Abstract

Wŏnhyo’s *Ijang ǚi* is a lengthy treatise that examines and explains the afflictive and cognitive hindrances to liberation and enlightenment more thoroughly than any known work in the history of Buddhism. While this in itself is sufficient to make it a watershed work, the treatise goes even further, in defining two distinctive systems of the hindrances, which are associated with the two major doctrinal lineages of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha. These two systems are labeled by Wŏnhyo with the Buddhist exegetical terms “explicit” (조사, 显了門) and “inexplicit” (연여르, 隱密門). These, I argue, are for Wŏnhyo not value-laden terms as usually seen in East Asian doctrinal classification systems, but conceived based on Wŏnhyo’s impression of the relative clarity (or lack thereof) of their systematic descriptions in the source texts of the two traditions. In the end, Wŏnhyo shows not only how these systems differ, but how they also mutually complement and inform each other. This makes this treatise an emblematic work demonstrating the Silla scholiast’s hallmark methodological approach of doctrinal synthesis (화자영). Wŏnhyo’s work on this topic deeply influenced scholarship on the hindrances by later Faxiang, Tiantai, and Huayan scholars in China, Korea, and Japan. In the course of introducing the *Ijang ǚi*, I also provide a brief outline of the development of the two hindrances concepts in the Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra traditions, along with a synopsis of the major pre-Wŏnhyo treatise on the hindrances, that by the Chinese scholar Huiyuan.

Keywords: Wŏnhyo, two hindrances, āvarana, harmonization, hwajaeng, Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha, Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, Huiyuan

A. Charles Muller is a professor in the Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, University of Tokyo. His main work lies in the fields of Korean Buddhism, East Asian Yogācāra, and East Asian classical lexicography. Among his recent book-length works are *A Korean-English Dictionary of Buddhist Terms* (Unjusa, 2014), and *Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate* (University of Hawai’i Press, 2015). He is the editor-in-chief of the *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism* (http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb) and the *CJKV-E Dictionary* (http://www.buddhism-dict.net/dealt).

Correspondence: acmuller@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Introduction: Doctrinal Classification vs. Hwajaeng

Wŏnhyo’s (617–686) System of the Two Hindrances (K. Ijang īi 二障義) is without doubt one of the most magisterial pieces of Buddhist scholarship ever written. Other scholars—even Wŏnhyo himself—may have written more lengthy and detailed commentaries on single works, or provided more detailed authoritative explications of a single system, but I cannot think of a single work by any scholar of Buddhism, past or present, which worked out such a thorough comparative/mutually integrating treatment of two such profound and complex soteriological systems—systems that contain enough differences to be identified as distinct from each other, yet at the same time overlap extensively.

Virtually all of the great commentators and essayists (at least in East Asian Buddhism, and all of those that I know of in India and Tibet) were the representatives of distinct Buddhist sub-traditions, and thus their work tended to be limited in focus to the discourse contained within their own school. When their work did extend to the treatment of other systems, it was usually with the ultimate aim of asserting the greater legitimacy of one’s own lineage vis-à-vis that of others. Examples in East Asia are numerous, including writings by such doctrinal giants as Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), Fazang 法藏 (643–712), Zongmi 宗密 (780–841), Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664), Kuiji 窺基 (632–682), Shandao 善導 (613–681), and so forth. More broadly-based scholars such as Jizang 吉藏 (549–623) and Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523–592) may have covered a wider range and shown a more even-handed attitude than their contemporaries (and both these figures had much influence on Wŏnhyo), but their work cannot come close to matching Wŏnhyo’s range and level of erudition, due in part to the simple fact that the century or so between their lifetimes and Wŏnhyo’s included the proliferation of Xuanzang’s new translations of the Yogācāra texts, coupled with the sophisticated new philosophical developments in Huayan and Tiantai Buddhist philosophy in the seventh century, which were reaching their apex.

