The Contribution of the *Yogācārabhūmi* to the System of the Two Hindrances

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I offer homage to those purified wholly or in part¹ through the nature of consciousness-only. I now elaborate their teachings to bring benefit and joy to all sentient beings. Thus I write this treatise for those who are perplexed in regard to the two kinds of emptiness, so that they can produce correct understanding, and so that this understanding can eliminate the two heavy hindrances. The two hindrances arise concurrently based on attachment to self and *dharmas*. If you realize the two kinds of emptiness, these hindrances will directly be eliminated. Once the hindrances are eliminated you can attain the two excellent realizations (of liberation and enlightenment). Based on the cutting off of the continuity of rebirth in the form of the afflictive hindrances, one realizes true liberation. Based on the elimination of the obstructions to understanding, one attains great enlightenment.

Opening passage of the *Chéng wéishì lùn* (T1585.1_{a7-12})

1. Preliminary Comments

Among the contributors to this volume, my way of entry into the field of Yogācāra Studies was probably somewhat unusual, as I entered in the process of researching the two hindrances – which I first came upon in a text associated with early Chinese Chán – the East Asian apocryphon, Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment (Yuánjué jīng 圓覺經). I did, however, at that time already have a deep curiosity regarding Yogācāra, along with my main early focus on Korean Seon Buddhism, and so, in 1997, when I was invited to assist in a project aiming at the translation of the entirety of Wonhyo's (元曉, 617-686) extant writings by dealing with his landmark work, the Doctrine of the Two Hindrances (Ijang ui 二障義), I was thrust rather suddenly into the central nexus of Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha soteriological discourse. Over a period of about twelve years, a steadily clearer map of this system has gradually taken form in my mind, and I have continued to spend a large portion of my time since then researching the two hindrances theory, both in connection with the Ijang ui and in connection with other relevant works.

Regarding the scope of the present paper: since (1) I am preparing to deal with the broader topic of the symbiotic development of hindrance theory in Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra, along with Tiāntāi and Chán interpretations in a longer forthcoming work,³ and since (2) the focus of this present volume is on Yogācāra

¹ I.e., Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

² This translation and study of the *Ijangui* was published in the volume *Wŏnhyo's Philosophy of Mind* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2012).

³ A volume edited by Chen-kuo LIN on the influence of Indian thought on sixth-seventh century Chinese Buddhism.

and the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, and since (3) there is more than enough to say about the hindrances in their formative Yogācāra aspect alone, I will not pursue in this paper any detailed discussion on Tathāgatagarbha and later East Asian models of affliction and nescience beyond that of basic introductory comments.

Before entering the main part of this discussion, I would like to clarify that my choice of rendering of the term *zhàng* (障) with the English word *hindrance* has specific reasons. One often sees this term rendered in scholarly works and in translations (especially from Tibetan, it seems) as "two veils," or "two obscurations," etc., apparently as an attempt to provide an appropriate English equivalent for the Sanskrit āvarana, which literally has these connotations. However, the actual application of the term in Yogācāra, as well as other soteriological systems, extends far beyond the cognitive connotations indicated by such words as *veil* and *obscura*tion. Especially in the case of afflictive hindrances, what is being indicated most of the time is the notion of "binding" (bandhana, samyojana; Ch. fú 縛, jì 繫), or debilitation, rigidity (dauṣṭhulya, Ch. cūzhòng, 麁重), etc. In the case of the afflictions, we are dealing only tangentially with problems of cognitive distortion that might be interpreted by veil, etc. And in the case of cognitive hindrances, although the meaning of veil can more readily be applied, these hindrances include the aspect of debilitation, and so the applicability of such a rendering even in the case of the cognitive hindrances can be misleading. These hindrances are not merely "sky-flowers" or a distorting prism – they represent the whole gamut of negative emotions, concepts, and habits that keep us bound in cyclic existence. Of course, rather than *hindrance*, one might well choose from other synonyms that broadly express the same meaning, such as "impediment," "obstruction," etc. But in my work on this topic, especially when comparing the Yogācāra hindrances with those from other systems, it is helpful to have a couple of other synonyms available in the case where one is dealing in a comparative manner with analogous concepts. Thus, I have been keeping "obstructions" aside for that purpose, and using "hindrances" as my primary translation term.

As we have seen in the epigram, the opening passage of the *Chéng wéishì lùn* (成唯識論, henceforth *CWSL*) raises the matter of the two hindrances with such prominence that one who did not know better, might well, upon reading that passage, assume that the investigation of the hindrances constitutes the primary object of the entire Yogācāra (or "consciousness-only") project. Yet the content of the *CWSL*'s actual discussion of the hindrances amounts to little more than a brief summary, filling about one Taishō register at best. Even if compact, this is at least a focused discussion, reflecting a crystallization of thinking on this system. The case of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (hereafter *YBh*) is, when considering the size of the text, far worse, since its discussions of the hindrances form a far smaller portion (not much more than the entire amount found in the *CWSL*) of the work as a whole. The treatment of the hindrances in the *YBh* is also often unsystematic, as they can sometimes be seen mixed in with older Abhidharmic models of tripartite hindrances, as well as various other arrays of hindrances that are not related to the fully matured two-hindrance structure.

So if the discussion of the hindrances does not constitute a major portion of the Yogācāra discourse, why is it that such a seminal text as the *CWSL* invokes them in

⁴ The literal meaning of the Sanskrit word is "cover, obstruction, shield" or the "act of covering, concealing, hiding." The Tibetan translation of the term is *sgrib pa*, which literally means "cover, wrapping, concealment, veil, lid."

such a prominent manner in its opening passage? One way of answering this question is to observe that even though there is not that much discussion of the hindrances under their exact names, one can say that from a soteriological standpoint, the ultimate aim of all Yogācāra practices is that of the rectification of the affective and cognitive habits that keep us bound in saṃsāra, and keep us unable to see things the way they actually are. From that perspective it might be asserted that just about everything written in Yogācāra texts addresses issues that ultimately tie into the hindrances.

Aside from the above-mentioned treatise by Wonhyo, the most extensive and in-depth discussion of the two hindrances in their fully systematized Yogācāra sense (at least where they are overtly labeled as such) in an extant canonical work is that found in the Fódijīng lùn (佛地經論, *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra = FDJL). But again, the total discussion of the hindrances in that text amounts to little more than a Taishō page. Other sources, such as the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Sṃdh) are even skimpier, basically containing less information than the YBh, and nothing as systematic as the CWSL.

On the other hand, there is the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (*MVbh*), the second chapter of which – as is well known to students of Yogācāra – is entitled "The Hindrances." While this chapter invokes the names of the afflictive and cognitive hindrances at its beginning and end, the discussion that ensues in between, while listing a fascinating array of obstructions to enlightenment and liberation (focusing much on daily life situations, such as where one lives, what one does, with whom one associates, and so forth), does not make any serious attempt toward aligning itself with the model taking form in the *Sṃdh*, *YBh*, and other mainstream Yogācāra texts. With this paucity of sustained systematic discussion of the hindrances in the primary Yogācāra texts, on what basis could Wonhyo write a treatise of twenty-five pages in classical Chinese (which amounts to a 200-page translation in English)?

