like the words *yan* and *mu* (in Chinese "eye" and "eye").

Pojo [Chinul] said: "Outside of the mind there is no Buddha" (HPC 4.742b 10–11) and "outside of the nature there is no dharma" (HPC 4.746c113–14). This also suggests a distinction in terms of Buddha and dharma, seemingly indicating that there is [a distinction] to be seen. Yet this is all done based on nebulous supposition, rather than on explicit facts. The teachings of the Buddhists have lots of wordplay but lack a definitive doctrine, and so their actual intentions can be understood. Our Confucian teachers say, "Exhaust your mind to understand the nature" (Zhu Xi *yulei*, 9). Here the original mind is used to fathom a profound principle.

The Buddha's teaching says, "Observe the mind and see the nature" (*Taishō* no. 2016, vol. 48, p. 656b7) and "mind is none other than the nature." This means that you use a separate one mind to observe this one mind. But how can a person have two minds? From this we can also readily know the impoverishment of their theories. We can sum it up by saying that using one's mind to observe the mind is like using the mouth to eat the mouth. What kind of nonsense is this to say that we will use the unobserving to observe?!

THE CONSISTENCY OF THE CONFUCIAN TEACHINGS

Moreover, our Confucian teachers say, "Within the space of a square inch, [all matters and all creatures have their definite principle]" (*Zhu Xi yulei*, 14) and "the rarefied spirit is undarkened, [including within it a multitude of principles and responding to a myriad circumstances]." The rarefied spirit which is undarkened is the mind. That which contains a multitude of principles is the nature. Those things which respond to a myriad circumstances are the sentiments. Now, since this mind is endowed with a multitude of principles, upon the arrival of all affairs and things, there are none that are not responded to appropriately. Therefore affairs and things are treated according to their correctness and incorrectness, and affairs and things follow the lead of the self. This is the learning of our Confucian masters. From inside the body and mind, extending out to all affairs and things—from the source, flowing out to the branch streams. All are penetrated by one, like the water that comes down from the fountainhead to flow out to a myriad streams: there is no place where it is not water. It is like holding the handle of the Big Dipper, which assesses the worth of all things under heaven. The relative worth of those things is just like the weighing of grams and ounces on a scale. This is what I mean when I say that there has never been an iota of inconsistency in the Confucian teachings.

Therefore I say: Buddhism is void, while Confucianism is substantial; Buddhism has two realities, while Confucianism has one; Buddhism has gaps, while Confucianism is consistent. This is something that learned people should clarify and discern.

THE BUDDHIST CONFUSION OF ESSENCE AND FUNCTION

It is like the saying "Essence and function spring from the same source; the manifest and the subtle have no gap between them." The Buddhist method of study addresses the mind, but does not address its manifestations. This can be seen in the Buddhists' saying things like, "The bodhisattva Mañjuśrī wanders through the taverns, but these activities are not his mind." Excuses like this for sloppy behavior abound in the Buddhist teachings. Is this not a separation of the mind from its activities? Chengzi said: "The study of the Buddhists includes reverence to correct the internal, but does not include justice to straighten the external." Therefore those who are stuck in these incorrect views will waste away.

THE BUDDHISTS' TREATMENT OF THE WORLD AS UNREAL

When [the Buddhists] see their Way as not distinct from concrete entities, they end up taking concrete entities to be the Way. Thus they say, "Good and

evil [phenomena] are all mind. The myriad phenomena are nothing but consciousness." By according with all things, they go along with their activity without contrivance; acting wildly and arbitrarily, there is nothing that they do not do. This is what Cheng Hao meant when he said "those who are rigid become like dry wood, and those who are unrestrained end up being arbitrary and reckless" (Cheng Hao, "Selected Sayings," no. 32). Yet when [the Buddhists] talk about their Way, they are referring to the mind. But they end up falling back down into the physical realm of concrete things, without even being aware of it themselves. How regrettable!

CRITIQUE OF THE BUDDHISTS' LACK OF THE APPLICATION OF "COMPASSION" TO STANDARD FAMILIAL NORMS

Heaven and earth take living beings as their mind; human beings take this mind of the living beings of heaven and earth to be born. Therefore people are uniformly endowed with the mind that cannot bear to watch the suffering of others. Even though the Buddha was a foreigner, he was still a human being. So how could he alone lack this mind? What we Confucians call the feeling of sympathy for the suffering of others, the Buddhists call "compassion." Both are functions of humaneness. Even though these two concepts are basically the same, significant differences can be seen in the way that they are actually carried out in practice.

