Wŏnhyo’s approach to harmonization of the Mahayana doctrines (hwajaeng)

By A. Charles Muller

Wŏnhyo (617–686) is known to the world as Korea’s leading Buddhist thinker and scriptural commentator, mainly due to his numerous exegeses and treatises that attempted to sort out the plethora of new Buddhist ideas generated in the fifth through seventh centuries in East Asia—ideas produced both through the continued influx of newly translated Indian texts, as well as the rapid appearance of fresh East Asian interpretations of the Buddhist doctrine. Wŏnhyo is especially noted for being the only scholar among the great East Asian commentators who had neither sectarian affiliation nor took a sectarian-based approach in the interpretation of Buddhist doctrines. Thus, the privileging of a specific sectarian approach was for Wŏnhyo impossible, since he saw each of the various doctrinal streams of Buddhism as representing a distinct but valid piece of the vast Mahāyāna system—as true as any other piece, but not to be seen as some kind of “ultimate” doctrine. Wŏnhyo’s method—known as hwajaeng (和諍, “harmonization”)—is characterized by the juxtaposing of two or more divergent theoretical positions, comparing them, and clarifying their distinctive assumptions and aims. Once these assumptions are properly apprehended, what on the surface appear to be contradictory opinions are shown to be commensurate with each other from a deeper perspective. This article examines in detail the range of motivations, methodologies, and approaches seen in Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng project. Wŏnhyo’s approach will be examined in terms of three general aspects, which straddle the range of doctrinal/scholastic, logical/philosophical, and religious, with the religious showing at least three levels of profundity.

Keywords: Wŏnhyo, harmonization, hwajaeng, doctrinal classification, two truths, faith, essence-function.
1. INTRODUCTION

(1) Lost in Translation

The term that has come down to modern times to characterize the distinctive style of Wŏnhyo’s commentarial work is the Sino-Korean hwajaeng 和諍, which has commonly been rendered into English as “harmonization,” or “reconciliation.” The Sinitic term taken by itself can be misleading, and its various English renderings have the potential of leading us further astray from understanding the application of the concept in the context of Wŏnhyo’s project. The term hwajaeng is originally used in the Chinese translations of the scriptures and vinaya primarily to refer to the resolution of a personal squabble among members of the sangha. In the context of Wŏnhyo’s writings, however, it should be defined as something like “the commensuration of divergent doctrinal positions based on a thoroughgoing inquiry into their underpinnings and the background and motivations of their proponents.”

Within Wŏnhyo’s writings, the term actually only appears twice: once in the title of his major essay, the Simmun hwajaeng non (Ten Approaches to the Harmonization of Doctrinal Disputes; 十門和諍論; hereafter, SHN—but the term itself does not appear in the actual text of this work) and once in the Yŏlban chongyo (Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra; 涅槃宗要). Thus, it is natural, once one begins to dig into this topic, to ask how this particular term came to characterize Wŏnhyo’s project.¹ The first answer to this question lies in awareness of the fact that the impact of the SHN on the Silla Buddhist world of Wŏnhyo’s day was extensive,² a position which is buttressed by the fact of Wŏnhyo’s posthumous title ending up being that of National Master of Harmonization of National Master of Harmonization of

¹ The problem of the appropriateness of applying this label to Wŏnhyo’s oeuvre is the point of departure for Fukushi Jinin’s 2004 article “Gangyŏ no shisō wo waso shisō to toraeru koto ni taishite” (元曉の思想を和諍思想と捉えることに対して “Concerning the Applicability of Hwajaeng for Characterizing Wŏnhyo’s Thought”).
² Some scholars think that there is good reason to guess that Wŏnhyo’s SHN may have been regarded by his contemporaries as his magnum opus. For example, the Kusŏn-sa Sŏdang hwasaeng t’appi (Stele Inscription to Master Sŏdang [viz. Wŏnhyo] of Kosŏn-sa; the earliest extant account of Wŏnhyo’s life, composed approximately 100 years after his death), mentions only two of Wŏnhyo’s works: the SHN and the Hwaŏm chongyo (Doctrinal Essentials of the Flower Ornament Sutra; non-extant; see Kusŏn-sa Sŏdang hwasaeng t’appi, in Cho Myŏnggi, ed., Wŏnhyo tusa chŏnjip, Seoul: Poryŏn-gak, 1978), p. 661. This is a fact of some significance, given the extensive influence of some of his commentarial works, such as his commentaries on the Awakening of Faith, Nirvana Sutra, and Vajrasamādhi-sūtra.
Disputes 和諍國師 (hwajaeng kuksa). Additionally, virtually no scholar denies the fact that Wŏnhyo’s work demonstrates a strongly distinctive tendency toward the effort of establishing a holistic systemativeness within Mahayana based on repeated demonstrations of the fact that apparent differences are grounded in the personal approaches and agendas of individual scholars and movements, rather than being the result of some kind of contradiction inherent in the content of the Buddha’s teaching.

Thus, the rendering of hwajaeng into English as “harmonization of disputes,” or “reconciliation of doctrinal controversies,” can be misleading without a sufficient explanation of background and content. Wŏnhyo may have indeed at times been dealing with live disputes, and he was clearly dealing with current doctrinal controversies. But what he was attempting to do more broadly in his writings was much the same in its underlying motivation as the work of the rest of the great East Asian Buddhist commentators of the sixth to eighth centuries in China and Korea: he was trying to make sense of the wide range of disparate strands of teaching that had been flowing into East Asia under the broad rubric of “Mahayana Buddhism.” The traditions associated with Prajñāpāramitā, Nirvana Sutra, Satyasiddhi, Yogācāra, Lotus Sutra, Pure Land, Flower Ornament Sutra, Madhyamaka, Awakening of Faith, State Protection, Logic, etc., each had their distinctive perspectives on the Buddhist teachings, and certain aspects of their doctrines were, at least at first glance, incommensurate with each other.

The leading figures of the East Asian exegetical community around the sixth through eighth centuries had settled down to a customary way of dealing with these complications—complications that put strains on the integrity of the Mahayana system, and which also made it difficult for any single tradition to claim to be the possessor of the most complete, or effective form of the teaching. The method that became predominant was that of p’an’gyo (Ch. panjiao) 判教—doctrinal classification, the primary hermeneutic strategy of East Asian Buddhist scholars for more than four centuries. Faced as they were with sorting out the

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3 From the Koryŏ sa 高麗史, fasc. 11, sixth year of Sukchong, eighth month, Kyesajo. At this time, Wŏnhyo was given the posthumous title of “National Preceptor of Harmonization of Disputes” and Ŭisang was given the title “National Preceptor of the Perfect Teaching.” It is thought that these two monks were conferred with these titles based on a petition to the emperor made by Ŭich’ŏn. (See Kim Sanghyŏn, Wŏnhyo yŏn’gu. Minjoksa, 2000, pp. 290–291) Note that in the Koryŏ sa, the reference to Wŏnhyo as National Master of the Harmonization of Disputes is written as 和靜國師 (hwajaeng kuksa) rather than 和諍國師. This notation is also seen in the subsequent Tongu yahjeon 東師列傳, which lists Wŏnhyo with the same title (HPC 10.996c16). Kim Pusik (金富軾; 1075–1151) of the Koryŏ period also referred to Wŏnhyo by this name in his Stèle for the National Preceptor of the Harmonization of Disputes at Punhwang sa (kept in Dongguk University Museum).
range of doctrinal streams still coming into East Asia from India and Central Asia, along with newly-developing indigenous doctrinal and practical traditions, and at the same time needing to preserve the meaning and power of scriptural authority across the spectrum of acknowledged canonical texts (i.e., they could not simply say that their favorite scripture was “right” and the other scriptures were “wrong.” In fact, they really couldn’t even directly say that one scripture was “better” than another.), they devised teleological categories of Buddhist scriptures and treatises that ranged from the primitive to the advanced. The advanced were usually called “complete,” “perfect,” “final” etc. (wŏn 圓); categories that ranged from the narrow (pyŏl 別) to the all-inclusive (tŏng 通); from the incomplete (puryo ŭi 不了義) to the fully revealed (yo ŭi 了義), and so forth. And of course, the most advanced, perfect, or inclusive scripture would be the one prized by one’s own school or tradition, with all of the rest being relegated to the status of being its propaedeutics. An unavoidable task, then, of most serious East Asian exegetes from roughly the fifth to eighth centuries, was that of deciding to which compartment a particular text belonged, and making the argument for assigning it there.