The answer to that question lies in understanding differences in level of textual mastery, background, and approach. When we modern scholars begin to dig into a topic such as that of the two hindrances, most of us are going to start by searching for related terminology in the digitized canons – in the present case, the East Asian canon. The availability of these digitized canons provides us with a remarkable advantage in the task of locating all kinds of philological data. We can see clearly which texts use certain forms of terminology, and we can analyze their relationships with each other far more rapidly than our counterparts could in earlier generations. Thus, we can readily compare the treatment of hindrance-related dis-

⁵ Discussions of the hindrances are found on at T1530, pages 310, 312, and especially 323. These closely correlate to the passages on the hindrances found in the *CWSL*. By comparison, Huìyuǎn's (慧遠, 523-592) discussion of the hindrances in his commentary to the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* covers three full pages in Taishō (T1843.188b-191a).

⁶ See in Xuánzàng's translation, *Biàn zhōngbiān lùn* (辯中邊論), at T1600.466b₂₇, and Paramārtha's translation, *Zhōngbiān fēnbié lùn* (中邊分別論), at T1599.453b₁₁.

⁷ Interestingly, Wonhyo *does* cite from the *MVbh* in his treatise on the hindrances, but instead of the second chapter on the hindrances, he utilizes the first chapter on the selflessness of persons. Concerning the chapter on the hindrances: it is not that there is no relationship whatsoever between the hindrances presented there and those seen in the matured format of the two hindrances under discussion in this paper, but a thorough examination of the text with the purpose of making correlations would be necessary. Hopefully a future project.

course in the major Yogācāra texts, as well as Tathāgatagarbha, Tiāntāi, etc., as needed.

But Wonhyo's project was not simply aimed at discussing the explicit occurrences of such terms as "cognitive hindrances" (智障 zhì zhàng), "hindrances of/by the known" (所知障 suǒzhī zhàng), "afflictive hindrances" (煩惱障 fánnǎo zhàng) and so forth in the canon. He was seeking a comprehensive understanding of the differences between the views of the hindrances as found in the Yogācāra system (mainly as represented in the new translations by Xuánzàng 玄奘, 602-664) compared to that which had developed in the family of texts we now categorize as being of the Tathāgatagarbha family, and which he saw as reaching their culmination of development in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (大乘起信論 Dàshèng qixin lin = AMF). In the process, he ended up creating a comprehensive and detailed map of the soteriological systems of both the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha traditions, along with explanations of their differences and their areas of overlap. Wonhyo systematized the gamut of connotations of affliction and cognitive distortion within these two systems: what they are, where they come from, their differences in type, quality, strength, embeddedness; in what layers of consciousness they operate and reside; by what practices, and on what level of wisdom they are to be removed; what kinds of bad effects they generate, and so on. In doing this, he utilized over fifty texts, many of which do not even contain the word hindrance, but which nonetheless contain relevant discussions about the factors that obstruct liberation and bodhi, along with their removal.

Among the 50-odd texts cited by Wonhyo in carrying out this exhaustive inquiry, he relies, far more than any other text, on the *YBh* – not only when dealing with the Yogācāra hindrances proper, but often when dealing with the Tathāgatagarbha hindrances as well. This is actually not surprising, since, after all, what other text contains as detailed an explanation, along with definition of terminology, for karmic activity, distinctions in the activities of mental functions, layers of consciousness, seeds and their permeations, path theory, and meditation practices, to the extent of the *YBh*?

2. Review of General Hindrance Theory

The two hindrances are the afflictive hindrances (kleśa-āvaraṇa, 煩惱障 fánnǎo zhàng) and the cognitive hindrances (jñeya-āvaraṇa, also interpreted as "hindrances of the knowable"). Xuánzàng rendered the latter term as suǒzhī zhàng (所知障), with the earlier rendering (in both Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha works) being zhī zhàng (智障). These two broad categories can be seen as a way of articulating what Buddhism takes to be the basic problems of the human condition: (1) that we suffer from a wide range of emotive imbalances, such as anger, jealousy, pride, lust, dishonesty, and so forth, which are able to take form based on the fact that (2) we live in a state of continuous misapprehension of reality, reifying and

⁸ In rendering the title of the *Dàshèng qixin lùn* as *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, as opposed to Hakeda's "Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna" I am following the argument made by Sung Bae Park in Chapter Four of his book *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment*. There he argues that the inner discourse of the text itself, along with the basic understanding of the meaning of *mahāyāna* in the East Asian Buddhist tradition does not work according to a Western theological "faith in..." subject-object construction, but according to an indigenous East Asian essence-function model. Thus, *mahāyāna* should not be interpreted as a noun-object, but as a modifier, which characterizes the *type* of faith.

attaching to conceptual constructs that assume our own existence to be as an autonomous "self," along with the assumed intrinsic, "as-is" reality of the objects that surround us.

It can be argued that long before the hindrances were distinguished by this kind of technical terminology, the earliest Buddhist thinkers already understood that the obstructions to enlightenment and liberation could be distinguished into afflictive and cognitive categories, as is reflected in the structure of their antidotes. For example, we could take the divisions of the eightfold path and distinguish Right View as being primarily directed at cognitive problems. Six of the seven remaining branches could be seen as directed primarily at addressing afflictive problems, with various aspects of Right Thinking falling on both sides.

Although the explicit division of all mental disturbances along the general lines of afflictive vs. cognitive is generally associated with Mahāyāna Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha, we find a precursory structure in Abhidharma texts, where the afflictive hindrances are established in contrast to the hindrances to liberation (解 脫障 jiětuō zhàng, vimuktyāvarana). In this case, the afflictive hindrances (煩惱障) refer to the manifestly active afflictions that serve to obstruct the production of undefiled wisdom, and thus obstruct attainment of liberation through wisdom (禁 解脫 huì jiětuō, prajñāvimukta). However, even if one overcomes these hindrances and is able to attain liberation through wisdom, one may still be obstructed by the subtler hindrances to liberation, which impede the attainment of the concentration of total cessation (滅盡定 mièjìn ding, nirodhasamāpatti). Thus, the latter type (also known as the "cessation hindrances" 定障 ding zhàng, samāpattyāvaraṇa) are said to impede both types of liberation (俱解脫, jù jiětuō, ubhayatobhāgavimukta). The prior are seen as being constituted by defiled ignorance (染污無知 rǎnwū wúzhī, kliṣṭājñāna), and the latter by undefiled ignorance (不染污無知 bù rǎnwū wúzhī, aklistājñāna). In the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāsā-śāstra (Āpídámó dà pípóshā lùn 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), the first two of the four kinds of correct elimination (四正斷, sì zhèngduàn, catvāri samyakprahānānī) remove the first kind of hindrance and the second two remove the second kind of hindrance (T1545.724b₂₉).

Articulated in detail in Yogācāra works, the term afflictive hindrances refers most directly to all the mental factors (心所 xīnsuǒ, caitta/caitasika) that are of unwholesome (不善 bùshàn, akuśala) quality, which bring suffering and anxiety to sentient beings. Included here are the factors enumerated in such categories as the six fundamental afflictions (六煩惱 liù fánnǎo, ṣaḍ kleśāḥ) and the twenty derivative afflictions (隨煩惱 suí fánnǎo, upakleśa), along with their further derivatives. In the most standard Yogācāra definition (as one will find in the YBh, CWSL, etc.), the afflictive hindrances are said to have their origin in the view of the reality of a self (身見 shēnjiàn, 我執 wǒzhí, ātmadṛṣṭi, etc.). They are said to operate within the first seven "forthcoming consciousnesses" (轉識 zhuǎnshì, pravṛṭtivijñāna) and can be eliminated by the gradual practices of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

⁹ One aspect of the hindrances that holds true throughout the various Buddhist subsystems in which they are used, is that the cognitive hindrances are always seen to be prior to, more subtle than, and serving as the basis for the afflictive hindrances. This reflects the basic Buddhist view that the sources of human problems are, to begin with, epistemological. See Dan LUSTHAUS' *Buddhist Phenomenology* (2002), Chapter Eleven, "The Privileging of Prajñā."