My family members and I share the same vital force. Other people and I are of the same species. Other beings and I share in being alive. Therefore, in the actualization of the mind of humaneness, one starts with one's family, then extends to other people, and then to other beings. It is like water overflowing from one hole, and then to a second and third hole. The source of humaneness is deep, and its extent is far-reaching. Including all the creatures in heaven and earth, there is not one that does not exist within our heartfelt love. Therefore [Mencius] said: "[The Superior Man] loves his parents intimately and loves people as people. He loves people as people and cares about creatures" (*Mencius* 7A:45). This is the Confucian Way. Therefore it is unitary, it is substantial, and it is consistent.

The Buddhists are different. In their treatment of other living beings, even if they are fierce animals like tigers and leopards, or insignificant bugs like mosquitoes and flies, they shamelessly desire to feed them with their own bodies. In their treatment of people, if a man from Yue (i.e., a total stranger) is hungry, they are concerned about giving their food to him. If a man from Qin is cold, they want to donate their clothing to him. And this offering of clothing is the so-called charity [*dāna*]. But in the case of someone extremely close, like one's father or son, or someone to whom great respect is due, such as the prince or minister, they unflinchingly seek to sever the relationship and run away. What is the meaning of this!?

Moreover, the reason that people learn to act with care and discretion is because they have fathers and mothers, wives and children. This causes them to learn proper values. The Buddhists regard human relationships as provisional combinations. The son does not treat his father as a father, and the minister does not treat his prince as a prince. Human warmth and justice go down the drain. People regard their most intimate family members like passersby on the street, and they treat the most venerable person like a capped boy. The original basis has already been lost. Therefore, if they try reach out to other people and beings, it is like a tree without roots, or a river without a spring, which easily dries up. In the end they succeeded neither in bringing benefit to people nor in giving aid to living beings . . . they haven't the slightest bit of feeling for them.

CRITIQUE OF THE SÓN PROCLIVITY TOWARD ANTINOMIANISM

The early Buddhist teachings did not go beyond the discourse of causes, conditions, and retribution, so that they could ensnare foolish people. Even though they took nothingness as their cardinal teaching, and abandoned the obligations of society, they still taught that the good obtain fortune while the evil reap misfortune. This engendered the custom of people choosing goodness over evil, of observing the rules of morality, and not falling into dissipation. Therefore, even though the importance of human relationships was disparaged, justice and reason were not completely stifled.

But when Bodhidharma arrived to China, he was aware of the shallowness of his own teachings and knew that they would not suffice to move the intellectual elites. Thus he proffered slogans such as "no establishment of words and letters," "cutting off the path of language," "directly pointing to the human mind," and "seeing the nature, one achieves buddhahood." Once these teachings had been released, they proliferated rapidly, and his followers continued to transmit and elaborate on them. Some said, "Goodness is none other than this mind, and you cannot use mind to cultivate mind. Evil is none other than this mind, and you can't use mind to eliminate mind." Alas, the practices of disciplining oneself against doing evil, and endeavoring to cultivate goodness, were extinguished.

Others said, "Even lust, anger, and ignorance are divine practices"; "regulating one's behavior through observing the precepts, one loses the Way." Regarding themselves as having avoided falling into the pit of entanglements, having released themselves from bondage and cast off the fetters, they arrogantly abandon themselves beyond the norms of propriety. Wholly absorbed in self-indulgence, they are as blind as madmen, never to return to humane principles. The so-called study of justice and principle, is, at this point, terminated.

Zhu Xi lamented this situation, saying: "The Western teachings of dependent origination and karma have agitated the foolish crowd, and have now been

long disseminated into the world. Climbing the latter beyond the heavens, they look back and point to the mind's nature; their sayings transcend being and non-being." This led directly to the spread of confusion and disputation throughout the world. This is called emptiness, without producing concrete fruits. Treading through this brambled path, who will take up the mantle of the three sages? Would it be extreme for us to burn their books? Our grief over this situation is extreme, and I myself am depressed to the point of making the three lamentations.

BUDDHISM IS A RELIGION BASED ON NOTHINGNESS

Prior Confucian scholars have [already] shown that the Confucian and Buddhist paths differ with every single phrase and every single situation. Here I will elaborate based on these. We say voidness, and they also say voidness. We say quiescence, and they also say quiescence. However, our voidness is void yet existent. Their voidness is void and nonexistent. Our quiescence is quiescent yet aware; their quiescence is quiescent and negative. We speak of knowledge and action; they speak of awakening and cultivation. Yet our knowledge is to know that the principle of the myriad things is replete in our own minds. Their awakening awakens to the fact that the mind is originally empty, lacking anything. Our action is to return to the principle of the myriad things and act according to it, without error. Their cultivation is to sever connection with the myriad things and regard them as unconnected to one's mind.