(2) Not doing p’an’gyo

While not denying the fact of the historical development of the doctrines of the various Buddhist schools, Wŏnhyo seems to have also seen the move toward compartmentalization as a way of avoiding the task of precisely identifying and articulating the reasons for the discrepancies. Wŏnhyo tended to go in the opposite direction: rather than creating a teleological edifice in which to pigeonhole texts and doctrines, he tried to dig into the assumptions,

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4 There is, in fact, a p’an’gyo system ascribed to Wŏnhyo in Fazang’s Huayanjing tansuan ji (Γ 1733.35.111a23–27). But we should be careful not to take this as an indication that Wŏnhyo was seriously involved in the work of doctrinal classification, as: (1) nowhere else in Wŏnhyo’s extant corpus do we find anything indicating his having created, or having placed emphasis on, a doctrinal classification system; (2) if we read Wŏnhyo’s works extensively, it would seem that his entire approach is antithetical to the work of compartmentalization; and, most important, (3) in the final lines of his Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra he says: “Yet, if you want to use the scheme of four teachings to categorize the scriptures, or use five time periods to delimit the Buddha’s intention, this is just like using a snail shell to scoop out the ocean, or looking at the sky through a tube!” 「而欲以四宗科於經旨亦以五時限於佛意。是猶以螺酌海用管闚天者耳。」 (Γ 1769. 38.255c5–7). Implicit here is a criticism of Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), who is associated with the practice of doctrinal classification in the text just above.
circumstances, and specific aims of the author of a given scripture or treatise, to clearly discern the underpinnings of the divergence.

While a significant portion of Wŏnhyo’s exegetical analyses that worked toward providing an interface for mutual understanding between ostensibly incommensurate views took up differences between major traditions such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, he tended to pay greater attention to subtler disagreements between thinkers and scholars who were members of the same tradition. Thus, in his Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra he treats the positions of six scholars who all basically accept the premise of innate Buddhahood, but who do so with various interpretations. Or, in the Ijang üi (System of the Two Hindrances; 二障義) he compares the divergent positions taken among a group of Yogācāra scholars, all of whom assume the existence of the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna), but who differ in the way they understand the details of its character and function.

Hwajaeng is the guiding principle that penetrates Wŏnhyo’s writings. We can see him, again and again, taking the differing positions of various schools or scholars, investigating them exhaustively until identifying their precise point of divergence, and then showing how differences in fundamental background, motivation, or sectarian bias on the part of the proponents of those particular doctrinal positions lead to the production of apparent conflicts. The end result of his inquiry is invariably that of seeing a way through the apparent contradictions inherent in two or more positions, to show how, when differences exist, it is usually for a clearly intelligible, logically explicable reason.

2. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF HAWAJAENG

I decided to undertake this investigation of Wŏnhyo’s of hwajaeng for the simple reason that, as far as I was able to tell, no one had yet devoted a full article to the topic in English. Almost all of us who work seriously with Wŏnhyo have acknowledged the importance of hwajaeng in the introductions to our books and translations, and sometimes in articles, including, at least Sung Bae Park, Robert Buswell, Jörg Plassen, and myself. But these discussions have been partial, dealing with hwajaeng from a specific angle, or in the specific context of the text.
under discussion, with only a minimal amount of attention paid to examples in other texts, or to the overall methodology and underpinnings of this exegetical practice. There are numerous works on the topic in Korean, as well as several useful articles in Japanese. Treatments of hwajaeng have been done with different aims and approaches, which we can categorize briefly as:

1. Inquiries of textual origins and sources for influences that stimulated Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng tendencies. For example, the work by Ishii Kosei 石井公成, identifying influences on Wŏnhyo’s harmonization in Jizang, the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*, etc. Jörg Plassen identifies the influence coming from Laozi, Wang Bi, and Zhuangzi through Sengzhao. The studies of the prior influences that contributed to the development of Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng by both of these scholars are well-documented.

2. Discussions of thematic bases for his hwajaeng thought, typified by the argument for the grounding of Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng tendencies in the One Mind doctrine, which is the main focus of Bhikṣuni Chŏn Haeju 全海佳 and is also discussed to some extent by Sung Bae Park. In Ven. Haeju’s establishment of the One Mind as the basis for Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng, she includes an extensive argument attempting to establish Hwaŏm (Huayan) as the major influence on Wŏnhyo’s harmonizing tendencies. Running close to this theme is the explanation made by Shigeki Satō 佐藤繁樹 of the grounding of hwajaeng in the “no-duality yet no unity” framework of the *Vajrasamādhi-sūtra*.

3. Discussions of the mechanics of the discourse through which the work of hwajaeng is actually carried out, such as that of Pak Chonghong and Sung Bae Park. Fukushi Jinin also covers this approach from a historical

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10 Ishii discusses the extent of the influence of Confucian and Daoist thought on Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng in Ishii 1983, and the influence from the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* in Ishii 2002.


12 See the introduction to Park’s Ph.D. dissertation (Park, 1979).

13 See Chŏn, 1999. For discussions in English, see the 1966 essay by Pak Chonghong entitled “Wŏnhyo ŭ ch’ŏllak sasang.” This first appeared in the volume *Han’gyuk sasangak, Puhŭg sasang’yon* (Seoul: Ilnsinsa, 1976), pp. 59–88, and has been made available to the English speaking audience through the translation by Robert Buswell with the title “Wŏnhyo’s Philosophical Thought” (in *Assimilation of Buddhism in Korea: Religious Maturity and Innovation in the Silla Dynasty*, pp. 47–103). Sung Bae Park discussed hwajaeng in his 1979 dissertation on “Wŏnhyo’s Commentaries on the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana” and we can assume this discussion will be updated and included in his forthcoming translation of these commentaries in the Wŏnhyo English translation series. See also Park, 1999, pp. 57–78.

perspective, while additionally reviewing works related to all categories (but not distinguishing them into these present categories).\(^{15}\)

Thus, when we discuss the phenomenon of hwajaeng in Wŏnhyo, it might be helpful to clarify what aspect of the project we are talking about. Are we concerned about its philological/historical roots in earlier writers and traditions (as investigated by such scholars as Ishii and Plassen)? Or are we concerned about establishing a doctrinal basis within the texts that were the objects of his exegesis, which influenced him? This would be the concern of such scholars as Ven. Haeju, who emphasizes Wŏnhyo’s affinity with the One Mind doctrine (especially as it comes to be interpreted in Hwaŏm). Pak Chonghong pays much attention to the apophatic/kataphatic influence of Mādhyamika thought, while Sung Bae Park emphasizes the relevance of the ch’e-yŏng paradigm for hwajaeng. Shigeki Satō emphasizes the “not-two, yet not attached to unity” influence coming out of Vajrasamādhi. Actually, the set of ch’e-yŏng, One Mind, and the “neither two nor one” as seen in the paradigms emphasized by Park, Haeju, and Satō are quite close to each other in their structure and implications.

Another distinct aspect that can be discussed is that of the methodology of Wŏnhyo’s hwajaeng—what kinds of tropes and literary techniques does he use to carry out his commensuration of disparate positions? One of the most prominent, that has been noted by many scholars, is that of kae-hap or “opening and combining,” which is closely related to his penchant for establishing and refuting the same notion in a single passage. We will address this, along with some other rhetorical techniques below.

One point, readily acknowledged by scholars as a by-product, or component of hwajaeng, but which actually can be seen as a causal factor, especially in comparison with the p’an’gyo inclinations of Wŏnhyo’s colleagues, is the fact that he was not affiliated with any particular school. Much of the motivation and very structure of the p’an’gyo practice was that of the valorization of the school or tradition to which one belonged, and thus, the specific text or family of texts that that tradition held to be the consummation of the Buddhist teachings. Wŏnhyo was the only major commentator who was not a founding patriarch, or in the lineage of a distinct tradition, and thus he had no institutionally-motivated obligation to set one particular teaching on top and the others below. One might well raise the chicken-or-egg question as to whether it was his basic hwajaeng orientation that led him to be non-sectarian, or the other way around, but nonetheless he did not have this formal restriction in place when he went to work.

\(^{15}\) For a more comprehensive listing of recent Korean works on hwajaeng, see note no. 2 in Fukushi 2004.
This is not to say that Wŏnhyo did not have his own preferences as to what constituted a more profound, or widely applicable interpretation of the Buddhadharma, or a more rigorously developed theory. It is clear that he personally preferred an innate-buddhahood interpretation of Mahayana (which clearly attributed the human mind with an intrinsically good nature) over a Yogācāra position of overall moral qualitative indeterminacy of the mind. But this personal preference does not result in any systematic disparagement, or relegation of the Yogācāra teachings. On the other hand, in terms of hermeneutical sources, Wŏnhyo relies on Yogācāra texts more than those of any other single tradition. This reliance attests to the strongly rational and systematic inclinations of his writing, as the doctrines of any distinguishable strain of discourse, whether it be from the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, *Amitābha Sutra*, *Lotus Sutra*, or any other Mahayana scripture, must pass the test of logical validity, as well as consistency with Mahayana Buddhist principles of individuated cause-and-effect, which happen to be explained in the greatest detail in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other Yogācāra works.16 Wŏnhyo makes his evaluations based more on his own learning and predilections, rather than for the purpose of giving added weight to any certain doctrinal system. Therefore, there is a distinctive level of fairness that he brings to his work.