More importantly, however, Wŏnhyo treated each separate doctrinal tradition with a level of fairness, thoroughness, and rigor unseen in the work of his predecessors, contemporaries, or successors. Serious “comparative philosophers”
have rarely appeared in any of the Buddhist traditions, though there are a few. One name that might be tendered is the sixth-century Indian Mādhyamika master Bhāviveka (ca. 490–570),2 who treated other Indian traditions such as Yogācāra with an unusual level of fairness. But after all, the Yogācāras were still his “opponents,” so when he is compared to Wŏnhyo on the basis of even-handedness, his arguments still show sectarian preference for Madhyamaka, and his range of coverage could never extend to the broad span of Mahāyāna doctrines that proliferated in East Asia, which were to become the purview of Wŏnhyo.

Wŏnhyo wielded an unparalleled mastery of the spectrum of Mahāyāna doctrines that made their way into East Asia, and composed commentaries on virtually all of the important scriptures from these doctrinal systems. He did so in such a way as to show how these doctrines could fit together in a vast, integrated network—how they complemented and mutually informed each other. Yet he showed little inclination toward proving the relative superiority or inferiority of any tradition in contrast to others. There were, of course, certain doctrinal themes that he prized, such as the view of innate Buddhahood, but this kind of preference is never discussed in a manner where alternative views are denigrated.

The tendency seen in Wŏnhyo’s work of attempting to thoroughly integrate the broad range of Mahāyāna doctrines among each other has been identified by Wŏnhyo scholars with a term that he employed himself: hwajaeng—usually rendered in English as something like “harmonization of disputes.”3 It is a term that is part of the title of his partially-extant magnum opus, the Simmun hwajaeng non (“Harmonization of doctrinal disputes in ten sections”).4

But “harmonization” and other simple English renderings of hwajaeng are not able to capture the full ramifications of this concept, and hence those who know of Wŏnhyo’s work only superficially sometimes regard hwajaeng as a kind of monism, or forced exercise to make all Buddhist doctrines appear unified. While Wŏnhyo’s efforts to this end were clearly motivated by a deep faith in the underlying unity of the Buddhist teachings, it is not true that he felt forced to prove perfect commensurability in every single situation; and if his only motivation were to provide a mechanism for showing the underlying unity of the Buddhadharma, he could have achieved that basic result by following the
practice of his contemporaries, fitting the puzzle together using the strategy of doctrinal classification (Ch. *panjiao*, K. *p’an’gyo* 管 教).

I rather tend to see it as an effort motivated by faith coupled with a deep intellectual curiosity, and the *Ijang ūi* is no doubt the prime extant example of Wŏnhyo’s combination of personal faith and intellectual curiosity at work in sorting out complex Buddhist doctrinal issues. Wŏnhyo compares two distinguishable systems of the two hindrances and finds them to roughly (but not strictly) represent what we modern-day scholars categorize as Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought, and labels them respectively as the “explicit” (K. *hyŏllyo mun*; 显了門 ≈ *niitártha*) and “inexplicit” (K. *ŭnmil mun* 隱密門 ≈ *neyártha*) approaches to the two hindrances. To simply identify the differences between the two it certainly would not be necessary for him to go to the lengths he does, to work out in such fine detail all of the most trivial details regarding the definitions of mental disturbances, their categories, variations in type, virulence, activity, removal, and relation to particular modes of practice. But more than simply distinguishing the general systems of the hindrances, he wants to use them to elucidate, supplement, inform—and indeed—complete each other. I do not believe that it was his intention—as some scholars have understood—to set up the Inexplicit interpretation of the hindrances (derived mainly from the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, Śrīmālā-sūtra, and *Ratnagotravibhāga*) as a “more profound” (in a valorizing sense) taxonomical (K. *p’an’gyo*) category over the Explicit interpretation (derived mainly from the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Fodijing lun*, *Mahāyānasamgraha-śāstra*, and other texts generally regarded as authoritative by the Xuanzang-Kuiji [Faxiang] tradition).