If we follow the "in accordance with all things," as taught by Śākyamuni, then in the case of children, if they are filial, we just accept them as filial; if they are criminals, we just accept them as criminals. In the case of vassals, if they are loyal, we just accept them as being loyal; if they are rebellious, then we just accept them as being rebellious. As for the usage of cattle and horses, if they work in plowing and transport, then we use them for plowing and transport, and if they gore, butt, kick, and bite, then we let them gore, butt, kick, and bite. The Buddhist way is to follow the way things are, and nothing more.

Although we Confucians cannot accept this sort of thing, the Buddhist teaching is like this. It is natural that we should subject the beasts to our usage, and not be subject to their behaviors. Should the mere weight of a single gram sink us? Are not our and their manifest behaviors different? Thus, the reason that heaven gave birth to human beings is for them to serve as the guide for the myriad creatures. Placed in the role of assistant manager, how can we be at ease?

This kind of explanation can be repeated again and again, and although there are numerous points that can be made, we can sum them up by saying that the Confucian's manifest mind is at one with the principle, while the Buddhist's manifest mind is something other than the principle. Their manifest mind is empty, lacking principle, but our manifest mind, though empty, is re-

plete with the myriad things. Therefore it is said that our Confucianism follows a unified principle, while Buddhism is dualistic. Confucianism is consistent, while Buddhism is incoherent. Yet if the mind is one, how can there be such differences between our and their ways of seeing things?

We cannot but regard Buddhism as a theoretical system that is shallow and fragmentary, and which desires to conceal shape and hide form. It can be regarded a unique doctrine that is obscure, spellbinding, difficult, and obscuring. It makes scholars carelessly place the mind outside the realm of text and words. Yet they say that the Way must be like this, and that one can attain it afterward. Hence, modern scholars of Buddhism suffer from the faults of depravity, lewdness, evil, and evasiveness, desiring to shift the meanings around. They skew the true learning of the ancients who are of illuminating virtue and renovating the people. This is certainly wrong! We should deliberate repeatedly on Zhu Xi's words, which are genuine and clear. If scholars would immerse their minds in these teachings, they will naturally attain them.

The Articulation of Orthodoxy (*Hyōnjōng non*)

THE BASIC BUDDHIST VIEW OF THE MIND

Though the mind's essence is neither existent nor nonexistent, it permeates existence and nonexistence; though it originally lacks past and present, it permeates past and present: this is the Way. Existence and nonexistence are based in nature and discriminations. Past and present are based in birth-and-death. The nature originally lacks discrimination, but when you are confused about the nature you give rise to discriminations; with the production of discriminations, wisdom is blocked—thoughts are transformed and the essence is differentiated. It is through this process that the myriad forms take shape and birth-and-death begins.

Practitioners of the three vehicles and practitioners of the five vehicles each have their own means of quelling discriminations. Humans and gods (etc.) have their own means of quelling their impure defilements and those of the three vehicles have their own means of quelling their pure defilements. Once pure and impure defilements are both extinguished, one intimately creates the state of great enlightenment. The five precepts lead to rebirth as a human being. The ten virtues lead to rebirth as a god. The practice of the four noble truths and the contemplation on dependent origination result in the realization of the two vehicles. The practices of the six perfections lead to the production of bodhisattvahood. We can, then, summarize the gist of the entire content of the Buddhist canon as none other than inducing people to abandon discrimination and manifest their original natures.

The discriminations that are born out of original nature are just like clouds appearing in the sky. The removal of discriminations and the manifestation of

the original nature is just like the dispersion of clouds and the clarity that appears. Among discriminations there are both light and heavy, in the same way that among clouds there are both thick and thin. But even though clouds show the distinction of thick and thin, they are all the same in that they obscure heavenly illumination. And although among discriminations there are differences between light and heavy, they are the same in their character of impeding the luminosity of the true nature. When the clouds appear, the illumination of the sun and moon is obstructed and the earth is darkened. When the clouds disperse, the illumination extends across the great chiliocosm and the universe appears limitless.

COMPARISON OF THE CONFUCIAN AND BUDDHIST APPROACHES TO MORALITY

The five precepts and the ten virtuous forms of behavior are the most shallow among the Buddhist teachings, originally designed for those of the weakest of spiritual abilities. Nonetheless, if one succeeds in practicing them, it is sufficient to bring about sincerity in oneself, and benefit to those around oneself. How much more so in the case of contemplation on the four noble truths and dependent origination? And how much more so again in the practice of the six perfections? The Confucians regard the five eternal principles to be the pivot of the Way. The moral precepts of Buddhism are none other than these five eternal principles of Confucianism: the Buddhist precept of "not-killing" is the same as humaneness (*in*); "not stealing" is the same as "justice" (*ūi*); "not engaging in sexual excesses" is the same as "propriety" (*ye*); "not drinking alcohol" is the same as wisdom (*chi*); and "not speaking falsely" is the same as trust (*sin*).