There are modern-day scholars who, having affiliation with specific lineages, tend to try to identify him with their own tradition—something that he would have probably found amusing. Of course, there are occasional references to Wŏnhyo in East Asian commentarial works indicating him to be of Huayan lineage. But I don’t see how the position of Huayan association can be supported by a full and balanced reading of his extant corpus, or the titles of his non-extant works.17

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16 Please see my discussion of Wŏnhyo’s usage of Yogācāra texts in his exegetical works in Muller 2007 and 2009.

17 In his *Ijang ŭi*, Wŏnhyo distinguishes discourse regarding the two hindrances into two main categories, one being a Tathāgatagarbhaic category, derived primarily from the interpretations provided by the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* [AMF], and *Śrīmālā-sūtra*, with the other being a Yogācāric category, derived from explanations of the hindrances found in the *Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra*, *Fodijing lun*, and other texts of the Weishi orthodoxy. Wŏnhyo labels the AMF’s interpretation of the hindrances as the indirect interpretation (*ŭnmil mun* 隱密門), and the standard Yogācāra explanation as the direct interpretation (*hyŏllyo mun* 显了門). Ven. Haeju, in her introduction to the Korean version of Volume One of the Chogye Translation Series (*Han’guk ch’ŏn’g’ong masang ch’ŏng sŏ, Pulgyo p’yŏn, ch’ŏngsŏn Wŏnhyo 한국정통사상총서, 불교원 정신 원효*), citing previous work by Yi Pyongnae, asserts that Wŏnhyo’s classification of the Yogācāra hindrances as “direct” and the Tathāgatagarbha hindrances as “indirect” constitutes a kind of *p’an’gyo* value judgment on his part, indicating his higher evaluation of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition. But I see no necessity to read it this way, in view of the actual content of the discussion of the *Ijang ŭi* itself. Leaving aside for the
Wŏnhyo was extremely prolific, having composed over two hundred fascicles in more than eighty works. Among these, twenty-two are extant either in full or fragmentarily. He composed commentaries on almost all of the most important texts from the major Mahayana traditions being studied in China at the time, with the exception of Esoteric Buddhism. Doctrinal traditions covered in his works include Prajñāpāramitā, Three-Treatise (Madhyamaka), Nirvana, Tathāgatagarbha, Lotus, Tiantai, Vinaya, Pure Land, Yogācāra, State Protection, Huayan, and Buddhist Logic. He wrote over eighty works on these texts and topics in over two hundred fascicles.

Wŏnhyo’s writing exhibits a few readily distinguishable modes of prose and poetic style. These are sometimes associated with a particular philosophical influence or a distinctive type of hermeneutic or discursive approach, of which several intertwining types can be identified. One of the first forms that can be discerned in the writings of Wŏnhyo is a lyrical mode that emulates Daoist style, most notably the Daode jing. This mode, especially seen in the prefatory sections of his works, serves mainly to elaborate and praise the attributes of the Dharma, the Great Vehicle, enlightenment, and so forth. It is powerful in its ability to describe something wondrous and inconceivable, but not applied in the development of any sort of specific doctrinal position. The verses that serve to comprise the prolegomena to Wŏnhyo’s commentaries are invariably accompanied by or blended with an exercise in inconceivability, using examples of extreme space, time, and so on, as can be seen, for example, in the prolegomenon to his commentary on the Flower Ornament Sutra.
Now, in the unhindered and unobstructed Dharma-opening of the Dharma-realm there is no Dharma, and yet no non-Dharma; no opening, and yet no non-opening. Thus it is neither large nor small, neither in a hurry nor taking its time; neither moving nor still, neither one nor many. Not large, it can become an atom, leaving nothing behind. Not small, it can contain all of space with room left over. Unhurried, it can include all the kalpas in the three divisions of time; not taking its time, it can enter fully into an instant. Neither moving nor still, samsāra is nirvāṇa and nirvāṇa is samsāra. Neither one nor many, one dharma is all dharmas and all dharmas are one dharma. (HPC 1.495a6–10)

The above passage is also useful for introducing the rhetorical strategy of kae-bap that is stressed by many modern scholars—a literary practice that is somewhat reminiscent of the Chan trope of “rolling out and taking back up”—one of Wŏnhyo’s strategies that works toward the disallowing of rigidly holding to a specific doctrinal position. Pak Chonghong characterizes this as:

“Open” (開; kae) opens up to the reader the vast numbers of different ideas presented in a text, while “combine,” (合; bap) provides a synthetic perspective which can reveal how those various ideas complement one another. When both the hermeneutics of opening and combining hermeneutics are applied simultaneously in the explication of a text, one is free to advocate certain positions and to critique others. One can open up for analysis different viewpoints without creating unnecessary complications, as well as combine those viewpoints into a single overriding perspective without creating untoward parochialism. Put another way, treating a text either analytically or synthetically neither adds anything to it nor takes anything away. Hence, one may advocate something without gaining anything, or critique something else without losing anything. (Pak, pp. 49–50; slightly modified from Robert Buswell’s original translation.)

I am in agreement that this kind of kae-bap stylistic strategy is distinctive in, and used by Wŏnhyo in his prolegomena and some places in his exegetical writings. Some caution is warranted, though, in asserting its role in Wŏnhyo’s writings to the extreme suggested by Pak and those who follow him on this, in that so far, the only examples that have been provided of its application have been like the above passage—which are taken from the short prefaces and prolegomena to his
Muller: Wŏnhyo’s Approach to Harmonization of the Mahayana Doctrines

commentarial writings. No doubt special attention should be paid to these prefaces, as they represent the essence of his thought and skills of literary expression. But it is much more difficult to demonstrate its consistent application in the longer exegetical portions of Wŏnhyo’s works, and there are a number of other complicated things going on there.20

Another prominent form of discourse utilized by Wŏnhyo is a paradoxical logic reminiscent of the Prajñāpāramitā texts, that goes something like “Since there is nothing that is shown, there is nothing that is not shown. Since there is nothing to attain, there is nothing that is not attained”21 In this case, rather than taking a

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20 The usage of kae-hap by Wŏnhyo was clearly articulated in the above passage from Pak Chonghong’s “Wŏnhyo ŭi chŏlhak sasang” (translated by Robert E. Buswell with the title “Wŏnhyo’s Philosophical Thought”), an essay in which Pak analyzed Wŏnhyo’s thought from a range of interrelated perspectives, taking buqjaeg as his point of departure, and then moving into a discussion the concepts of kae-hap (rendered by Buswell as “synthesis/analysis”) and “thematic essentials” (chong-yo 宗要); apophasis and kataphasis; and syncretism (t’ong Pulgyo 通佛). Pak’s overview has come to serve as a standard reference for scholars in Korea and the West in their own works on Wŏnhyo. Sung Bae Park, in writing his own summary of Wŏnhyo’s thought (in Silla Buddhist Spirituality) adheres closely to the sequence and content of Pak’s analysis, while adding the argument that buqjaeg grows primarily out of Wŏnhyo’s ch’e-yong (essece-function) inclinations, a position that he establishes through citation of the Wŏnhyo’s commentaries on the Awakening of Faith. This singling out of kae-hap as a basic organizing principle for Wŏnhyo’s writing by Pak Chonghong is cited in turn by several modern scholars in their own introductions to Wŏnhyo’s thought. For example: Robert Buswell, in Cultivating Original Enlightenment (2007, UHP) says:

In his lengthier works, including most of his commentaries (so) and “thematic essentials” (chong-yo), Wŏnhyo often employs a nascent hermeneutical approach to explicate the text, an approach that was first explained by Pak Chonghong: explications based on “analysis” (kae; lit. “to open up” [for analysis]) and “synthesis” (hap; lit. “to combine together” [in a synthesis]), which reveal the text’s “themes and essentials” (chong-yo). In analytical mode, Wŏnhyo seeks to unpack for the reader the vast array of teachings and doctrines appearing in a text as a way of illustrating the diversity and originality of Buddhist doctrinal teachings. In synthetic mode, Wŏnhyo seeks to explain how the variant ideas described in a text can actually be viewed as complementing one another. Both of these hermeneutical devices applied together then yield a description of the principal topic and insight of the text: its “themes and essentials.”