This is not to say that Wŏnhyo did not have his own preferences as to what constituted a more profound or widely applicable interpretation of the Buddhadharma, or a more rigorously developed theory. There can be little doubt that he personally preferred an innate-Buddhahood approach to of Mahāyāna over a Consciousness-only position of overall moral karmic indeterminacy of the mind; but this does not lead to any systematic disparagement or relegation of the Yogācāra teachings. On the other hand, in terms of hermeneutic sources, Wŏnhyo relies on Yogācāra texts more than on those of any other single tradition. This reliance shows the strongly rational and systematic bent of his writing, as the doctrines of any distinguishable strain of discourse—whether
they be from the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (AMF)*, *Amitābha-sūtra, Lotus Sutra*, or any other Mahāyāna scripture—must, for Wŏnhyo, pass the tests of logical validity, and of consistency, with Mahāyāna Buddhist principles of individuated cause and effect, which happen to be explained in the greatest systematic detail in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other Yogācāra works. Wŏnhyo makes his evaluations based on his own learning and predilections, rather than for the purpose of providing added weight to any certain doctrinal system. Therefore, there is a distinctive level of fairness that he brings to his work.

### Why Study the Two Hindrances?

The fact that few present-day Buddhologists seem to be especially interested in the topic of the two hindrances does not mean that it is not worthy of serious attention. I think that the lack of visible work on this topic by modern scholars is due to a general lack of interest in classical Buddhist soteriological doctrines. Nonetheless, the fact remains that these were the topics of primary interest to the Buddhist scholiasts of the Tang, Silla, and Nara-Heian dominions. The two hindrances lie at the very core of Mahāyāna soteriological discourse, and the providing of a systematic map of the two hindrances results in the fullest and most detailed account of Mahāyāna soteriology. Hence, numerous studies of Mahāyāna path theory, past and present, take the discussion of the hindrances as their point of departure. Most notable in this regard is the *Cheng weishi lun*, which starts off with the statement:

Vasubandhu composed the [Treatise] “Thirty Verses” for those who are deluded about or deny the two kinds of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), so that they may arouse correct understanding. “Correct understanding” means eliminating the two heavy obstacles (*āvaraṇa*). These two obstacles arise as a result of attachment to a self and dharmas. By realizing the two kinds of emptiness, the obstacles are removed, and by removing the two obstacles, one obtains two excellent results: by eliminating the obstacle of passions that lead to rebirth, one realizes true liberation; by eliminating the obstacle to the knowable that hinders true understanding, one obtains great awakening (*mahā-bodhi*).
Also, Vasubandhu composed the Treatise to instruct those who are attached to a self and dhammas and who are deluded about consciousness only, to permit them to reach the two kinds of emptiness and really comprehend the principle of consciousness only.\(^{10}\) (\textit{T} 1585.31.1a7–13; trans. from Cook [1999])

The eminent Japanese Yog\(\text{\u091c}\)\(\text{\u0928}\)\(\text{\u094d}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)\(\text{\u0902}\)\(\text{\u0917}\)\(\text{\u0924}\) specialist Yokoyama Kōitsu starts off his book \textit{Yasashii Yuishiki: kokoro no himitsu wo toku} (2004) by introducing the hindrances; the second of the five chapters of the \textit{Madhy\(\text{\u091c}\)\(\text{\u0928}\)\(\text{\u093e}\)\(\text{\u0932}\)\(\text{\u0938}\)\(\text{\u094d}\)\(\text{\u0938}\)\(\text{\u0924}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)\(\text{\u0940}\)\(\text{\u093e}\)\(\text{\u0938}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)}\(\text{\u0927}\)\(\text{\u0930}\)\(\text{\u094d}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)) is devoted to a discussion of the hindrances.\(^{11}\) All of the great East Asian Mah\(\text{\u091c}\)\(\text{\u093e}\)\(\text{\u0905}\)\(\text{\u0926}\)\(\text{\u0924}\)\(\text{\u0932}\)\(\text{\u0938}\) doctrinal masters, including Fazang, Zhiyi, Huiyan, Kuiji, Zongmi, Wŏnhyo, Zenju 善珠 (727–797), and others afforded the topic serious treatment in their works. The two hindrances assume a pivotal position in the \textit{AMF}, and the challenging difference in their presentation there as distinguished from their characterization in other works is enough to spur Wŏnhyo into a thoroughgoing study of the topic. So why the disparity between ancient and modern scholars in terms of attention paid to this topic? I am inclined to guess that the main reason is that the above-mentioned figures were all scholar-monks, who held a deep faith in the Buddhist teachings—who were fully invested in the tradition—and thus compelled to fully master its soteriological frameworks. Present-day scholarly interest in the Yog\(\text{\u091c}\)\(\text{\u0928}\)\(\text{\u094d}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)\(\text{\u0902}\)\(\text{\u0917}\)\(\text{\u0924}\) and Tath\(\text{\u0920}\)gatagarbha currents of thought in East Asia and Europe tends to be largely focused on philological and historical problems. At the same time, the interest of modern North American scholars of philosophical inclination on classical Buddhist doctrines tends to be placed on epistemological/semiological insights, especially at the points where these have apparent resonance with modern-day philosophical discourses. The spurt of interest in soteriological issues in East Asian Buddhism seen in the 1970s–80s has disappeared, leaving much rich material untouched.