However, the Confucians' way of teaching people is not through the example of virtuous action, but through laws and punishments. Therefore it is said, "If you lead them by laws and regulate them by punishments, the people will avoid these, but will be without shame. If you lead them by virtuous action and regulate them with propriety, the people will have a sense of shame and reflect on themselves" (*Analects* 2:3). Now "leadership by virtuous action and regulation by propriety" is something of which only sages are capable. Therefore the saying: "accomplishing silently; not speaking yet being trusted constitutes virtuous action" (*Zhouyi*, *Xici zhuan*, part 1). In the case of "leading by laws and regulating by punishments" one cannot avoid the clarification by reward and punishment. Therefore the saying: "reward and punishment are the great basis of the state."

"Accomplishing silently; not speaking yet being trusted" (*Zhouyi*, *Xici zhuan*, part 1) is strongly characteristic of the Buddhist method of teaching, where it is used in conjunction with the teaching of cause and effect. If you teach people by the method of reward and punishment, then there will invariably be some who will follow you only superficially. If you teach them with the concept of cause and effect, then they will be changed—and changed in their

inner minds. Such a situation can be readily observed in this present world. How so? If you encourage them with rewards and discourage them with punishment, then the stopping of evil actions will merely be due to the people's fear of authority. Virtuous behavior will only occur as the result of seeking the benefit of rewards. Therefore the change that occurs will only be superficial. There will not be a change in their inner minds.

If people want to understand the reasons for the successes and failures in the present life, then teach them regarding the seeds sown in prior lifetimes. If they want to know about the fortune and misfortune to come in the future, then teach them regarding present causes. Then those who have enjoyed success will rejoice in the knowledge of the goodness of their seeds and redouble their efforts. Those who have failed will regret their lack of cultivation in prior lives and discipline themselves—and if they seek to invite good fortune in subsequent lives, they will apply themselves unstintingly toward goodness. Wanting to avoid misfortune in subsequent lives, they will grasp the necessity of being careful not to act in an evil way. If people are taught in this way, but are not influenced, then that will be the end of it. But if they are influenced, they will be influenced in their inner minds, and there will never be a case where someone merely goes along superficially.

Even so, how could you possibly cause every single person to change his inner mind? Therefore, those who are not able to change their hearts can be guided for the time being through reward and punishment. This will cause their hearts to become increasingly joyful and they will sincerely change. Therefore, in addition to the teaching of cause and effect, we may also retain the devices of reward and punishment. This concept is reflected in the [Buddhist] saying "gently lead those who can be gently led; force those who must be forced" (*Taishō* no. 353, vol. 12, p. 217c11–12)—which is close to the Confucian way. Seen this way, neither Confucianism nor Buddhism should be rejected.

The Buddha's way of transforming people is to take his dharma and confer it on the princes and ministers. If you want to use this Way to lead all the people and play a major role in governing the realm, causing all to tread together on the same path of cultivation of truth, then our Buddha's teaching does not advocate either remaining a householder or becoming a monk. All that is required is to have people not act contrary to the Way—and nothing more. It is not necessary to shave one's head or wear special clothes in order to practice. Therefore the sayings "loosening the bonds according to the situation is metaphorically called *samādhi*," and "there is no set entity named perfect enlightenment" (*Diamond Sūtra*; *Taishō* no. 235, vol. 8, p. 749b15). With the Buddha's mind being like this, why should there be such a limitation in approach? (*HPC* 7.218a).

DEFENSE OF THE BUDDHA'S "LEAVING HOME"

However, if one lacks self-control, then it is extremely difficult to live in the secular world without becoming polluted, and extremely difficult to accom-

plish the Way as a householder. Therefore people are taught to leave the secular world and are encouraged to cultivate the practices of detachment. The Confucian saying, "The man has his house and the woman has her family" (*Zuozhuan*, *Huangong*, Year 18) is taught in order to perpetuate the family business and not cut off the ancestral sacrifice—this can be called "filial piety." Well, the Buddha ended his marriage and abandoned the basic societal relationships, wandering long through the mountains and forests, severing his posterity. How could this be called filial? The classics say: "At night prepare the bed, in the morning inquire"; "be sensitive regarding their faces and accord with their expressions" and "when going out, let them know; when returning, announce yourself." Now the Buddha, without informing his parents, left the household by his own authority. Once he left home, he never returned for the rest of his life. While his parents were alive, he did not offer them sweet meats, and after they died, he did not provide a rich funeral. Is this not quite unfilial?