Kim Yongpyo (2002, p. 54), cites Buswell’s above prose from a 2002 article that treats the same topic. While I generally agree that a principle resembling this can be seen operating in Wŏnhyo’s works, there is a problem to be seen in the presentations on the topic made thus far, in that they tend to cite the same narrow set of passages from Wŏnhyo’s prefaces and prolegomena. My guess is that the argument can probably eventually be made, but I do not think it has yet been done adequately.

21 無所示故、無所不示。無所得故、無所得不 (Dae hyedo gyeong jong-yo, Doctrinal Essentials of the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra; 大慧度經宗要; HPC 1.480a16–17; T 1697.33.68c4–5.)
point to the limit of its logical extension, as in the Daoistic mode discussed above, we see a series of paradoxical statements that reflect an understanding of the logic of Buddhist emptiness (śūnyatā). This mode often ends up being indistinguishable from another favorite approach, the “negation of negation” as seen in Mādhyamika logic, and utilized throughout Wŏnhyo’s writings. At the same time it should be noted that this is, like his other rhetorical strategies, not something that he adheres to exclusively.

Mixed in with these modal borrowings from classical Chinese and Indian Buddhist modes of discourse are East Asian approaches, such as a reliance on the paradigm of essence-function. Wŏnhyo moves seamlessly between these modes, combining them to execute his detailed arguments that ultimately assert the integrity of the Mahayana system.

4. PHILOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: TERMINOLOGICAL BASES FOR HWAJAENG

As noted earlier, aside from its appearance in the title of the SHN, the word hwajaeng only appears once in Wŏnhyo’s writings—in the Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra, in the section where he explains the four attributes of the dharmakāya. There we read:

第六、四德分別、略有四門。一顯相門、二立意門、三差別門、四和諍門。  
Sixth is the distinction of the four attributes, which are outlined into four approaches: (1) the approach of revealing their marks; (2) the approach of defining them; (3) the approach of distinguishing them, and (4) the approach of harmonizing them.²²

In the section on the fourth approach, that of harmonizing, we read:

次第四、明和相諍論。諍論之興乃有多瑞、而於當偏起異諍法身常住、化身起滅。於此二身諸説不同。唯於報身二執別起。別起之諍  
Next is the fourth, the clarification of the harmonization of debates. As these debates proliferate they show much promise; yet they go to extremes, giving rise to disagreements. The Dharma-body abides eternally, while the transformation body arises and ceases. Theories regarding these two bodies are not in agreement. Only in regard to the reward body do two attachments arise separately. These separately arisen disagreements do not

²² T 1769.38.245b24.
go beyond two trajectories, viz., attachment to eternal abiding and attachment to impermanence. Within the position of attachment to the eternal there are also two camps. The position of one is that...23

From here Wŏnhyo will—as usual—go into an extensive discussion analyzing the two positions, showing the underpinnings and contextual framework leading to each position.

The two logographs comprising the term hwajaeng 和諍 are also seen separated within phrases, with the same sort of implications, as in the Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra:

統眾典之部分歸萬流之一味、開佛意之至公、和百家之異諍
[It] unifies the divisions of all the scriptures, returning the thousand streams to the single taste [of the ocean]. Revealing the perfect fairness of the Buddha’s intention, it harmonizes the dissension among the hundred philosophers.24

Or, the Expository Notes to the Awakening of Faith:

如攝論說。三性相望、不異非不異。應如是說。若能解此三性不一不異義者、百 家之諍、無所不和也。
As the Mahāyānasūtraṃgraha says: “The relationship between the three natures is one of neither difference nor non-difference. You should explain it like this: If you are able to understand the meaning of neither sameness nor difference among the three natures, none of the disagreements among the hundred philosophers will not be harmonized.”25

There are several examples of this sort, and these represent the gamut of the actual usage of the term hwajaeng in Wŏnhyo’s texts. What is more important is that the notion is amply expressed throughout his writings with other terms, and in the character of the content of the discourse itself.

An important synonym of hwajaeng that Wŏnhyo uses—and one that appears more often in Buddhist texts in general—is hoet’ong 會通—a term that has basic connotations very close to the implications of hwajaeng in Wŏnhyo’s context—the commensuration of variant doctrines and interpretations26 For example, we read once again in the Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra:

23 T 1769.38.247c2–6.
24 T 1769.38.239a25
25 T 1845.44.227c20.
26 The term hoet’ong appears in every major Buddhist dictionary, while hwajaeng appears in none. We
The meaning of Buddha-nature is distinguished into six aspects: (1) showing the essence; (2) cause and effect; seeing the nature; (4) existence and non-existence; (5) in the three times; (6) commensuration.  

It is important to note here that when Wŏnhyo arranges the structure of exegesis of a text or a certain doctrinal problem, it is typically the case that the last section is going to be the one where the various incongruent positions on the matter are taken up for analysis, with the intent of arriving to a deeper understanding of the issues involved, if not a total commensuration among those positions. As another example, the prologue to the Ijang ŭi reads:

The doctrine of the two hindrances will be explained in six aspects: (1) The definition of their terminology; (2) the presentation of their essences and characteristics; (3) an explication of their functions; (4) a summary of their various categories; (5) a clarification of the processes of their subjugation and elimination; (6) the resolution of discrepancies.

For Wŏnhyo, the resolution of discrepancies is inevitably the ultimate task to be undertaken.

His basic strategy is to identify the underlying assumptions, as well as the overriding aims and purposes of the disputants. When two scholars are in disagreement on a point of doctrine, unless one is clearly guilty of a fallacy, it is rarely the case that one is right, and the other wrong. He starts off with the assumption that their argument has a specific intention, or that their basic viewpoint regarding the issues has been informed by a clearly definable background. Once the individual scholar’s intent, background, and point have been fully laid bare, Wŏnhyo usually acknowledges that “he has a valid point,” or “his position makes sense,” it is “logical,” etc. The operative phrase here is yu tori 有道理 which is commonly seen in phrases such as isa sosŏl kae yu tori

find 1,697 appearances of the former in Taishō, with only 76 for the latter. I would like to acknowledge being alerted to Wŏnhyo’s more extensive usage of this term by Fukushi Jinin, who identifies seven instances of appearance of the term at critical junctures in Wŏnhyo’s works. A digital search for hoe tong through Wŏnhyo’s extant corpus yields sixteen occurrences.  

This, by the way, is a fascinating discussion, done mostly with Buddhist logic, reconciling a series of positions on the existence, nominal existence, and real existence of self and dharmas, as well as stages of the bodhisattva path with their Hinayāna counterparts. HPC 1.789c4.
二師所說皆有道理（the theories of both scholars make sense, have a valid principle, etc.), or 二師皆有道理（both theories make sense, have a valid principle, are logical, etc.)

Of course this kind of phrase can be seen in the writings of other major commentators of the period, but nowhere near to the extent and frequency that it is used by Wŏnhyo. Again and again, he takes us through a detailed analysis of all the positions involved in a given argument, ending with this conclusion.\(^{29}\)

First, let us look at some brief examples, and then we will follow with a more detailed account of an argument with which some of us are familiar.

From the *Commentary on the Awakening of Mahayana Faith*,

二師所說皆有道理、皆依聖典之所說故。初師所說得瑜伽意。後師義者得起信意。

The theories of both scholars are valid, since they both rely on scriptural authority. The theory of the first scholar relies on the logic of the *Yogācārabhūmi*; the second relies on the logic of the *Awakening of Faith*.\(^{30}\)

From the *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra* (Kŭmgang sammae kyŏng non):

問。餘處說有三無性觀。何故此中但說二無。答。無相無生合為一邊。所遣相生同是有故。又、此二觀皆有尋思。遣無性時無尋思故、或開或合。皆有道理故。

Question: In other places it is explained that there are three contemplations of naturelessness. How is that only two are explained here?

Answer: Marklessness and birthlessness combine to form one extreme, since the marks and the birth that are expelled are the same in being existent. Furthermore, these two contemplations both have discursive thought. Since, when one expels naturelessness there is no discursive thought, whether you explain them from the perspective of unfolding or combining, both are valid.\(^{31}\)

Finally, once more from the *Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra*:

問。二師所說、何得何失。答。或有說者皆得皆失。所以然者。若決定執一邊皆有過失。如其無障礙說倶有道理。

Question: Which, between the theories of these two scholars is correct and mistaken?