What are the Two Hindrances?

The two hindrances as articulated in Mah\(\text{\u091c}\)\(\text{\u093e}\)\(\text{\u0905}\)\(\text{\u0926}\)\(\text{\u0924}\)\(\text{\u0932}\)\(\text{\u0938}\) Buddhist texts are the afflictive hindrances (Skt. \textit{kle\(\text{\u0946}\)\(\text{\u0930}\)\(\text{\u093e}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)\(\text{\u0940}\)\(\text{\u093e}\)\(\text{\u0938}\)\(\text{\u0943}\)}) and the cognitive hindrances
(Skt. jñeya-āvaraṇa; 所知障, 智障, 智礙), which together constitute a distinctive Buddhist way of categorizing the broad range of mental phenomena that engender suffering, impel the continuity of the cycle of rebirth, impede the attainment of liberation, and obstruct the ability to see things as they really are. These hindrances include all psychological functions associated with nescience,¹² delusion,¹³ affliction, suffering, anxiety, and so forth. The systematization of the individual factors that constitute the mind and its functions, and along with this, the hindrances, can be seen in the Abhidharma texts with the establishment of the seventy-five dharmas. Abhidharma had begun the project of taking up the negative mental functions and categorizing them according to their general afflictive or cognitive character. The clear and formal classification into these two broad categories followed in the course of the composition of the Yogācāra texts, including early works such as the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra (Ch. Jie shenmi jing 解深密經; compiled during the fourth century) and starting from roughly the same time, an analogous categorization of mental disturbances into the two categories of cognitive and afflictive can be gleaned (albeit not as overtly) in early Tathāgatagarbha texts such as the Śrīmālā-sūtra (Ch. Shengman jing 勝鬘經, also compiled during the fourth century) and the Ratnagotravibhāga (Ch. Baoxing lun 寶性論), as well as in the AMF.

The general definition given to these two kinds of hindrances in basic Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha texts explains the afflictive hindrances to be the primary object of the purifying contemplations of the adherents of the two vehicles, with the cognitive hindrances being subtler noetic problems of which only the bodhisattvas are aware, and which only they can attempt to treat. However, as Wŏnhyo and virtually all scholars who dealt seriously with the hindrances soon realized, this hard distinction does not hold up under close scrutiny, since the imputation of, and attachment to a self, along with a lack of thorough recognition of such things as dependent arising and impermanence clearly have a cognitive dimension, so obviously the practitioners of the two vehicles must deal with cognitive impediments to a certain extent. And of course the bodhisattvas must also overcome the afflictive hindrances. But they must also be prepared, at a relatively early juncture, to cope with the correction of obstructions to insight, which lie outside the purview of the awareness and practice of the lesser vehicle adherents. Thus, once one begins to precisely
define the hindrances (as the Yogācāra texts especially do), there are areas of overlap that defy easy categorization.¹⁴

**Process of the Development of Two Hindrances Systems**

Throughout the Mahāyāna texts where the hindrances are invoked, their most common basic function is to serve as a means of distinguishing the problems and antidotes peculiar to the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna paths. The general characterization made is that the practices of the adherents of the two vehicles (śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas) are limited in their focus and application of contemplation to the afflictive hindrances, while the practices of the bodhisattvas can be applied to both. In Yogācāra, this means that the two-vehicle adherents are limited in their degree of enlightenment to their realization of selflessness—*anātman*, and thus only attain the Hīnayāna nirvāṇa, whereas the bodhisattvas penetrate further, to the thorough realization of *śūnyatā*, and can therefore attain the higher level of *bodhi* equal to that of the buddhas. While the Tathāgatagarbha texts do not define the causes of the hindrances directly in terms of attachment to selfhood of persons and dharmas, their descriptions of the hindrances agree in their treating this Hīnayāna/Mahāyāna distinction in terms of level of enlightenment attained.