This can be tested, though, by observing: the constant and the expedient are the great factors of the Way. Without the constant there is no way to preserve eternal principles. Without expediency, there is no way to adjust to circumstances. When you are able to use the constant to maintain the principles and use the expedient to adapt to circumstances, you can attain to the great completion of this Way and there will be nothing that you cannot accomplish. But if you do not know how to maintain principles, there will be no way to correct the human mind. And if you do not understand adaptation to circumstances, there will be no way for you to accomplish great tasks.

People receive their lives from their parents. They are able to continue in life by the graces of the ruler and the state. "When inside the home, be filial; when out in society, be loyal." This is certainly the behavior appropriate to citizens and children. Furthermore, the ceremonies of wedding and ancestor worship are certainly the great bonds of human relationships. Without marriage, the connection of the continuity of life would be severed. Without the sacrifice, the method of honoring one's ancestors would be lost.

Nonetheless, it is not easy for ministers and children to be perfect in their loyalty and filial piety. It is also quite difficult to go through a lifelong marriage and maintain perfect constancy, or always to be able to offer the sacrifice in a state of perfect mental purity! One who is able to maintain perfect loyalty and perfect filial piety and at the same time conduct one's livelihood—to be constant in marriage and pure at the sacrifice and not waver in the slightest to the end of one's days will undoubtedly be spoken of highly after his death, and subsequent to his death, will be reborn as a human being. These are the merits of holding to the eternal principles.

Yet while one may not fail to attain a good reputation, those who go on to eliminate attached love and desire are exceedingly few. And although one may succeed in attaining a human rebirth, escaping cyclical existence is a far more difficult matter. Attached love is the root of transmigration and desire is the precondition for receiving life. So if someone has not yet escaped the fetters of

spouse and children, how can that person eliminate attached love and desire? And if attached love and desire have not been eliminated, how can one escape from cyclical existence? If you want to escape cyclical existence you must first sever attached love and desire. If you want to sever attached love and desire, you must first forsake spouse and children. If you want to forsake spouse and children, you must first leave the secular world. If you do not leave the secular world, you cannot forsake spouse and children, sever attached love and desire, nor escape cyclical existence. Aside from the great expedient example of the Great Sage who offers his compassion, can ordinary, unenlightened people be capable of living in the world and attaining liberation?

This kind of person is difficult to meet, even in a trillion generations, and is hard to lay hold of, even among a hundred million people. The attraction of attached love is like that between steel and a magnet. If one is deficient in forbearance, it is quite difficult to avoid attached love while living in the secular world. To be able to do like our founding teacher Śākyamuni who abode in Tuṣita Heaven with the name "Protector of Luminosity Bodhisattva" and then descended into this world in the palace of the king, with the name Siddhārtha: how could he have been lacking in forbearance?! It would be like the sun being ashamed of its far-reaching illumination, or the formless realm's being embarrassed about its erasure of conditioning.

Even while passing through the clutches of attached love, Śākyamuni was never defiled by his entanglement in attached love. He aspired to become the example for future generations—the rightful heir to the golden wheel. Without announcement to his father and mother he slipped away, entering the Himalayas. Showing little regard for his own life, he practiced strict discipline, steadily, without wavering, waiting out the full exhausting of all his emotional afflictions. Only after the true luminosity had shown in its full brilliance did he return home for an audience with his father and ascend to heaven to pay respects to his mother. Through his teachings on the essentials of the dharma, he brought both of them to liberation. This is an example of the sages' merging with the Way by utilizing expedient methods to adapt to conditions even though they act contrary to eternal societal principles.

DEFENSE OF BUDDHIST "ANTISOCIAL" PRACTICES

The Confucians complain, saying: "The Buddhists roam idly, avoiding the responsibilities of society. Neither harvesting nor plowing, they depend on others for their food and clothing, and therefore the people bear this suffering, often being forced into destitution because of it. Is their decadence not great?"

In response to this, I say: The responsibility of the monks lies in spreading the dharma and elevating the consciousness of sentient beings. By their spreading of the dharma they cause wisdom and life not to be severed. By elevating the consciousness of the people, they cause each one of them to proceed toward goodness. This is the job of the monks. Who else is capable of per-

forming this task? Therefore, there is no need for them to be embarrassed about receiving alms from the people. If a monk proves to be incapable of his responsibilities, it is an individual fault. How could it be the fault of the Buddha? Mencius said: "Here is a man who is filial at home and respectful to those he meets in the world. He preserves the Way of the ancient kings so that it may be picked up by later scholars. Yet he does not receive his sustenance from you. Why do you respect the carpenter and the wheelwright, and show disdain for the man of humaneness and justice?"