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\(^{29}\) The exact phrase *yu tori* （有道理） appears in Wŏnhyo’s extant corpus more than fifty times, but other related usages of *tori* （道理） can be seen more than three hundred times. Fukushi cites about twenty instructive cases.

\(^{30}\) T 1844.44.217a16.

\(^{31}\) T 1730.34.965b17–21; HPC 1.611b13–18; See Buswell 2007, p. 73.
Answer: According to one position, both are correct and both are mistaken. How so? If you are rigidly attached to one extreme, both are wrong. In the case of an unhindered explanation, both are valid.\(^{32}\)

It should be noted that these kinds of pronouncements inevitably constitute the summation of a long and detailed discussion, sometimes extending over several pages, including as many as six divergent positions, often being treated at multiple levels of interpretation. The point is, one should not assume that Wŏnhyo is simply pronouncing both positions to be valid based on a brief look. Let us now take a look at an example that retains larger portions of the full argument.

This example is a treatment of the classic Yogācāra issue of the extent and depth of the penetration of nescience and affliction within the eight consciousnesses, something that Wŏnhyo was compelled to confront in the course of his detailed study of the two hindrances—the ĩjang ŭi. It occurs in the context of his discussion of the three karmic moral qualities (sam sŏng 三性) of wholesome (sŏn sŏng 善性), unwholesome (ak sŏng 惡性), and indeterminate (mugi sŏng 無記性) within the cognitive hindrances (soji chang 所知障). This discussion, treating the matter of whether the nescience of attachment to dharmas (pŏpchip mumyŏng 法執無明) is limited only to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, or also includes the five sense consciousnesses and ālayavijñāna, may seem to some to be arcane and trivial. But it has profound ramifications for explaining the exact processes for the generation of, and removal of various forms of nescience. And it is typical of the thoroughness with which Wŏnhyo will pursue a discrepancy that he believes needs clarification. This discussion covers almost two full pages in the HPC (1.791b–793a) and translates out to some fifteen pages in English\(^{33}\). I have here just included the opening and closing passages, leaving out the bulk of the intermediate argumentation.

所知障體其相云何。或有說者、法執無明唯在第六、第七二識、不通餘識。推求性故、法愛恚等非見所攝。不推求者亦通五識。如攝論說「能遍計心唯意識」故。一切不通阿賴耶識。如瑜伽說。「阿賴耶識無有不與」煩惱、而共相應。」故。What are the characteristics of the composition of the cognitive hindrances? Some say that the nescience of attachment to dharmas only exists in the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, and does not extend to the other consciousnesses.\(^{35}\) Strictly speaking, attraction or aversion to

\(^{32}\) T 1769.38.248b27.

\(^{33}\) Translated in full in Muller and Nguyen 2012.

\(^{34}\) Here we change 不與 as found in the HPC to 無有 as seen in Taishō.

\(^{35}\) According to Kuiji, this distinction in the two positions as to whether or not discrimination is limited to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, or extends to the eighth consciousness can be
Wŏnhyo’s Approach to Harmonization of the Mahayana Doctrines

dharmas is not something that is included in the category of the sensible.\textsuperscript{36} But if we interpret in a looser sense, then [attachment and aversion] to dharmas can also be said to be shared by the five [sense] consciousnesses. As the Mahāyānasamgraha says: “Subjective pervasive discrimination is only done by the manovijñāna.”\textsuperscript{37} None whatsoever occurs in the ālayavijñāna. As the Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra says: “The ālayavijñāna does not contain afflictions, even if it is associated with them.”\textsuperscript{38} (HPC 1.791b12)

Wŏnhyo proceeds from here into a detailed analysis of numerous arguments from the Mahāyānasamgraha, Yogācārabhūmi, Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, Fodijing lun, Madhyāntavibhāga, etc., which support this position from various angles. He arrives to the end of his articulation of this position with a citation from the Fodijing lun, saying:

\begin{quote}
若此識中有法執者、成法我見。有無明等不應唯與五法相應。 [...] 
又、若此識有法執者、無所薰故、應念念失。不須對治卽成太過。
\end{quote}

If there were attachment to dharmas within this [ālaya] consciousness, it would construct views of the inherent existence of dharmas. If this were the case, then the existence of nescience and so forth would not be limited in its association to only the five [pervasively functioning] mental factors.\textsuperscript{40} “Furthermore, if this consciousness had attachment to dharmas, it would not undergo perfumation, and therefore would disappear in every thought-moment. If one did not employ corrective practices, there would be great error.”\textsuperscript{41}

He then, after exhaustively articulating the positions that recognize attachment to dharmas only in the manas and manovijñāna, takes up the other side. Importantly, the citations to support the argument come from basically the same body of texts—and so this is not the position of a scholar from another tradition, such as an adherent of the Nirvana Sutra, Awakening of Mahayana Faith, etc.:
Some maintain that discrimination and attachment to dharmas functions throughout the eight consciousnesses. This is because when one has not realized the selflessness of dharmas, one grasps to discriminated characteristics. As the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* says: “From the eighth *bhūmi* up, the extremely subtle latent afflictions are removed. After this, none of the afflictions will ever again be active. From here only the cognitive hindrances exist to serve as the basis for mental disturbance.”\(^{42}\) This shows that subsequent to the eighth [bodhisattva] ground only the cognitive hindrances are active, and one cannot say that the hindrances are produced by the forthcoming consciousnesses, since they do not serve as a basis for the latent afflicting. One should understand that this means that the extremely subtle cognitive hindrances in the *ālayavijñāna* continue their activity unabated.\(^{43}\)

Again, we are taken through several pages of detailed argumentation punctuated by extensive and relatively precise\(^{44}\) citation. He moves toward winding up this portion of the argument as follows:

From this we know that the five consciousnesses also have mistaken attachment. Yet these five consciousnesses only attach to the five [material] objects. They are not able to engage in calculating everything (*parikalpanā*), and they do not attach to names. Therefore [the activity of] calculating everything is said to be limited to the *manovijñāna* (sixth consciousness). If, based on these passages, one affirms that the five consciousnesses lack attachment to dharmas, then it would follow that the *manas* (seventh consciousness) is also not attached to dharmas. Therefore we can confirm that this text does not corroborate [the position taken by the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*].\(^{45}\)

And finally...

\(^{42}\) T 676.16.707c17–18.

\(^{43}\) HPC 1.791c15–22

\(^{44}\) I stress the aspect of precision here after having the opportunity to do more extensive work with the commentaries written by many of Wŏnhyo’s Silla and Tang colleagues. Wŏnhyo’s accuracy in citing the title and the actual prose of the source is remarkably high.

\(^{45}\) HPC 1.792a20–b3.
One theory asserts that since there is no attachment to person in the preparatory path prior to the meditation on the selflessness of person, then there should also be no attachment to dharmas in the preparatory path prior to the meditation on the selflessness of dharmas. Another position is that since in the preparatory path prior to the contemplation on no-self, there is no apprehension of a self, in the preparatory path prior to the marklessness [concentration], there is no apprehension of marks. The analogy of the objection fails in the former case, and it also fails in the latter case. If you follow this logic, there is no mistake.

Some say that the views presented by both scholars are equally valid. How so? If you maintain a loose interpretation of the matter, then the theory of the first scholar makes sense. If you look at the matter more thoroughly, allowing for both rough and specific approaches, then the theory of the second scholar also makes sense. If one recognizes that each approach is based on its own valid logic, the apparent contradictions in the texts can be well reconciled.

If we were to take the nescience of the attachment to dharmas in the narrow interpretation and try to apply it throughout the situations of eight consciousnesses and three karmic moral qualities, it would not make sense, and thus it would be incorrect. If, on the other hand, you view the attachment to dharmas in its looser interpretation and try to limit it to the two [manavijñāna and manas] consciousnesses, it will also not work well. Not only will it not make sense, but it will also be at odds with scriptural authority. Since the theories of the two scholars are not [misapplied] like this, both theories make sense.
I would like here to emphasize the balance taken in his approach, and the thoroughness of the investigation. Wŏnhyo is not saying anything like “all these positions are ultimately the same” (as he is sometimes characterized as doing). He is saying that each scholar is making a valid point, based on the sources being used and the perspective of his particular approach. In this example Wŏnhyo does not make any evaluative judgment between these positions. He will, however, make evaluative judgments in other places, one of the better known being his evaluation of the positions of the six scholars in the *Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra*. But this is not because he is committed to supporting a certain lineage or doctrine. It is simply because he finds a particular line of argumentation to represent a more profound, or rigorous understanding.