³¹⁰ For a comparative study of these mental factors in various Abhidharma and Yogā-cāra works, see the article by Jowita KRAMER in the present volume.

The cognitive hindrances are derived from the fundamental error of understanding phenomena (dharmas) to have their own intrinsic reality (法執 fǎzhí). They are conceptual errors, the most subtle of which are contained in the ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識 ālàiyé shì) and can only be permanently eliminated by bodhisattvas who have a thoroughgoing awakening to emptiness. They serve as the basis for the afflictive hindrances. The five paths of Yogācāra practice (唯識修道五位 wéishì xiūdào wǔwèi) are distinguished in terms of the bodhisattva's ability to quell and eliminate the active manifest forms, seed forms, and karmic impressions of these two kinds of hindrances. In Yogācāra, these two kinds of hindrances are further subdivided into those that are produced by discrimination (分別障 fēnbié zhàng) and those that are innate (俱生障 jùshēng zhàng), with the former residing in the mental region of waking consciousness (i.e., the first six consciousnesses, 六識 liùshì, ṣaḍvijñāna) and the latter residing in the subconscious region of the mind – the manas (未那識 mònàshì) and the ālayavijñāna.

While one might easily get the impression from standard reference works that the doctrine of the two hindrances is fundamentally a Yogācāra construction, it did not develop only in the Yogācāra system, as texts from the Tathāgatagarbha family contain roughly parallel discussions from an early date. In a very general sense, the two hindrances serve the same role in both Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha of distinguishing between affective and cognitive problems. Both systems also agree that, generally speaking, the afflictive hindrances can be remedied by the practices of Hīnayāna adherents, whereas cognitive hindrances only can be removed by the compassion and insight into emptiness possessed by bodhisattvas. Nonetheless, the radical differences in approach to be seen between these two systems on other issues also show themselves in the way they understand the problem of the hindrances.

3. Non-Yogācāric Interpretations of the Hindrances

It is the Korean monk Wonhyo (元曉, 617-686) who discovered and analyzed the difference in the respective interpretations given to the two hindrances by the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha textual families, which he encountered as a problem in the course of composing his commentaries to the *AMF*. In explicating the *AMF*, Wonhyo was forced to come to grips with a teaching of two obstructions (二礙 èrài, i.e. 煩惱礙 fánnǎo zhàng and 智礙 zhī zhàng), which at first glance seems to be roughly equivalent to the standard Yogācāra model, but which, when examined more closely, turns out to be based on a radically different under-

In fact, in my early work on this topic, I had been making the mistaken assumption that the system of the two hindrances was primarily a Yogācāra creation, which was then subsequently adopted by other Buddhist traditions, including Tathāgatagarbha, Tiāntāi, Huáyán, Chán, and so forth. (I wrote from this kind of perspective in my 2004 article in *JIABS*, entitled "The Yogācāra Hindrances and their Reinterpretations in East Asia," as well as a few other articles published between 2002-2007.) My subsequent work on the topic has led me to realize that the hindrances are far from being a distinctly Yogācāra creation. They were a pan-Mahāyāna phenomenon that began to appear in Tathāgatagarbha texts at just about the same time they begin to appear in Yogācāra, receiving an important – if not major – part of their development in the Tathāgatagarbha environment with a great deal of cross-fertilization going on during this process. I discuss the influence of Tathāgatagarbha notions of the two hindrances on Yogācāra in some detail in the introduction to my translation of Wonhyo's *System of the Two Hindrances*.

standing of the process by which the mind departs from its innately possessed pristine awareness.

Without going into too much detail on this point, the most fundamental difference seen in the afflictive obstructions in the AMF is the fact they are defined as "the inability to perceive thusness" (T1666.577c₂₁), which means that they include a markedly cognitive dimension, in addition to constituting basic emotive turbulence. According to Wonhyo, the AMF's interpretation of the afflictive obstructions subsumes everything contained in both hindrances in the standard Yogācāra explanation. The cognitive obstructions in the AMF are also interpreted differently from the Yogācāra model, in that as the basis of the AMF's definition of nescience (無明 wúmíng, avidyā), they refer specifically to the inability to properly discriminate objective phenomena. Thus, it is the bodhisattva's "conventional spontaneous karmic cognition" (世間自然業智 shìjiān zìrányè zhì) – utilized in teaching others – that is obstructed. Spurred by the desire to clarify the structure of the hindrances, first separately within the respective Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha systems, and then to attempt to reconcile these with each other, Wonhyo wrote the *Ijang ui*. In this work, borrowing extensively from a prior commentary on the AMF done by Huìyuǎn (慧遠, 523-592), Wonhyo traces a current going to the Awakening of Faith from earlier Tathāgatagarbha texts such as the Śrīmālāsūtra (勝鬘經 Shèngmán jīng, T353) and Běnyè jīng (本業經, T1485), which based the explanation of affliction and ignorance on the framework of the four/five entrenchments (四住地惑 sì zhùdì huò · 五住地惑 wǔ zhùdì huò). Wonhyo labels the AMF's interpretation of the hindrances as the "abstruse" interpretation (隱密 門 yǐnmì mén), and the standard Yogācāra explanation as the "standard" interpretation (顯了門 *xiǎnliǎo mén*).¹²

Tiantāi masters such as Zhìyǐ (智顗, 538-597) and Zhànrán (湛然, 711-782) were also quite interested in the theory of the hindrances and incorporated it into their own three truths system, which during the process introduced new thought-provoking insights into their meanings. In Zhìyǐ's time, it was too early for him to have been exposed to the kind of clear differentiation of two streams of hindrance-thought that had been made apparent to Wonhyo. So, it is not surprising that we can see, on one hand, where his definitions of the hindrances appear to be derived

¹² There is an understanding held by some Korean (especially Hwaeom/AMF) scholars that Wonhyo's classification of the Yogācāra hindrances as "standard" and the Tathāgatagarbha hindrances as "abstruse" constitutes a value judgment on his part, indicating a preference for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition. But I see neither the need nor any clear justification to read it in this way. While it is true that Wonhyo could be called a "Tathāgatagarbhan" who greatly respected the AMF, a number of aspects of the content of the Ijang ui and his oeuvre as a whole tend to work against this position. Firstly, his career-long project of hwajaeng (和諍), in which the various doctrinal forms of Mahāyāna were shown to be mutually complementary in their role of taking a place in the larger whole, goes directly against the practice of doctrinal classification (判教, Kor. pangyo, Ch. pànjiào) that was used for this kind of privileging of certain doctrines. Wonhyo himself was not affiliated with any particular school, and thus had no sectarian claims at stake. Secondly, aside from this distinction made between esoteric and exoteric, there is no other language in the *Ijang* ui that lends itself toward indicating any kind of preference. I think it is fine to simply take these labels of "standard" and "abstruse" at face value: The Yogācāra explanation fits into a nice, rather neatly structured system, extending from its roots to its branches. The AMF's system, on the other hand, is somewhat convoluted and paradoxical, and relatively difficult to digest, thus neyārtha ('of expedient meaning').