The development of a comprehensive and systematic description of the hindrances in both of the systems of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha occurs rather late in comparison with the finalization of other facets of their respective doctrines, with meaningful discussions of the hindrances appearing at first only rarely, then with gradually increasing frequency in a broader range of texts over a period of a couple of centuries. At the earliest stages, the hindrances are mentioned with almost no explanation, usually as simple markers to indicate the completion of a certain set of practices, or the attainment of a certain stage.¹⁵

Although most scholars and reference works tend to associate the two hindrances with the Yogācāra system and define it terms of the Yogācāra framework, in fact, the earliest effort in East Asia to thoroughly define and systematize the hindrances, done by Jingying Huiyuan in his commentary on the *AMF*,¹⁶ is based solely on Tathāgatagarbha texts, mainly the Śrīmālā-sūtra. This discussion,
occupying three full pages in the Taishō canon (T 1843.44.188b29–191a1), arises as a long digression within the commentary. In the AMF itself, the hindrances are invoked in a terse and cryptic manner, barely explained at all. Not long after this, Zhiyi’s compilers publish a much shorter, but nonetheless valuable analysis of the hindrances in the Mohe zhiguan—one that suggests a possible awareness of Huiyuan’s model.17 Essays that aim to fully define and systematize the hindrances reach their peak in the middle of the seventh century, when during roughly the same period the Fodijing lun (FDJL) and the Cheng weishi lun (CWSL) articulate the system of the hindrances in a way that comes to be the standard for the Weishi school, while soon after Wŏnhyo composes the all-time definitive treatise on two hindrances theory, the Ijang ŭi. Wŏnhyo’s treatise is, like Huiyuan’s work, a digression written in the process of the composition of a commentary to the AMF, which apparently grew to such a scale that Wŏnhyo decided to publish it separately. The Ijang ŭi is of critical importance, not just for hindrances discourse, but for its thorough, nonsectarian analysis of East Asian Buddhist philosophy of mind at that point in history, in that Wŏnhyo is the first to identify two distinct streams of hindrances discourse—what we now call the Yogācāra tradition (as understood in the East Asian Weishi/Faxiang lineage, derived from such works as the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Yogācārabhūmi-sāstra, FDJL, etc.), and the Tathāgatagarbha tradition (derived from texts such as the Śrīmālā-sūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga, AMF, etc.). It is obvious from the structure and usage of terminology used in Wŏnhyo’s treatise (not to mention the use of the exact same title, 二障義) that he could not have but been intimately acquainted with Huiyuan’s work before his own encounter with the AMF and his composition of the Ijang ŭi. This is because there is in fact no explicit system of the hindrances articulated in these Tathāgatagarbha texts, nor does one exist, until Huiyuan creates it, and Wŏnhyo, in defining the Tathāgatagarbha approach (Inexplicit approach), starts by immediately using the framework from the Śrīmālā-sūtra identified by Huiyuan.18

The Yogācāra System of the Hindrances19

In their standard Yogācāra interpretation, the afflictive hindrances (Skt. kleśa-āvaraṇa; 煩惱障) include all the various forms of affliction enumerated in the
Yogācāra scriptures and treatises. In the most standard Yogācāra definition (as one will find in the *FDJL, CWSL*, etc.), the six primary afflictions arise based on the reification of an imagined self (Skt. *atma-grāha*; 我執). From these six afflictions are derived the twenty secondary afflictions, as well as the ninety-eight, 104, 128 afflictions, etc. These exist in “actively entangling” form, “latent” form, “debilitating” form, “seed” form, as habit energies, and in a range of sub-varieties of strength and weakness, coarseness and subtlety, and intermixture. Generally speaking, they are karmic—i.e., in addition to being the direct causes and manifestations of suffering, they create bonds to cyclic existence, enmeshing sentient beings into perpetual rebirth. Thus, by definition, they obstruct the attainment of liberation—*nirvāṇa*. This means that the affective hindrances receive their name based primarily on their role as the agents, rather than as the objects, of obstruction. Another way of describing the affective hindrances is to say that they include all the mental functions (simso 心所) that are of unwholesome (*pulson 不善*) quality—which bring suffering and anxiety to sentient beings. They are said to be eliminated by the practices of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, as well as bodhisattvas.