Why does it now suddenly become incorrect for those who preserve the Way and elevate the consciousnesses of people to receive food and clothing from those people? Whether one will be wealthy or poor in this life is based on his karmic predisposition. If one has an abundance of good seeds from prior lifetimes, then even if he spends money every day, he will always have extra. But if one lacks good seeds from the prior lifetime, then even if he saves every day, he will never have enough. There are people in this world, who, upon seeing a Buddha, do not show respect, and seeing monks, vilify them. They do not once in their whole lives offer a single cent for alms. They do not have enough clothes to cover their bodies, nor enough food to satisfy their stomachs. Have they also come to this condition because of the *samgha*?

DEFENSE AGAINST THE CHARGE OF DECADENCE IN THE SAMGHA

The Confucians complain, saying: Purification and the reduction of desires; abandoning oneself in pursuit of the dharma; studying the scriptures widely and memorizing deeply; kindly instructing those who come after: these are definitely the proper activities of Buddhists. But the present-day monks do not engage in religious cultivation; they oppose and defile their teacher's dharma. When people question them as to their Way, it is like standing and facing to the wall. They peddle the Tathāgata to garner their necessary sustenance. They dwell in regular houses and act like secular people. They enrich themselves through the means of regular society and even become ministers in the government. How can the prince and the state stand for this?

In answer to this, I say: The Qilin and the Phoenix do not form flocks. The rarest of gems are not to be found in the local marketplaces. Among the three thousand disciples of Confucius, those who can be called men of truly outstanding acumen numbered no more than ten. Among the vast body of the Tathāgata's disciples, those who were categorized as first-rate also numbered no more than ten. Now, as the time of those sages passes further and further away, and the religious faculties of people grow ever weaker, how can you expect every single person to be able to possess the morality of Kāśyapa, or the breadth of learning of Ānanda? In the thousand or so years since the time of Confucius and Yan Hui, the likes of Yan Hui and Min Ziqian have not been heard of.

For a monk to live up to his name, once he has embodied the Five Virtues

and cultivated the Six Kinds of Harmony—then he deserves to be called a monk. However, when it comes to the matter of matching the name with the reality, the problems lie with the individual. In the forest there is wood that is not fit for use as lumber; in the fields there are grains that do not bear fruit. Granted, there are monks who are not capable of acting as repositories and exemplars of the dharma, but one should not be alarmed to the extreme by these types. Even these persons, if they formally submit to the dharma, their seeds will gradually mature to infuse their nature, and they will not fail in following the Way. How can you castigate their dharma based on individual failings?

THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS FOUND IN THE CHINESE CLASSICS

As for the theory of karmic reward: how can it be suggested that this is only the teaching of Buddhism? The *Yijing* says: "When you accumulate virtue you will have abundant good fortune; when you accumulate evil you will have abundant calamity" (*Yijing, kun* [hexagram no. 2]). Another example is the teaching given in the *Great Plan* to the effect that when the people accord with ultimate principles, heaven rewards them with the five blessings. When they are at discord, then heaven responds by bringing about the six extremes (see James Legge, *Shoo King*, pp. 340–41). What is this, if not karmic reward? It is already obvious that there is karmic reward while the bodily form is still present. But also in death—even though the body disappears, the spirit remains to reap the good and evil fruits. How could it not be so? The Buddha once said: "Even after the passage of a hundred thousand aeons, the karma that one has created does not disappear. When the right causes and conditions are encountered, the fruits of each action return to oneself" (*Ratnakūṭa-sūtra, Taishō* no. 310, vol. 11, p. 335b14). How can you deceive people?

THE TRUE MEANING OF "HUMANENESS"

The Confucians argue, saying: People eat living creatures and living creatures sustain people—this is certainly the natural course of things. And if those in their seventies are not fed meat, their stomachs will not be filled. Therefore those who take care of the elderly cannot fail to serve them with meat. Also, the methods of hunting for spring, summer, fall, and winter are the means by which the ancient kings helped the people to avoid difficulty. These systems, which are established according to the change in seasons, cannot be altered. Furthermore, sacrificial animals have been used as the ceremonial objects for making offerings from ancient times to the present. This practice also clearly cannot be abandoned. The parents of the Buddhists become aged, but they do not feed them sweet foods, nor do they serve them with meats. They also teach people to abandon the systems established by the ancient kings and the ritual of sacrifice. Is this not excessive?