There are also instances where a given position will be judged invalid. In these cases, however, invalidity is usually demonstrated by applying a rule from Hetuvidyā or Mādhyamika principles of proof. Thus, Wŏnhyo extensively utilized the logical traditions of Hetuvidyā and Madhyamaka in conducting his inquiries.

One of the most concentrated and sustained examples of this kind of approach can be seen in the *SHN*\(^5^3\)—one of Wŏnhyo’s few extant non-commentarial essays.\(^5^4\) The *Ijang ŭi* is comparable to the *SHN* in the fact of its being an essay and not a direct commentary, but it is in some sense a commentarial work, since he wrote it in conjunction with his commentaries on the *Awakening of Faith*, for the purpose of coming to full grips with a problem presented in that treatise. The *SHN* can be characterized as a methodological exercise that selectively utilizes Mādhyamika and Dignāgan logic, interwoven with the motifs of several major Mahayana scriptures, including the *Lotus Sutra*, *Nirvana Sutra*, *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, *Prajñāpāramitā Sutra*, and so on. As in his other works, Wŏnhyo’s point is to work through ostensibly conflicting doctrinal problems to clarify their content, reveal their underpinnings, and ultimately demonstrate the way that the variant doctrinal positions fit into the Mahayana Buddhist system as a whole.

\(^{53}\) HPC 1.838a–840c. Unfortunately, only fragments from the beginning portion of this text are extant. A translation is available in Muller and Nguyen 2012.

\(^{54}\) Wŏnhyo also wrote a couple of hortatory tracts for practitioners, which are translated in *Wŏnhyo: Selected Works*. Muller, 2012.
5. PARADIGMATIC BASES FOR WŎNHYO’S PERSPECTIVE OF HARMONIZATION

(1) The One Mind

As mentioned above, different paradigmatic structures are posited by scholars as providing the primary conceptual framework for Wŏnhyo’s harmonization of doctrines in his integrated view of Mahayana Buddhism. One that is often seen taken up by Korean scholars as the basis for doctrinal harmonization is that of his understanding of the One Mind. In his discussions of Buddha-nature/original enlightenment works, such as the *Awakening of Faith*, *Vajrasamādhi-sūtra*, *Nirvana Sutra*, and so forth, the notion of One Mind plays a pivotal role.

In terms of representing Wŏnhyo’s view of the One Mind as the mainspring that motivated his practical outlook, one of the direct and sustained discussions takes place in his *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra*, presumed to have been written in his later years. The One Mind there is described as being bound to neither existence nor non-existence: in its real and mundane aspects, it is neither one nor two, neither pure nor defiled. The harmonization that merges the real and mundane is based on One Mind.

In this text Wŏnhyo unfolds his view of the performance of practice through the logic of harmonization. In the prolegomenon to his commentary on this sutra, we can see that in the course of clarifying the source of the One Mind and the ocean of the three kinds of emptiness, of existence and non-existence, the real and the mundane are not two. At the same time, they are not one, as expressed in the phrase, “non-dual, without sticking to unity” 無二不守一.

The sutra says: At this juncture the Honored One spoke a *gāthā* saying: “The meaning of the production from causes and conditions is the meaning of extinction. The meaning of the non-production and extinction is that of the “single taste” 一味 which is explained from the perspective of the aspect of *nirvāṇa* and the aspect of Buddha-nature. This “single taste” can be seen as another expression for the One Mind, referring to the non-unitary yet non-dual nature of reality.

55 In the *Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra*, the ground for the logic of harmonization is that of the “single taste” 一味 which is explained from the perspective of the aspect of *nirvāṇa* and the aspect of Buddha-nature. This “single taste” can be seen as another expression for the One Mind, referring to the non-unitary yet non-dual nature of reality.

56 Trans. in Buswell 2007.
of all production and extinction means production and non-extinction.” The treatise says: This is the fourth explanation. The meaning of the four phrases has both specific and general aspects. From a specific standpoint, it clarifies the meaning of the two aspects. From a general standpoint, it expresses the dharma of the One Mind. All Buddha dharmas are contained in this One Mind and Two Aspects, and there are none that are not contained. What does this mean? The prior two phrases merge the conventional with the real, expressing the meaning of equality. The latter two phrases merge the real with the conventional, expressing the aspect of differentiation. Stated from the general perspective, while the real and conventional are not two, there is no clinging to oneness (thus non-differentiation, monism, etc.). Since there are not two, it is none other than this One Mind. Not sticking to oneness, the two fully and completely emerge. This is what is known as the One Mind in Two Aspects.57

For Wŏnhyo, the essential nature and characteristics are interfused; past and present are wrapped up in each other, and the diverse arguments of the one hundred philosophers are harmoniously reconciled with each other.58 This explanation of the One Mind as given in the Exposition is, as might be expected, closely related to the One Mind of the Tathāgatagarbha found in his Commentary on the Awakening of Mahayana Faith and the Expository Notes on the Awakening of Mahayana Faith. After all, the Awakening of Mahayana Faith was for Wŏnhyo “the text that posits and negates freely, being the patriarchal source of all doctrines and the chief arbitrator of all debates” (HPC 1.678a18–19) and which took the theory of Tathāgatagarbha as the principle for the harmonization of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka.

Because the minds of thusness and arising-and-ceasing, which are two aspects of the One Mind, have the appearance of being in conflict with each other, the Awakening of Mahayana Faith reconciles them by explaining that they are actually only Two Aspects of the One Mind. Because there are Two Aspects to the One Mind, these two approaches combine to produce, through the reciprocal function of both aspects (posing and refuting), the three kinds of greatness of essence, aspects, and function.59 Therefore, it is argued that the One Mind is a major basis for Wŏnhyo’s harmonization of disputes, and the One Mind that is the principle

57 T 1730.34.995c26–996a3; HPC 1.658c9–16.
of the harmonization of disputes is the mind of the Tathāgatagarbha of the *Awakening of Faith*.

The prior passage from the *Exposition* is helpful for demonstrating, in a few short passages, a seminal characteristic of Wŏnhyo’s approach to the Dharma, which basically cannot be separated from his hermeneutical method. However, while it does lend support to the positions of those scholars who take the One-Mind/Two-Aspects paradigm as being the basis for Wŏnhyo’s approach, within it I see contained a more pervasive, lesser common denominator functioning throughout Wŏnhyo’s exegetical rhetoric, one which is perhaps so obvious that it goes unnoticed. Or perhaps because it is something not especially distinctive within Buddhist discourse, some scholars may think Wŏnhyo would receive no special merit from recognition of its usage. I am referring here to the two truths. I do not dispute the One-Mind-in-Two-Aspects approach as one viable way of trying to show a basis for Wŏnhyo’s attempts at philosophical commensuration. I do, however, think that those who would like to argue for it as the most fundamental basis for Wŏnhyo’s *hwaajaeng* argumentation are going beyond what is necessary in identifying the basic apparatus used by Wŏnhyo in making his arguments.

(2) Two Truths

Specifically, it seems to me that everything that the One Mind in Two Aspects approach has to provide for the philosophical argumentation that Wŏnhyo would like to undertake is more fully encompassed by seeing it as a development, or alternative expression of his application of the two truths. We can find two-truths hermeneutics applied virtually everywhere in Wŏnhyo’s writing. It is often stated that one scholar’s position can be seen as holding true from an absolute (*chin* 真) perspective, while the other can be seen as holding true from conventional (*sok* 俗) perspective. Equally visible in this respect are the various analogs of the two truths, such as emptiness (*kong* 空) and existence (*yu* 有), the conditioned (*yuwi* 有爲) and the unconditioned (*muwi* 無爲), etc.

In acknowledging the extent of his application of the two truths, one could say that Wŏnhyo is following a general Buddhist approach that is explicitly articulated in Madhyamaka and subsequently applied by numerous influential thinkers from various schools. What is perhaps slightly distinctive about Wŏnhyo is the extent of his unceasing emphasis on the mutual containment of the two truths—their not being two yet not being one. Furthermore, the two truths simultaneously play

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60 See Ch’oe Yujin 1988; also Ishii 1990, p. 546.
the role of hermeneutic tool with which one deals with the text as object, while at the same time serving as a type of personal (meditative) exercise for undoing the habituated tendencies of one’s own consciousness—the tendency to instantaneously and unconsciously move in the conceptual directions of reification or nihilation. For Wŏnhyo, the act of scriptural exegesis and one’s engagement in one’s own personal efforts toward breaking the habituation of constructing and maintaining dualisms are not two separate things. Thus, he seems to believe these categories, applied flexibly, and pushed to their limits, can go just about the whole way in explaining the contradictions to be seen in Buddhist discourse, without needing to take the step of placing texts, theories, and doctrines into pigeonholes.