The cognitive hindrances (Skt. *jñeya-avarana*; 所知障/智障) are said to be derived from the fundamental error of understanding phenomena (dharmanas) to have intrinsic reality (Skt. *dharma-grāha*; 法執). They are noetic errors, the most subtle of which can be permanently eliminated only by bodhisattvas who have a thoroughgoing awakening to emptiness. The Sanskrit *jñeya*, which can be interpreted in English as “the knowable(s)” or “the known,” was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang as *suozhi* 所知 (K. *sojī*)—“that which is known,” or “objects of cognition,” etc. In one sense (as Wonhyo points out), the initial orientation for the naming of the cognitive hindrances is opposite from that of the affective hindrances, since, in the case of the cognitive hindrances, it is the things that should be known (reality, thusness, the noble truths, correctly apprehended dharmanas, etc.) that are subject to obstruction, rather than being the obstructing agents. But there is also a sense in which those things that are cognized end up being taken as the obstructions, and thus the definition of the cognitive hindrances is more complicated. In any case, whereas it is the affective hindrances that directly bring about karmic suffering and rebirth in the three realms, it is the cognitive hindrances that keep sentient beings in a state of misapprehension of reality, allowing them to continue making the
errors that allow for, at best, the nonelimination of the afflictive hindrances, and at worst, the creation of new afflictions. At the beginning of his explanation of the “substance of the hindrances” in the Ijang ŭi, Wŏnhyo derives his basic definition from a Yogācāra source as follows:

Led by the attachment to person, the [six] fundamental afflictions and the [twenty] derivative afflictions, such as anger, resentment, concealing, and so forth, constitute the nature of the afflictive hindrances. If we take into account the other dharmas that are associated with these afflictions, including attendant factors, the karma they produce, as well as the karmic retribution that is experienced, all can be seen as playing a role in constituting the afflictive hindrances.

What constitutes the cognitive hindrances? Led by attachment to dharmas, they have as their substance deluded conceptualization and discrimination, along with attachment to teachings, pride, nescience, and so forth. Taking into account the secondary dharmas that can be included as cognitive afflictions, there are also the attendant factors and their characteristics to which one attaches.⁸¹

The relationship between the two kinds of hindrances in their basic Yogācāra schematization has a distinctly systematic, clearly defined roots-to-branches structure. The cognitive hindrances, which represent subtler errors that are mistaken functions of awareness, serve as the basis of the afflictive hindrances. The cognitive hindrances for the most part do not in themselves produce negative karma, since in most cases they do not have moral retribution associated with their function. The afflictive hindrances are behavioral habits that are always contaminated to some degree, and in most cases, bring about undesirable moral retribution. When the two hindrances are discussed in the context of the stages in which they are removed (such as the paths of seeing and cultivation, or the ten bodhisattva grounds), the afflictive hindrances are removed earlier by both bodhisattvas and adherents of the two vehicles (who rely on self-salvifically oriented practices) and the cognitive hindrances are removed later, by bodhisattvas only, through practices that are empowered by emptiness and compassion.⁸²
The earliest mention of the hindrances in the Yogācāra tradition is seen in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* (*Smdh*), after which they appear to one extent or another in most texts, but none of the major definitive Yogācāra śāstras, including the *Yogācārabhūmi-sāstra* (*YBh*), *Mahāyāna-samgrāha*, or *Madhyānta-vibhāga* contain a unified and thoroughly systematic discussion.