from the sources in the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, by virtue of references to the four and five entrenchments (四·五住地惑 sì/wǔ zhùdì huò). On the other hand, he utilizes the Yogācāra classification of hindrances removed in the path of insight (見所斷煩悩 jiàn suǒduàn fánnǎo, darśanaprahātavya) and hindrances removed in the path of cultivation (修所斷煩悩 xiū suǒduàn fánnǎo, bhāvanāprahātavya), in the form of conceptual errors (見惑 jiànhuò) and embedded errors (修惑 xiūhuò) (also known as 'perceptive errors', 思惑 sīhuò). He understands these two classes taken together, jiànsīhuò (見思惑), to be equivalent to the Yogācāra afflictive hindrances (煩惱障 fánnǎo zhàng), with the mental disturbances of innumerable details (塵沙惑 chénshāhuò) and delusion taken together (無知惑 wúzhīhuò) to be equivalent in meaning to the undefiled nescience 不染污無知 taught in Abhidharma, and to the cognitive hindrances (所知障/智障). He also adds nuance by distinguishing the cognitive hindrances into the dimensions of principle (理智障 lǐzhì zhàng) (resembling the AMF's afflictive hindrances) and phenomena (事智障 shìzhì zhàng) (resembling the AMF's cognitive hindrances).

It would seem that Zhànrán (711-782), whose period of activity in the mideighth century comes well after that of Xuánzàng (玄奘, 602-664), Kuījī (窺基, 632-682), Wonhyo, and Fǎzàng (法藏, 643-712), would certainly have had the opportunity to be exposed to the Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha bifurcation identified by Wonhyo. However, I have not yet had the opportunity to conduct a sufficiently careful study of the works of either Zhìyǐ or Zhànrán, so for now I would like to limit the discussion to this basic introduction. I hope to have the opportunity to provide a detailed analysis of the Tiāntāi positions on the hindrances in the near future.

The hindrances also appear in later East Asian works connected with the Chán and Huáyán schools (especially in China and Korea), ¹⁴ and these tend to be in a rather generalized format that does not show recognition of the clear distinctions elucidated by Wonhyo. ¹⁵ In the Hossō tradition of Japan, which was a direct inheritor of the Xuánzàng-Kuījī transmission based primarily on the *CWSL*, the

 $^{^{13}}$ Zhìyǐ's most thorough discussion of the hindrances is found in his *Móhē zhǐguān* (摩 訶止觀), at T1911.85b₂₂-c₂₆.

⁴ The Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment (圓覺經 Yuánjué jīng), an influential text in the formation of early Chán doctrine, also utilizes a framework of two hindrances in its fifth and sixth chapters, which seems to show awareness of all the above approaches. We can see in this text a clear influence from the East Asian essence-function (體用 tiyòng) logic as manifested in the Huáyán principle-phenomenon (理事 lǐ-shì) paradigm, as the two hindrances are referred to as the "phenomenal hindrances" (事障 shì zhàng) and "hindrances of/to principle" (理障 lǐ zhàng). The phenomenal hindrances refer to karmic restrictions and habituations (thus, equivalent to afflictive hindrances), whereas the hindrances of principle refer to conceptual errors (cognitive hindrances). Reflecting the SPE's overarching theme of special emphasis on non-attachment to one's religious insights, the hindrances of principle are especially pointed out as being obstructions that develop as a result of one's clinging on to what one has "realized." Please also see my Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment: Korean Buddhism's Guide to Meditation, esp. chapters five and six. In his Large Commentary on the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment, Zōngmì (宗密, 780-841) takes up the explanation of these hindrances, basically following the distinction made by Wonhyo into Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha/AMF interpretations (Z 243.9.333-334). I have translated this treatment of the hindrances at http://www.acmuller.net/twohindrances/zongmi.

¹⁵ Please see my discussion of this topic in MULLER (2004) and (2007).

strict systematic application of the hindrances in their fully matured Yogācāra format becomes the norm.¹⁶

4. Development of the Basic Yogācāra Model of the Hindrances: Following the Direct References

As we learn from Wonhyo's treatise, if we attempt to develop a comprehensive discussion of the hindrances based only on places in the text where they are directly and formally named as such, we would not have much to work with, because it is more often the case that discussions that really show the content of the problems of affliction and cognitive distortion occur without being directly labeled with the headings fánnǎo zhàng (煩惱障) or suǒzhī zhàng (所知障). Nevertheless, if we want to trace the way in which the notion of the two hindrances developed into a formal structure of East Asian Yogācāra discourse, we have little choice but to start with a look at the points where these precise terms are actually invoked. Doing this, we can see how, gradually, a pair of terms that was initially used as little more than a flag indicating the completion of the two kinds of paths ends up becoming an increasingly important key to organize the Yogācāra system of practices, stages, and consciousnesses. Let us now look at the development of Yogācāra hindrance theory in a few of the representative major texts. We will start with the *Smdh*, to show the earliest developments of the hindrances, followed by the *YBh*, and finish with a look at the fully developed articulation seen in the *FDJL*. We will then wrap up by briefly comparing this with the systematized summary provided by the CWSL.

4.1. Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra

The *Smdh* has three passages where the hindrances are discussed, all of which are repeated in the *YBh*. The first occurrence, amounting to less than thirteen lines (T676.695a₂₈-b₉) is rather vague, merely indicating that śrāvakas remove the afflictive hindrances, and that cognitive hindrances are not removed until attaining the enlightenment of the Buddha. In their early usage in the seminal Yogācāra texts translated from Sanskrit (including the *Sṃdh*, *YBh*, and *Mahāyānasaṃgrāha*), it is quite often the case that the hindrances are simply named at the end of the list of a series of *bhūmi*s, or some other set of practices, where the removal of both hindrances is declared as an indicator that the practices have been completed, viz. that both liberation and bodhi have been fully attained. In these cases, the hindrances are usually just named without any further explanation of their contents. This is the case in a subsequent passage of the *Sṃdh*, where upon being asked what kinds of hindrances are removed at each of the ten *bhūmi*s by the practices of śamatha and *vipaśyanā*, the Buddha responds by enumerating a specific type of hindrance to be removed at each ground (*bhūmi*),

At the first ground, one counteracts the hindrances of defilement by afflictions in the negative destinies, karma, and rebirth; at the second ground, one counteracts the hindrances of the activity of subtle infractions; at the third ground, one counteracts the hindrances of desire and craving; at the fourth ground one counteracts the hindrances of attachment to concentration and attachment to the *dharma*; at the fifth ground

¹⁶ As is seen in influential works such as the *Kanjin kakumu shō* (觀心覺夢鈔, 3 fasc., T2312), composed by the Japanese Hossō monk Ryōhen (良遍) around 1244.

one counteracts the hindrances of attachment of one-sided rejection of samsāra and pursuit of nirvāņa; at the sixth ground one counteracts the hindrances of the activity of proliferation of marks; at the seventh ground one counteracts the hindrances of the activity of subtle marks; at the eighth ground one counteracts the hindrances of exerting oneself in marklessness, as well as not achieving independence within marks; at the ninth ground one counteracts the hindrances of not attaining independence with regard to all rhetorical skills; at the tenth ground one counteracts the hindrances of non-attainment of the realization of the complete dharma-body. Good sons, these practices of śamatha and vipaśyanā at the stage of the Tathāgata counteract the most extremely subtle afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances. Since these hindrances have been permanently disabled, one finally realizes unobstructed and unattached omniscience and insight, and based on the perfectly accomplished referents that are created, produces the perfectly pure *dharma*-body. (T676. 702a₁₋₁₃)

Thus, the two hindrances are invoked at the end, as a way of summarizing all the other hindrances removed in the prior ten *bhūmis*. The same kind of application can be seen in a passage that soon follows, where the *bhūmis* are re-explained from a different perspective and then summed up once again with the final stage, wherein the most subtle manifestations of both hindrances are removed at the buddha-stage (T676.704a₁₉-b₂).