To this, I say: Violence toward heaven's creatures is something in which the sage will have no part. How much less so could one who manifests the heavenly Way and perfectly accomplished humanity encourage people to kill life in order to nourish life! The *Book of History* says: "Heaven and earth are the parents of all creatures, and of all creatures man is the most highly endowed with intelligence. Only the most intelligent among men becomes the great sovereign, and the great sovereign becomes the parent of the people." Since heaven and earth are already the mother and father of all things, then those things which are born within heaven and earth are all the children of heaven and earth. So the relationship of heaven and earth to its creatures is just like that between parents and children. Children naturally differ in terms of stupidity and intelligence, just like the difference in mental endowment between human beings and the myriad creatures. But even if a child is stupid, the parents will not turn away from it—in fact, they will love it and treat it with special care. They will even have special concern as to whether or not it is able to attain its proper sustenance. How could they possibly go as far as to inflict harm upon it?

Killing life in order to nourish life is like one's own children killing each other in order to nourish themselves. If children are killing each other in order to nourish themselves, how are the parents going to feel about this? To have their children killing each other is certainly not the wish of their parents. So how could the mutual inflicting of harm between human beings and the other creatures be the will of heaven and earth? Human beings and the myriad things already share in their possession of the vital energy of heaven and earth. They also share in their possession of the principle of heaven and earth, and dwell together in the space of heaven and earth. Sharing, as they do, in the same vital force and the same principle, how could there be a principle that condones the killing of life in order to nourish life? It is like the saying: "Heaven and earth and I share the same root; the myriad things and I share the same body" (*Taishō* no. 2016, vol. 48, p. 915a8). These are the words of the Buddha. "The man of humanity forms one body with heaven and earth and the myriad things" (*Henan ercheng ishu*, p. 15). These are the words of a Confucian. Only when one's actions fully accord with these words can we say that someone has fully achieved the Way of humaneness (*HPC* 7.219b).

The term in the medical texts for numbness in the hands and feet is "non-humaneness" (*Kor. purin*). The hands and feet are the extremities of the body. Even with a slight sickness the vital energy will not penetrate them. Therefore *humaneness* implies the interpenetration of heaven and earth and the myriad things into a single body, wherein there is no gap whatsoever. If you deeply embody this principle, then there cannot be a justification for inflicting harm on even the most insignificant of creatures. This can be called the actualization of the Way of the humane person.

The *Book of Odes* says: "One arrow for five boars" (see Legge, *She King*, p. 36). The *Analects* say: "When the master fished he would not use a net;

when hunting he would not shoot a perched bird" (*Analects* 7:26). Mencius said: "The superior man stays far away from the kitchen. If he hears the screams of the animals he cannot bear to eat their flesh" (*Mencius* 1A:7). These are all examples of incompletely actualized humaneness. Why don't they try to come up to the level of "forming a single body"? The *Doctrine of the Mean* says: "His words reflecting his actions, his actions reflecting his words—how can this Superior Man not be sincere through and through?" (*Doctrine of the Mean*, commentarial section 13). Who among those I have cited here comes up to this level? This is an example of the Confucians preaching about the goodness of the path of *humaneness* but not following through. If it is necessary to place limits on the killing of birds, why even shoot the arrow at all? If it bothers you to shoot a perched bird, why shoot it when it is flying? If the superior man is going to avoid the kitchen, why does he eat meat at all? [Here Kihwa digresses to tell an interesting story that explains how he came to develop the position he is presently articulating.]

One time, during the period when I still had not yet entered the Buddhist order, a monk named Haewöl was reading the *Analects* to me. He reached the passage that says: "Zigong asked: 'Suppose there were a ruler who benefited the people far and wide and was capable of bringing salvation to the multitude, what would you think of him? Might he be called humane?' The Master said, 'Why only humane? He would undoubtedly be a sage. Even Yao and Shun would have had to strive to achieve this'" (*Analects* 6:28). Haewöl commented, using the phrase "The man of humaneness forms a single body with heaven and earth and the myriad things." With this, he put the scroll aside and asked me: "Was Mencius a man of humaneness?" "Yes," I replied. "Are 'fowl, pigs, dogs and swine' to be counted among the 'myriad things'?" "Yes," I replied. Haewöl continued, citing Cheng Hao: "The humane man forms a single body with heaven and earth and the myriad things." If this statement is to be taken as a true expression of the principle, how are we supposed to see Mencius as humane? If 'fowl, pigs, dogs and swine' are to be counted among the 'myriad things,' how could Mencius say: 'If, in the raising of fowl, pigs, dogs and swine, their breeding times are not missed, then people seventy years old can eat meat'" (*Mencius* 1A:3). I was completely stymied by this question, and could not answer. I pondered over all of the classical transmissions, and could not come up with a single text that could support a principle that condoned the taking of life. I inquired widely among the brightest thinkers of the day, but not one of them could offer an explanation that could resolve my perplexity.