Thus, lurking in the background of this entire discussion is the basic Buddhist problem of attachment (ch’ip 执), to any kind of rigid position, whether it be the conventional or the real, existence or emptiness, etc. Attachment, typically expressed in the extremes of reification and nihilism, is the key object of criticism in Wŏnhyo’s comments on the Mahāyāna precepts, where he argues repeatedly that the most critical point is not to reify the precepts in either direction, but to be able to flexibly judge morality according to the proper context. And while we still have this passage fresh in our minds, we should also take note of a couple of other key terms that appear there, which are regularly-employed hermeneutic categories for Wŏnhyo, equally serving to maintain fluidity of interpretive perspective: these are the categories of specific (pyŏl 別), and general (ch’ong 总, or t’ong 通), as well as fine (se 细) and coarse (ch’u 粗). Quite often a given theory is seen as being acceptable in a general sense, but not in specific situations, and vice versa. We are going to return to this important matter of non-attachment toward the end of this essay.

One of the best examples of Wŏnhyo’s usage of the two truths in an exercise of non-attachment to extremes is found in his preface to the Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra 金剛三昧經論:

夫一心之源
離有無而獨凈。三空之海融貫俗而湛然。湛然融二而不一。獨凈、離邊而非中。
非中而離邊故、不有之法不即住無。不無之相、不卽住有。不一而融二故、非眞之事、未始為俗。
非俗之理、未始為眞也。融二而不一故 眞俗之性 毫不立、染淨之相 莫不備焉。
離邊而非中故、有無之法無所不作、是非之義、莫不周焉。爾乃無破而無不破、
無立而無不立。可謂無理之至理、不然之大然矣。是謂斯經之大意也。

61 See for example, in the Posal kṣybon chibŏn yogi 菩薩戒本持犯要記, T 1907.45.919b3 ff. (translated by Jin Y. Park as Essentials of Observing and Transgressing the Code of Bodhisattva Precepts in volume one of the Jogye Order translation series.)
Now, the fount of the One Mind is free from existence and non-existence and is entirely pure. The ocean of the three [levels of apprehension of] emptiness\(^62\) merges the absolute and conventional and is perfectly calm. While calmly fusing two, it is not one. Entirely pure, it is free from extremes, but does not lie in the center. Not lying in the center, yet free from extremes, non-existent dharmas do not abide in non-existence, and marks that are not non-existent do not abide in existence.

Since it is not one yet merges dualities, non-absolute phenomena are not originally conventional, and the non-conventional principle is not originally absolute. Since it merges dualities and yet is not one, there is nothing that the natures of the absolute and conventional do not establish, and there are no marks of purity and pollution not contained within. Since it is free from extremes, yet not in the center, there are no existent or non-existent dharmas that are not created, and no positive or negative implications that are not subsumed.

Accordingly, without refutation, there is nothing not refuted; without positing, there is nothing not posited. We can call it the ultimate principle of no-principle, the great being-so of not being-so. This is the general message of this sutra.\(^63\)

The principle of the two truths is probably the most fundamental and extensively-used hermeneutic structure throughout Wŏnhyo’s works, applied in a way that emphasizes the importance of the maintenance of an attitude that allows the fluid shifting back and forth between the truths, as well as their analogs, such as conditioned/unconditioned, existence/emptiness, and the One Mind that always includes both aspects without being two and without being one.

But lest we oversimplify: The matter of technique and approach in the application of this basic principle is not dependent simply to a skillful application of the paradigm of the One Mind in Two Aspects, or the two truths alone. There are, in Wŏnhyo, many factors involved in being able to reconcile doctrinal disagreements, not the least of which is a basic level of mastery of the doctrines that allows him to fully apprehend what the proponents of various positions are trying to say. Wŏnhyo possessed an unusually extensive grasp of the major scriptures and śāstras from all of the Mahayana traditions represented in East Asia, and was able to readily bring to mind and cite a passage from anywhere within the Mahayana canon to support or refute a certain position.

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\(^62\) As described in the *Vajrasamādhi-sūtra*: emptiness of marks, emptiness of emptiness, emptiness of that which is empty. See T 273.9.369b5.

\(^63\) HPC 1.604b7–20
6. HARMONIZATION, FAITH, AND DISTANCE FROM LANGUAGE

(1) Linguistic hwajaeng and non-linguistic hwajaeng

To see an example of the practice of hwajaeng as an exercise carried out through systematic logical argumentation based on a thorough grasp of, and detailed citation of canonical sources, we can go just about anywhere in any of Wŏnhyo’s works, and either in the prolegomena or in the conclusion of a discussion of a doctrinal problem find an example of Wŏnhyo saying something like “Since scholar A’s position is based on idea X, and since scholar B’s position is based on idea Y, each argument is in itself valid.” That is, as the conclusion of a series of logical arguments, plural, ostensibly disparate positions can be reconciled. We can label this as one general type of hwajaeng, which is conceptual, being based in the consummation of a rational exercise, grounded in doctrinal paradigms.

We can also identify another kind of hwajaeng, one that might be seen as having more affinity with Chan practice than with the logic of Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, or Huayan. This can be characterized as “non-linguistic” hwajaeng, which consists of taking one further step in disclosing non-obstruction by saying that true resolution of a doctrinal disagreement resides neither in being able to accurately and subtly analyze the preconceptions held by a set of disputants and logically reconcile their positions, nor in seeing all doctrinal positions to be subsumed in the One Mind. It lies instead in the reader’s ability to freely dissociate her or his own mind from the words—to be able to step out into, and observe from a non-conceptualizing state. This is a dimension of Wŏnhyo’s approach that sets him apart from his doctrinal contemporaries, as we have an exegete for whom the non-linguistic domain is always just one step away, and ultimately the only true point of perceiving things the way they are. This is the hwajaeng where all conflicts are resolved in a non-conceptual experience. We might guess that the ability to do language-based hwajaeng is no doubt stimulated by having this kind of experience.

As an example of this kind of turning point in Wŏnhyo’s writings, first from the Doctrinal Essentials of the Lotus Sutra (Pŏphwa chong-ye, 法華宗要), we can read:

Resolution: This statement is not right. Why? Suppose one says that because “not three but only one [vehicle]” does not lie outside the four logical
Muller: Wonhyo’s Approach to Harmonization of the Mahayana Doctrines

possibilities, that which is to be obtained is not final. If this is the case, then obtainability is wrong, and non-obtainability is right. Since this also falls within the four possibilities, then obtainability is also not a correct observation. If, relying on words, we say it is unobtainable; this is not the same as language attaching to non-obtainability. Therefore the unobtainable does not fall within the four logical possibilities. There are other cases where one also relies on words to provisionally explain the One Vehicle, but this is not the same as language grasping to the One Vehicle. This is because the One Vehicle indeed falls outside the four possibilities. Therefore we should know that in pursuing words, both are wrong. If we are not attached to the language, there is no difference between the two explanations.

A more fully developed argument of this type can be found in the SHN:

然今更引聖說離言之喻。喻如虛空容受一切長短等色、屈申等業。若時除遣諸色色業、無色虛空相似顯現。謂除丈木處、卽丈空顯。除尺木處、卽尺空顯。除屈屈顯、除申申顯等。當知卽此顯現之空、似長似短。離言之事、如是空事。隨其所應前時容受長短等色。

Now, I will further cite from the scriptures an example of freedom from language. This is the example of empty space, which accommodates all sorts of material objects, whether they are long or short, and all sorts of actions, such as expansion and contraction. When you extract various forms and activities, non-material space seems to appear. When you extract a ten-foot rod, ten feet of space appears. When you extract a one-foot rod, one foot of space appears. When you remove [the condition of] contraction, contraction becomes evident, and when you remove expansion, expansion becomes evident. You should know that this space that becomes apparent [merely] seems long and short. The situation of being free from language is like this situation of space, which adapts according to the size and shape previously occupied by various objects.

No matter what position one takes regarding the problems of existence and emptiness, the main thing the reader has to do is learn how to apprehend the

64 The four logical possibilities (Skt. catuṣkoṭi), or tetralemma, established in Madhyamaka. The four terms of differentiation, e.g., of all things into A, not-A, both A and not-A, neither A nor not-A. Or, empty, not empty, both empty and not empty, neither empty nor not empty.
65 HPC 1.491a7–14.
66 In other words, expansion and contraction become evident only after their activity stops.
67 HPC 1.838b11–17; emphasis mine
argument while maintaining a certain degree of distance from the words themselves—an admonition that can be found frequently in Wŏnhyo’s writings.68

(2) Non-conceptual faith as the final destination

But one may ask further: how does one get to this condition, where he or she, as reader or writer, is able to avoid these inevitable conceptual traps—the traps that catch all of the unenlightened? What is the subjective, personal perspective of hwajaeng, and how does one arrive to this state?