There is one more passage in the *Smdh* that takes us through the *bhūmis* and concludes with a mention of the hindrances. This one has great significance for subsequent discourse regarding the hindrances in their Yogācāra context, as it contains many of the fundamental concepts that allow the elaboration of modes and distinctions in later discourse – all of which will be picked up by Wonhyo:

"World Honored One: How many kinds of afflictive latencies (煩惱隨眠 fánnăo suímián) can be treated in these grounds?" The Buddha, responding to Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva, said: "Good Sons, there are basically three kinds: the first are the complicit latencies (害伴隨眠 hàibàn suímián), which refers to the case of the first five grounds. How so? Good Sons, all non-innate active afflictions (不俱生現行煩惱 bù jùshēng xiànxíng fánnǎo) serve as supporters to the innate active afflictions (俱生 煩惱現行助伴 jùshēng fánnǎo xiànxíng zhùbàn). Since, at this time, they never re-arise, they are called *complicit latencies*. The second are weak latencies (羸劣隨眠 léiliè suímián), which means that they will manifest subtly (微細現行 wēixì xiànxíng) in the seventh and eighth grounds. If they are subject to quelling (所伏 suǒfú), they will not appear. Third are the extremely subtle latencies (微細隨眠 weixì suímián) which refer to their condition in the eighth ground and above. From here on, the afflictions will never again be active (不復現行 bùfù xiànxíng). There are now only the cognitive hindrances to serve as a basis" (T676.16_{707c12-19}).

Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva again asked the Buddha: "World Honored One, in how many kinds of debilitation do these latencies appear?" The Buddha, addressing Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva, said: "Good Sons, it is only through two kinds, i.e, through elimination of the externally resident debilitations (在皮癰重 zàipí cūzhòng), that the first two are revealed; and it is through the elimination of the medially resident debilitations (在 膚癰重 zàifū cūzhòng) that the third is revealed. If one is able to remove

the internally resident debilitations (在骨麤重 zàigǔ cūzhòng), I declare that he will be forever freed from all latencies and reside at the buddha-stage" (T676.707c₂₀₋₂₄).

The above passages have introduced several basic concepts that figure prominently in subsequent systematic hindrances discourse, and which are examined in extensive detail by Wonhyo. The most important is that of activity (現行 xiànxíng) vs. latency (隨眠 suímián), which, as any good student of Yogācāra will know, is going to be intimately connected with theories of liminal and subliminal consciousness, seed theory, etc. The notion of debilitating tendencies (麤重 cūzhòng) also plays a central role in discussions of the hindrances, and is something that is explored in depth by Wonhyo. The debilitations fall into both the afflictive and cognitive categories, they are mostly subliminal, but they are different from seeds in that they do not generate new effects of the three karmic moral qualities. Also introduced are the distinctions between "quelling" ($\oiint fu$) and "elimination" ($\oiint du an$) as two levels of effectiveness with which any kind of afflictive or cognitive problem may be countered, remedied, or treated with an "antidote" (對治 duìzhì, pratipakṣa). The main antidotes are the pair of meditative techniques of śamatha and vipaśyanā introduced in the previous passage. Quelling and elimination will, in later works, also be shown to have varying degrees of effectiveness, depending on the practice, the level of the practitioner, the level of embeddedness of the hindrance, and so on. But the *Smdh* has not yet gotten to this level of detail.

4.2. Yogācārabhūmiśāstra

The diverse character of the discussions of the hindrances in the YBh reflects the composite nature of that text, in that these discussions on the whole are not systematic, and address varying types of arguments. One type is basically equivalent to – or even identical with – the citations provided above from the Smdh, where the hindrances are invoked merely to summarize all the types of hindrances removed in the practices of the ten *bhūmis*, or some other set of stages – as the final achievement of practice.¹⁷ The second type of frequent recurrence of mention of the hindrances in the YBh – and especially of the afflictive hindrances – is one that still shows admixture from the older Abhidharmic scheme. In this case, one or both of the two hindrances is mentioned together with the hindrances to deep concentration (定障 *dìngzhàng*) or hindrances to liberation (解脫障 *jiětuō zhàng*). Again, this is usually just the concluding portion of some sort of listing, which includes no detailed explanation of their content. 18 On the whole, in the YBh, the notion of the two hindrances as a set pair is not yet firmly established, and therefore the afflictive hindrances are mentioned in a wide variety of contexts with a wide range of other hindrances, such as karmic hindrances (業障 yèzhàng, karmāvarana), and retributive hindrances (異熟障 yìshóu zhàng, vipākāvarana).

 $^{^{17}\,}See\ T1579.495c_{5\text{--}8},\,496c_{5},\,562b_{26},\,727c_{11\text{--}16}.$

¹⁸ For example, at T1579.656a₁₂₋₂₁, the afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances are included in a list of twelve items with the afflictive hindrances listed at number ten (their removal constituting wisdom liberation, 慧解脱 huì jiětuō) and the cognitive hindrances as number twelve (their removal constituting the Tathāgata's liberation, 如來心 得解脫 rúlái xīndé jiětuō), with the cessation hindrances in between at number eleven (their removal constituting the dual liberation, 俱分解脫 jùfēn jiětuō).

 $^{^{19}}$ See, for example, at T1579.44_{6a18} ff.

There are also several instances where the afflictive hindrances are mentioned together with hindrances derived from the Abhidharmic model with no mention at all of the cognitive hindrances – one more piece of evidence of the stratified character of the *YBh* into stages of development. For example, at T1579.354a₁₃ff., we have liberation from the afflictive hindrances (煩惱障解脫 fánnǎo zhàng jiětuō) juxtaposed with liberation from the hindrances to deep concentration (定障解脫 dìngzhàng jiětuō), along with dual liberation (俱障解脫 jūzhàng jiětuō). In such contexts, we never see the afflictive hindrances defined as originating in the view of person – it is just a reference to the phenomenon of affliction in general. Similar cases can be seen at T1579.425b₁₈ff. and 427a₁₆ff. Beyond this, there are a number of places where they are named as obstacles to overcome, with no special explanation of their content or implications.