This doubt remained buried within my mind for a long time without being resolved. Then, while traveling around Mount Samgak in 1396, I arrived at Sünggasa, where I had the chance to chat with an old Sön monk throughout the night. The monk said: "The Buddha has ten grave precepts, the first of which is not killing." Upon hearing this explanation, my mind was suddenly overturned, and I recognized for myself that this was indeed the behavior of

the truly humane man. I was thereupon able to embody deeply the teachings of the Way of humanity. From this time forth, I was never again to be confused regarding the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism. I subsequently composed a verse, which went:

Up till now, knowing only the teachings of the classics and histories, and
the criticisms of Cheng and Zhu,
I was unable to recognize whether the Buddha was wrong or right,
But after reflecting deep in my mind for long years,
Knowing the truth for the first time, I reject [Confucianism] and rely
upon [the Buddhadharmā].

The creatures that make nests understand the wind; those that dig holes understand the rain; spiders possess the skill of weaving, and dung beetles are adept at rolling things. All creatures are like this, sharing in the same inherent spiritual awareness. Furthermore in their sharing in the emotion of loving life and hating death, how do they differ from human beings? Hearing the sound of ripping flesh and the cutting of the knife, livestock are in utter fright as they approach their death. Their eyes are wild and they cry out in agony. How could they not harbor bitterness and resentment? And yet people are able to turn a deaf ear. In this way human beings and the creatures of the world affect each other without awareness and compensate each other without pause. If there were a man possessing humaneness present, how could he observe such suffering and continue to act as if nothing were wrong?

KIHWAS CONCLUSION: THE UNITY OF THE THREE TEACHINGS

You ask: What are the points of sameness and difference and the relative strengths and weaknesses of Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism?

The answer is this: Laozi said: "No doing and no not-doing; eternally doing, yet not-doing." The Buddha said: "Quiescent, yet eternally luminous; luminous, yet eternally quiescent." Confucius said: "The Changes have neither thought nor activity; still and unmoving they extend throughout and penetrate the world." Now this "stillness" that has never failed to "extend" is the same thing as the "quiescence" that is "eternally luminous." The "extend throughout and penetrate" that has never not been "still" is exactly the same as the "luminous, yet eternally quiescent." "No doing and no not-doing" is none other than "still, yet eternally extending." "Eternally doing, yet not-doing" is none other than "extending, yet eternally still."

If you can grasp this, then the words of the three teachers fit together like the broken pieces of the same board—as if they had all come out of the same mouth! If you would like to actually demonstrate the high and low among these teachings, exposing their points of similarity and difference clearly in their actual function, then you must first completely wash the pollution from

your mind and completely clarify your eye of wisdom. Then you can study all of the texts contained in the Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist canons. Compare them in your daily activities, at the times of birth and death, fortune and misfortune. Without needing words, you will spontaneously nod in assent. Oh, King, how strongly do I need to make my argument to get you to listen?

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Confucianism and the Practice of Geomancy

Hong-key Yoon

Geomancy, or *p'ungsu* (lit. wind and water, best known in the West through the Chinese pronunciation *fengshui*), is an essential element in the practice of every major Korean religion in regulating relationships with the environment. The use of land, including building houses, planning cities, siting graves, and locating temples and shrines, has especially been affected by the art of geomancy.

Geomancy originated in China, especially in the region of the Loess Plateau. It is thought to have been developed by the early Chinese as a technique for selecting auspicious cave-dwelling sites. The technique must have been introduced from China to Korea during ancient times, but at least since the later part of the Silla period (ca. eighth century), geomancy has significantly affected Korean society, including politics and religion. For instance, the impact of geomancy on the three major traditional religions of Korea, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shamanism, is plainly visible in the sites they have selected for their temples and shrines and in their religious writings. Folk narratives describing their religious values also demonstrate that geomancy has been incorporated in the practice of their beliefs. Thus, geomancy and traditional Korean religion have been in symbiotic relationship with one another for more than a millennium. In this chapter, I will briefly examine the relationships between geomancy and Confucianism, mainly through folklore and the writings of Confucian scholars, before assembling and translating relevant source material.

Many Confucian scholars of the Chosŏn dynasty were experts on geomancy and accepted the practice of geomancy to varying degrees, sometimes claiming that the great Confucian scholars of China such as Confucius and Zhu Xi (1130–1200) accepted geomantic ideas. Zhu Xi, one of the principal architects of Neo-Confucianism, seemed to have embraced geomancy, as he was interested in searching for auspicious grave sites for his family and wrote a (Geomantic) Discourse on Royal Tombs (*Shanling yizhuang*), which was presented to the Chinese emperor in 1194. A Korean Confucian scholar-court officer, Ha Ryun (1347–1416), was an expert on geomancy and played an important role in searching for