Our investigation into hwajaeng would be incomplete if we did not take into account the fact that Wŏnhyo’s argumentation, along with its strong roots in precise philosophical argumentation through the principles in logic—grounded on an unusually broad and deep mastery of the canon—also has a distinctly religio-mystical dimension. That is, while the defense of a specific doctrinal tradition or tenet is obviously not the be-all, or end-all, for Wŏnhyo, it is further the case that in the end he is more than a philosopher, dialectician, or master of the doctrine. His ultimate purpose of resolving doctrinal disputes is a religious one—one aimed eventually at the arrival to the state of deep faith as described most completely in the Awakening of Mahayana Faith.

That deepest form of faith is a state of mind that linguistic argumentation cannot lay hold of, a state where words cannot gain any traction. Yet, in line with the fluidity of the One Mind expressed continuously throughout his writings, that state of faith in which the attachment to language is broken off can be utilized as a position that allows the exegete to see beyond the differences in the positions of the various participants in doctrinal argumentation, to see their underpinnings. Thus, the ability to be in a state wherein one is disconnected from words, while being its own end, can also serve as an exegetical standpoint from which reconciliation is far more readily undertaken.

Thus, the real source of all disputation for Wŏnhyo is none other than attachment. There are scores of examples throughout his extant writings where the correctness or not of a certain position has nothing to do with its doctrinal or logical supports: rather, the key determinant is whether or not one is attached to the position. With yet another example from the Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra:

68 One way of seeing the extent of this is by doing a search for such terms as 無言 and 絕慮 in the digital version of Wŏnhyo’s corpus (contained in Volume 1 of the digitized HPC at <http://ebti.dongguk.ac.kr/ebti_en/main.html>).
We can also re-invoke the One Mind approach in a subjective sense as a mental way of being that emphasizes personal spiritual fluidity and non-attachment to conceptual structures. In other words, the One Mind in Two Aspects is seen not as an ontology, or a hermeneutic framework, but as a way of understanding Wŏnhyo’s view of the psychological structure of his own mind, and the state of mind from which one should ideally read the scriptures, and apprehend doctrinal controversies. To say that the One Mind has two aspects is not merely a way of describing its character in an objective sense; it means that the human being who seeks to truly understand himself and his world in a holistic way must be personally able to fully experience both aspects of the mind, and must furthermore be able to move fluidly between the two. This experiential dimension is also something that has been strongly emphasized in Wŏnhyo’s biographical materials, most notably in the form of his “Consciousness-only” realization experience in the skull-filled cave on his aborted trip to China.\(^{70}\)

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\(^{69}\) HPC 1.537b5–9; T 1769.38.248b28–c3

\(^{70}\) According to the hagiographical accounts, what stopped Wŏnhyo from pursuing this opportunity to go to the Tang was none other than a major awakening experience. As the story goes, when Wŏnhyo and his colleague Úisang arrived at their port of embarkation, their ship’s departure was delayed by inclement weather. Caught in the rain and without a place to stay, they took shelter for the night in a nearby cave where they found gourds from which to drink, and so were able to get a decent night’s sleep. In the light of the dawn, they realized that the cave in which they stayed was actually a tomb, and that the “gourds” from which they had drunk were human skulls. The storm continued, delaying their departure for another day, and they were forced to spend another night in the same cave. During their second night in the cave they were unable to sleep, being plagued by ghosts and nightmares. As Wŏnhyo reflected on this experience, he suddenly became deeply aware of the extent to which his perception of the world was based on the limits of his own mind. He experienced a great awakening to the principle of Consciousness-only, after which he decided that there was, after all, no need to go to China in search of the dharma. He explained his experience thus: “Because of the arising of thought, various phenomena arise; since thought ceases, a cave and a grave are not two.” (This
Thus, while we can, from the perspective of logical argumentation, assert that the overriding goal and aim of all the modes of Wŏnhyo’s discourse described above is that of hwajaeng, we might still see hwajaeng as only the penultimate aim of Wŏnhyo’s efforts. His final purpose, even as a scholarly commentator, is religious, not philosophical or doctrinal. Thus, his intent in validating each of these texts through his exegesis is to allow each one of them to serve as the best guide possible to Buddhist salvation. As noted, he often admits, in the closing portions of his works, or in the closing sections of arguments, the futility of approaching the truth through language, and thus admonishes himself and his readers to recognize that the only real recourse is to enter the domain of the non-conceptual. As can be seen in his Doctrinal Essentials of the Sutra of Immeasurable Life (Muryangsu kyŏng chŏng-ya; 無量壽經宗要), this non-conceptual experience is none other than the experience of absolute faith itself.

The incomparable, unequaled, supreme cognitive faculty is established in order to overcome both these barriers—the doubt [about the possibility of omniscience] and the problem [of whether its attainment is sudden or gradual]. Therefore I want to clarify that this mirror-like cognitive faculty surpasses the other three kinds of cognitive faculties—there is nothing like it. Outside the two truths one resides independently, in non-duality. Both barriers and their two external expressions transcend the barrierless. One should just have faith, because it cannot be apprehended through reason. Therefore it is called the incomparable, unequalled, supreme cognitive faculty.

Or,

is a reference to the verse in the Awakening of Mahayana Faith that says when a thought arises, all dharmas arise, and when a thought ceases, all dharmas disappear.

心生故種種法生，心滅故種種法滅。 T 1666.32.577b22). And so he said: “Since there are no dharmas outside the mind, why should I seek them somewhere? I will not go to the Tang.” This story is told in Úisang’s biography in the Song gaoseng zhuan, starting on T 2061.50.729a3.

HPC 1.562a6–10.
...since there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing that [the incomparable, unequaled, supreme cognition] does not see. In this way it corrects the fourth doubt. If you are unable to grasp the point, it is like words grasping meanings—limited and limitless—none escape error. It is indeed precisely based on the approach that denies a limit that one provisionally posits limitlessness. If one is unable to resolve these four doubts, even if one manages to be born in that [pure] land, one resides only at its outer edges. If there is someone like this, even if she or he is unable to understand the world of the prior four cognitive faculties, but is able to humbly yield even though his mind’s eye is not yet opened, and with faith, think only of the Tathāgata with wholehearted submission, this kind of person, according to his level of practice, will be born in that land, and not reside at its outer edges. (HPC 1.562a24–562b8)

This same point is made in the citation from the *Doctrinal Essentials of the Lotus Sutra* above, and it appears frequently in various forms in Wŏnhyo’s commentaries on the *Awakening of Faith* and *Vajrasamādhi-sūtra*.

Again, in the closing passage of the *Ijang ŭi*, Wŏnhyo says:

然此衆生及與諸法、非如所說有人有法、而非是無故。作是說耳、然二障道理唯佛所窮。但依仰信聊須斟酌也。

Yet these sentient beings, as well as all dharmas, are not really persons or dharmas in the commonly understood sense of the word, nor are they nonexistent. I am offering this explanation, yet the truth of the two hindrances can be fathomed only by the enlightened ones. [We sentient beings] should consider it relying on pious faith.72

Finally, as Wŏnhyo says in the oft-cited preface to his *Commentary on the Awakening of Faith*:

自非杜口大士 目擊丈夫 誰能論大乘於離言 起深信於絕慮者哉

Who, besides Vimalakīrti or the One-glance Gentleman,73 can discuss the Great Vehicle without language, and produce profound faith in the state of severance of thought?74

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72 HPC 1.814b18–20.
73 A reference to Confucius and Wenbo Xuezi, who, according to the *Zhuangzi*, did not say anything to each other when they met, even though Confucius had wanted to meet Wenbo for a long time. When Confucius was asked the reason by his disciple Zīlú, he replied: “With that kind of man, one glance tells you that the Way is there before you. What room does that leave for the possibility of speech?” This discussion occurs in Chapter 21 “Tian Zi-fang.” See Burton Watson, trans., *The Complete Works of Chuang-tzu* (NY: Columbia University Press), p. 223.
74 HPC 1.698b13–14.
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Muller: Wŏnhyo’s Approach to Harmonization of the Mahayana Doctrines

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4. Abbreviations


SHN = Simmun hwajaeng non 十門和諍論. By Wŏnhyo HPC 1.838–841.

T = Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏経 (Revised Tripitaka compiled during the Taishō period). Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaikyoku 渡辺海旭, eds. Tokyo: Daizō kyōkai, 1924–1935. (Electronic Texts from SAT used as source)