The first time we come across something close to the classical definition of the hindrances in terms of their application to the situations of the śrāvakas and bodhisattvas starts from T1579.478c₂₃, where it is written:

There are, briefly speaking, two kinds of purification. The first is the purification of the afflictive hindrances, and the second is the purification of the cognitive hindrances. All those who have the seed-nature of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize the purification of the afflictive hindrances, but they are not able to realize the purification of the cognitive hindrances. Those with the seed-natures of bodhisattvas are able to realize the purification of the afflictive hindrances, and are also able to realize the purification of the cognitive hindrances. (T1579.478c₂₃₋₂₆)

In answer to the question of why the bodhisattvas are able to accomplish this, there is no direct mention of their superiority in terms of realization of the selflessness of dharmas. They are said to be superior to the śrāvakas in terms of: (1) their faculties (根 $g\bar{e}n$); (2) their practices (行 xing) (which prioritize the benefit of others); (3) their teaching skills (善巧 shànqiǎo), and (4) their realization (果 guǒ, phala = anuttarā samyaksambodhi), from which one could infer the inclusion of the deeper realization of emptiness, although this is not directly stated (T1579.478c₂₇-479a₁₀). There are also a few other places in the text where the distinction between the hindrances is based primarily upon their being the objects of the practices of the bodhisattvas and the adherents of the two vehicles, such as T1579.573b₂₀₋₂₉, where the bodhisattvas attain the same level of freedom from anticipatory contamination (無漏 wúlòu) as the śrāvakas, but go beyond them in terms of seeking to liberate sentient beings and in terms of discernment. There are a number of other passages where the bodhisattvas and practitioners of the two vehicles are compared in terms of purity, wisdom achieved, compassion, etc., but not in connection with anything that directly links the hindrances to the classical definition of realization of the selflessness of persons (人無我 rén wúwǒ) and the selflessness of dharmas (法無 我 fǎ wúwǒ). This happens in the invocation of the two hindrances in the Tattvārtha Chapter, one of the most important points for the definition of the hindrances in the entire YBh, to which we now turn.

As is well known to students of Yogācāra, the Tattvārtha Chapter establishes four increasingly profound levels of apprehension of reality. The first two levels described are: (1) Reality as understood through widely shared linguistic convention (世間極成眞實 shìjiān jíchéng zhēnshí), wherein sentient beings, when seeing the earth, call it earth, and when seeing fire, call it fire, without confusion, and (2) reality as formulated by accurate reasoning (道理極成眞實 dàolǐ jíchéng zhēn-

shí) – the reality accepted by the wise based on direct perception (現量 xiànliáng), inference (比量 bǐliáng), authoritative validity (聖教量 shèngjiāoliáng), and other valid forms of knowledge. These first two share in being within the realm of rational discourse.

Numbers three and four are defined as levels of awareness reflecting the removal of the hindrances. Number three is reality as formulated by the cognition purified of the afflictive hindrances (煩惱障淨智所行眞實 fánnǎozhàng jìngzhì suǒxíng zhēnshí), and number four is reality as formulated by the cognition purified of the cognitive hindrances (所知障淨智所行眞實 suǒzhī zhàng jìngzhì suǒxíng zhēnshí). The text says:

What is the awareness of reality in the sphere of cognitive activity that is purified of the afflictive hindrances? This refers to the sphere of activity of uncontaminated cognition, of the inducing of uncontaminated cognition, and the uncontaminated, subsequently attained mundane cognition of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. [...] Since one cognizes this objective realm, one cleanses the cognition that was obstructed by affliction, and lives without obstruction in subsequent births. Therefore it is called reality wherein the sphere of cognitive activity is purified of the afflictive hindrances. What is further implied? [...] It means that through very careful analysis one actualizes clear contemplation of [the Four Truths], and having done this, accurate cognition is produced. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are able to observe that nothing is obtainable except the aggregates, and that beyond the aggregates there is no self to be obtained. And based on the cultivation of the discernment of the fact that all things arise and cease dependently, and because of the cultivation of the view that apart from the aggregates there is no person, one gives rise to this insight into the holy truths ($T1579.486c_{4-15}$).

Next is the reality purified of the cognitive hindrances:

What is awareness of reality in which the sphere of cognitive activity is completely purified of the cognitive hindrances? Since they are able to hinder the cognition of the knowables, they are called the cognitive hindrances. Since one obtains the sphere of activity of cognition liberated from the cognitive hindrances, you should know that it is called awareness of reality in which the sphere of cognitive activity is completely purified of the cognitive hindrances. What is the further meaning of this? It means that the bodhisattvas and the world-honored buddhas realize the selflessness of dharmas. They have already entered into the excellent purity of all dharmas as free from the self-nature of language (言自性 yán zixing) and free from the self-nature by designation (假說自性 jiǎshuō zixing). This is the sphere of activity of the perfectly equal, undiscriminated cognition (平等平等無分別智所行境界 píngděng wú fēnbié zhì suŏxíng jingjie). This objective realm is the unsurpassed extent of the knowable in the cardinal thusness. It is at this point that all discriminated analyses of the true dharma are completely turned back, unable to proceed any further. Furthermore, in establishing the character of this reality, you should know that this is the disclosure of non-duality $(T1579.486c_{16-24}).$

This is a watershed passage when it comes to establishing the role of the hindrances as – while the distinction of the hindrances as being within the purview of respective practices of the adherents of the two vehicles and bodhisattvas is noted in several places – this is the only place in the *YBh*, and one of the earliest places overall in the Yogācāra literature, where the direct relationship of afflictive

hindrances/two vehicles/selflessness of persons, and cognitive hindrances/bodhisattvas/selflessness of *dharma*s is stated together in one place. Of course, by the time later-developing works such as the *FDJL* and *CWSL* appear, this is standard fare, but in the *YBh* and *Smdh* it has not, up to this point, been explicitly stated.

Care must be taken regarding the description of the afflictive hindrances, which are here, in the context of a discussion focused on purity of cognition, defined wholly in terms of the their cognitive cause (attachment to the view of self of person), and the cognitive conditions ensuing from their purification. There is nothing at this juncture in the way of discussion of the aspect of the afflictive hindrances that predominates later works – i.e., their primary role of producing karma and empowering rebirth (能發業及能結生 *néngfā yè jí néngjié shēng*)²⁰ through afflictive emotive attachments. Since the context of these four levels of apprehension of reality is exclusively cognitive, it is not odd to see this kind of cognitively oriented description of the afflictive hindrances. Still, in the places in the YBh where the afflictive hindrances are specifically named as such, there is little in the way of direct discussion of the afflictive character or composition of the hindrances.²¹ Yet on the other hand, Wonhyo will, in fleshing out the exact makeup of the afflictive hindrances, end up utilizing the YBh more than any other single text. But this is done retroactively, in the process of Wonhyo's appropriation of the YBh's detailed articulations of the afflictions in general to fill out his own description of the Yogācāra system. In the YBh itself, discussions of afflictions are not directly arranged under the rubric of "afflictive hindrances."

When it comes to the composition of the hindrances, the YBh does deal with one vital aspect in a number of places, that of the seminal concept of debilitation ($\mathbb{R} = c\bar{u}zh \hat{o}ng$). While the concept of debilitation also has cognitive dimensions, it is seen most prominently in connection with discussions of the afflictive hindrances. Its specific technical connotations are to those afflictions or karmic impressions contained in the subconscious levels of mind that act in a way to bring about rigidity, obstruction, weakness, incapacitation, etc. In the YBh, they are explained from a variety of perspectives in various contexts and from the classical definition provided in the text six connotations are given. In addition to, and in connection with this dimension of incapacitation, the YBh in a number of places introduces to the discussion of the hindrances – and especially of the afflictive hindrances – various aspects of tenacity, their depth of embeddedness, the various extents to which they can be removed, the amount of time required for their removal, and so forth. In fascicle forty-eight, we read:

Furthermore, based on the heretofore explained twelve bodhisattva abodes, during the time of the passage through three incalculable great eons as calculated according to units of time, one is able to eliminate all of the debilitating tendencies that are subsumed in the category of the afflictive hindrances (煩惱障品所有臟重 fánnǎo zhàng pǐn suǒyǒu cū-zhòng), as well as all of the debilitating tendencies that are subsumed in the category of the cognitive hindrances (所知障品所有臟重 suǒzhī

²⁰ See the *Ijang ui* at HBJ 1.795b₅.

zi I.e., what the *FDJL* and Wonhyo will refer to as *fánnǎo tǐ* (煩惱體) or *fánnǎo zhàng tǐ* (煩惱障體). In the *FDJL*, see T1530.323c₁₂, and in the *Ijang ui*, see HBJ 1.790a₁₆.

²² The six connotations are the aspects of: (1) manifest heaviness (現重 xiànzhòng); (2) rigidity (剛強 gāngqiáng); (3) obstruction (障碍 zhàngài); (4) timidity (怯劣 qièliè); (5) restriction (不自在轉 bù zìzai zhuǎn); and (6) incapability (無堪能 wú kānnéng) (T1579. 657a₁₉).

zhàng pǐn suǒyǒu cūzhòng). It should be understood that it is within the practices of the third abode that one is able to eliminate the debilitating tendencies that are subsumed in the category of the afflictive hindrances (T1579.562a₂₈-b₁).

This means that in the abode of extreme bliss (極歡喜住 jí huānxǐ zhù) all of the debilitating tendencies of the class of afflictions of the evil destinies (惡趣諸煩惱品所有麤重 èqù zhū fánnǎo pǐn suǒyǒu cūzhòng) are completely and permanently eliminated (皆悉永斷 jiēxī yǒngduàn), and all afflictions of superior and middling tenacity cease to be actively manifest (皆不現行 jiēxī yǒngduàn). In the markless abode that has neither application nor exertion (無加行無功用無相住 wú jiāxíng wú gōng-yòng wúxiāng zhù), all of the debilitating tendencies that are subsumed in the category of the afflictive hindrances, which have the potential to completely obstruct the pure patience based on the cognition of the nonarising of phenomena, are completely and permanently eliminated, and no other afflictions are manifestly active. One should know that in the abode of the ultimate consummation of bodhisattvahood (最上成滿菩薩住 zuìshàng chéngmǎn púsà zhù), all of the obstructions, habituated tendencies (習氣 xíqì), and latencies (隨眠 suímián) of affliction are completely and permanently eliminated (T1579.562b₂₋₇).

Here, the discussion of the constitution of the hindrances has been opened up beyond that of the hindrances *proper* (正障 *zhèngzhàng* – Wonhyo's term), such that it now includes the discussion of their manifest activity, latencies, habituated tenden-cies, along with their debilitating aspects, which, as Wonhyo will explain in detail (based primarily on other passages in the *YBh*), are removed at various stages of practice depending on their relative degree of tenacity, subtlety, activity/latency, and so forth. These are all issues that are explored in depth in both the *FDJL* and Wonhyo's treatise, and thus this passage is critical to the opening of that gateway of discussion. The *YBh* continues:

Entering into the Tathāgata's abode, you should know that the debilitating tendencies subsumed in the category of the cognitive hindrances also come in three kinds. These are: (1) externally resident debilitations (在皮 羅重 zàipí cūzhòng); (2) medially resident debilitations (在唐羅重 zàifū cūzhòng); and (3) internally resident debilitations (在南羅重 zàiròu cūzhòng). One should know that the externally resident debilitating tendencies are completely and finally eliminated in the abode of extreme bliss. The medially resident debilitating tendencies are completely and finally eliminated in the markless abode that has neither application nor exertion (無加行無功用無相住 wú jiāxíng wú gōngyòng wúxiāng zhù). The internally resident debilitating tendencies are completely and finally eliminated in the abode of the Tathāgata (如來住 rúlái zhù). Attaining the cognition that thoroughly purifies all afflictions, in these three abodes, the two kinds of hindrances of afflictive and cognitive are permanently eliminated (永斷 yǒng duàn) (T1579.562b₈₋₁₄).

There are perhaps seven or eight other places in the YBh, where the two hindrances are formally mentioned together in some way that defines them in terms of their sequence of removal, their relation to the vehicles, or some sort of stage, but nothing that illuminates them significantly beyond the passages we have cited here.

5. Filling out the Yogācāra Hindrances System: The Fódìjīng lùn and Chéng wéishì lùn

The matured form of two hindrances theory within Yogācāra proper is best seen in the *FDJL*, which has numerous passages that treat the hindrances in detail from the most important perspectives, including their content, function, and removal. We need not go into extensive detail regarding the arguments presented in the *CWSL*, as they appear to be either derived directly from the *FDJL*, or from a common source – one that was apparently also accessible to Wonhyo, as many of the lines found in the *FDJL* also appear unreferenced in the *Ijangui*.

The first passage in the *FDJL* that provides a solid overview of the hindrances is found in fascicle seven, where we read:

The two hindrances are the afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances. Thoroughly agitating body and mind (惱亂身心 nǎoluàn shēn-xīn), disallowing serenity (令不寂靜 lìng bù jijìng), they are called afflictive hindrances. Obscuring the undistorted nature of knowable objects (覆所知境無顚倒性 fù suǒzhī jìng wú diāndǎo xìng), disallowing the clear apprehension of their true form (令不顯現 lìng bú xiǎnxiàn), they are called the cognitive hindrances. The afflictive hindrances have the attachment to view of the reality of the individual (執實我,薩迦耶見 zhí shíwǒ, sàjiāyé jiàn) at their head, and include the 128 fundamental afflictions and their derivatives. Whatever activity they generate, and whatever effects they may induce, these function under the same category [of affliction]. This is because they all have affliction as their basis (T1530.323a₂₉-b₅).

The cognitive hindrances have attachment to the view of intrinsic existence of dharmas that are pervasively discriminated (執遍計所執諸法 薩迦耶見 zhí biànjì suǒzhí zhū fǎ sàjiāyé jiàn) at their head. Such mental states and mental factors as ignorance, attachment to dharmas, ill-will, etc. (無明,法愛,恚等諸心,心法 wúmíng, fǎài, huì děng zhū xīn, xīnfǎ), along with the activity they generate and the effects that they bring about are all subsumed in this category. This is because all have attachment to dharmas (法執 fǎzhí) and nescience (無明 wúmíng) and so forth as their basis. There is an interpretation that says that attachment to dharmas, nescience, and so forth operate in all modes of karmic moral quality, including wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate (善,惡,無記,有漏 心品 shàn, è, wújì, yǒu lòuxīn pǐn). This is because both contaminated states of mind and uncontaminated states of mind in the two vehicles are unable to realize the selflessness of dharmas, and because both arise resembling the objective and subjective aspect. There is also an interpretation that says they only operate in unwholesome and morally indeterminate tainted states of mind (不善,無記,有漏心品 bùshàn, wújì, yǒu lòu-

As we can see, not only do we now have carefully developed definitions at this point – we now have differences emerging in interpretation – the sort that Wonhyo

²³ The number of 128 is arrived at by counting the 112 conceptually arisen afflictions (見惑 *jiànhuò*) plus the sixteen intrinsic afflictions (思惑 *sīhuò*); also called *bǎièrshíbā shǐ* (百二十八使). Wonhyo explains how these numbers are generated in the *Ijang ui* at HBJ 1.798b₆₋₁₄.

²⁴ T1530.323b₆-b₁₂. This discussion continues on into an in-depth inquiry into different theories about the degree to which affliction and cognitive error penetrate the various levels of the eight Yogācāra consciousnesses – a fascinating discussion, which is treated in full in my forthcoming translation of Wonhyo's *Ijang ui*.

is going to attempt to work through, most likely coming from various masters circulating around the Nālanda school. We have clearly arrived to the climactic stage of the development of theories regarding the hindrances in Yogācāra proper.

We should note that this passage, like many others in the *FDJL*, has a close parallel in the *CWSL* at T1585.48c₁₀₋₁₁, which says:

Views, doubt, nescience, attachment, ill-will, pride, etc., obscure the undistorted nature of knowable objects, and function to obstruct *bodhi*, and so they are called the cognitive hindrances.²⁵

While these two appear almost the same at first glance, the difference between the CWSL's "nescience, attachment, ill-will, pride" (無明,愛,恚,慢 wúmíng, ài, huì, màn) and the FDJL's "such mental states and mental factors as ignorance, attachment to dharmas, ill-will, etc." (無明,法愛,恚等諸心,心法 wúmíng, fǎ'ài, huì děng zhū xīn, xīnfǎ) is worth notice, since, in the context of distinguishing the cognitive and afflictive hindrances, the difference between the general term attach-ment (愛 ài) as one of the three poisons, and attachment to dharmas (法愛 fǎ'ài) (which could be construed as being equivalent to 法執 fǎzhí, "attachment to (the reality of) dharmas," the ostensive source of cognitive hindrances) as the cause of cognitive problems is significant. But from the point of view of Wonhyo's treatment of the cognitive hindrances, both of these definitions would be somewhat proble-matic, since both invoke afflictive factors as causes of cognitive problems, whereas in basic two-hindrance theory, especially in Yogācāra, the cognitive hindrances are seen as being caused almost exclusively by cognitive factors. In the Ijang ui, Wonhyo says:

What are the cognitive hindrances? Because the nature of the totality of things and the thusness of things are illumined [respectively] by the two kinds of cognition, they are called "the knowables." The mental disturbances of attachment to *dharmas* and so forth obstruct the nature of cognition so that it cannot carry out clear observation. They obscure the nature of the objects so that the mind of clear observation cannot manifest. Due to these connotations, they are called the cognitive hindrances. [These hindrances] derive their name from that which is obscured, as well as their function.²⁶

Subsequent to this in his treatise, Wonhyo will fine-tune his definition to acknowledge that there are cases where afflictive problems could influence the creation of cognitive distortions, but he will never directly define the cognitive hindrances in terms of afflictive activities, as is done in these two texts.

In any case, the treatments of the two hindrances in the *FDJL* and the *CWSL* are obviously derived from, if not the same person, at least people working in the same close circle. And both are using the *YBh* and the *Mahāyānasaṃgrāha* as their scriptural authorities. Since Wonhyo invokes many passages from this same overall corpus, it is clear that all this material was available to him at this time. The reception of notions of the hindrances in the *FDJL* and the *CWSL* from the *YBh*, *Sṃdh*, *Mahāyānasaṃgrāha*, and other related texts marks the culmination of the development of hindrance theory in its strict Yogācāra/Fǎxiàng form in East Asia –

²⁵ 見,疑,無明,愛,恚,慢等。覆所知境無顛倒性能障菩提,名所知障。此所知障。

²⁶ HBJ 1.789c₁₇: 所知障者。盡所有性,如所有性,二智所照故、名所知。法執等惑遮止智性、不成現觀。覆弊境性不現觀心。由是義故,名所知障。此從所弊及用得名。

although the two hindrance model will still undergo changes based on its ongoing juxtaposition with the competing model produced by the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, which is linked up by Huìyuǎn and Wonhyo with the framework of the Tathāgatagarbha texts.

An interesting question comes to mind regarding the rather abrupt leap of detail and precision to be seen in articulating the hindrances, going from the vague and sketchy passages in the Smdh, YBh, and Mahāyānasamgraha, to the systematic articulation in the FDJL and CWSL. That is, as of yet, I have not come across any pure Yogācāra text that would serve adequately as a bridge to cover the wide gap in development between these two groups of texts. Yet during this interim period, the model of the hindrances in the Tathagatagarbha texts undergoes significant development in such works as the Srīmālāsūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga, Běnyè jīng, AMF, and most importantly, in the writings of Huiyan and Zhiyi. While it is too early to suggest that the seventh-century Făxiàng version of the hindrances received direct influence from these texts, we do know that the CWSL, in its section on the hindrances, briefly notes the Tathāgatagarbha model of the four and five entrenchments (T1585.48c₂₄₋₂₇). Given this fact, it may be quite possible that even if the masters of the Yogācāra/Wéishì school did not seek to apply the Tathāgatagarbha structure to their own articulation of the hindrances, they may well have felt pressure to flesh out their own argument to demonstrate their own level of sophistication on the matter. This is another potentially rich topic of inquiry, not only for clarifying hindrance theory, but also for shedding light on the broader relationship between the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha streams of soteriological thought.

In any case, we can say with certainty that although the YBh is an important source for the development of a stable system of the two hindrances, this full systematization – at least in East Asia – actually does not crystallize until a relatively later period. The major early Yogācāra sources, such as the Saṃdhinir-mocanasūtra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, contain only sparse references to the hindrances. The YBh adds a considerable amount of material to advance the argument beyond that of these other two texts, but its discussions of afflictive and cognitive problems have not yet been articulated and organized in a systematic way. Thus, the appearance of three major works in the seventh century (the Fodijing lùn, Chéng wéishì lùn, and Ijang ui) was necessary for finalizing the form of the hindrances into the way they are received by the subsequent Făxiàng and Hossō traditions.

Abbreviations and Sigla

CWSL Chéng wéishì lùn (成唯識論).

FDJL Fódìjīng lùn (佛地經論, *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra.

HBJ Hanguk bulgyo jeonseo [The Collected Texts of Korean Buddhism] (1984).

Seoul: Dongguk University Press.

T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō [Japanese Edition of the Buddhist Canon] (1924-1935).

Tokyo: Daizōkyōkai.

Z Zokuzōkyō [Dai nihon zokuzōkyō] (1905-1912). Kyoto: Zokyō shoin.

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HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES Edited by MICHAEL WITZEL

VOLUME SEVENTY-FIVE

The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners

The Buddhist *Yogācārabhūmi* Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet

Edited by Ulrich Timme KRAGH

PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DISTRIBUTED BY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
AND LONDON, ENGLAND

2013

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For information write to Editor, Harvard Oriental Series, Department of South Asian Studies, 1 Bow Street, Cambridge MA 02138, USA 617-495 3295; email: witzel@fas.harvard.edu

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist *Yogācārabhūmi* Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet

Harvard Oriental Series; v. 75 ISBN 978-0-674-72543-0

I. Ulrich Timme Kragh 1969-

II. Title

III. Series: Harvard Oriental Series; 75

CIP