The diverse character of the discussions of the hindrances in the *YBh* reflects the composite nature of that text, in that these discussions are rather unsystematic, and address a broad range of problems. One frequent type of mention of the hindrances is identical to that seen in the *Smdh*, where the hindrances are invoked merely to summarize all the types of hindrances removed in the practices of the ten *bhūmis*, or some other set of stages—as the final achievement of practice. The later-standardized definition of realization of selflessness of persons and selflessness of dharmas does not happen until the invocation of the two hindrances in the Tattvārtha chapter, which establishes four increasingly profound levels of apprehension of reality. Among these four, numbers (3) and (4) are defined as levels of awareness reflecting the removal of the cognitive hindrances.

The most mature form of two hindrances theory within Yogācāra proper in East Asia is best seen in the *FDJL*, which contains a couple of fairly long sections that treat the hindrances in detail from their most important perspectives, including their content, function, and removal. It is clear that the discussion of the hindrances in the *CWSL* is a summary derived from the *FDJL*, or from a common source (see *T* 1585.31.48c10–12).

**The Tathāgatagarbha System of the Hindrances as Schematized by Huiyuan**

Huiyuan explains the content of the hindrances relying on the doctrine of the four afflictive entrenchments (K. *sa chuji* 四住地) and the nescience entrenchment (K. *mumyōng chuji* 無明住地; Skt. *avidyā-vāsabhūmi*) as first articulated in the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*, and later utilized in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, *Foxing lun* (K. *Pulsōng non* 佛性論) and so forth. The four entrenchments as taught in these Tathāgatagarbha texts are four underlying bases from which manifestly active afflictions are generated—and which retain the afflictions when they are in a dormant state. In other words, they are a latent aspect of the hindrances—
comparable in connotation to the concept of bija (seeds) in Yogācāra. In the Śrīmālā-sūtra they are contrasted with active, or “arisen” afflictions (K. ki pōnnoe 起煩惱—analogous to the Yogācāra active afflictions, K. hyōnhaeng pōnnoe 現行煩惱). The fifth entrenchment, entrenched nescience, refers to nescience as something innate and deeply embedded in the mind, which is extremely difficult to remove, and which serves as the basis for the other four entrenchments, and thus as the ultimate basis for the production of afflictions.26

Utilizing this structure, Huiyuan sees the application of the hindrances as having three levels of possible interpretation, which are distinguished on a sliding scale of differentiation between what kinds of mental functions are regarded as afflictive and what kinds are regarded as cognitive. All three categories are explained through the framework of the four/five entrenchments. These are:

1. The first level, which is the most straightforward, is the one that takes the four afflictive entrenchments (K. saju pōnnoe) to be directly equivalent to the standard Yogācāra afflictive hindrances, and the nescience entrenchments to be directly equivalent to the standard Yogācāra cognitive hindrances. (Although Huiyuan would not yet have had access to the detailed scheme of the hindrances of the FDJL or CWSL at this time, the structures outlined in the Smdh and YBh would have been sufficient to establish this correlation if he happened to have access to any pre-Xuanzang versions of materials based on these texts.)

2. In the second approach, the intrinsic natures of all five entrenchments are collectively understood to constitute the afflictive hindrances, while the inability to properly cognize distinct phenomena constitutes the cognitive hindrances. In this approach, nescience is distinguished into two types: confusion in regard to principle, and confusion in regard to distinct phenomena. This is a clear Sinitic move, rarely seen in the Indian or later Faxiang tradition. Huiyuan identifies this interpretation as equivalent to the understanding of the hindrances in the AMF.

3. In the third approach, the essences of the five entrenchments, as well as obscuration of cognition in regard to both principle and phenomena are taken to be the afflictive hindrances, leaving only the function of discriminating cognition itself as the cognitive hindrances.27
At level (1), cognitive problems are clearly distinguished from afflictive problems. The narrowness of focus on the cognitive increases in the second and third levels, as cognitive error is defined in level (2) as delusively discriminating cognition, and then in level (3) as discriminating cognition itself.

As noted above, the straightforward afflictive/cognitive distinction provided in level (1) that separates the nescience entrenchments from the four entrenchments of desire and aversion toward the world, can be directly mapped to the standard Yogācāra explanation. As for level (2), Huiyuan tells us that this is the one that corresponds to the description of the hindrances in the AMF, and this is the category that Wŏnhyo will later label as Inexplicit. Level (2) also introduces a special type of cognitive problem not treated in the first level—and not overtly discussed in Yogācāra—the implication of bodhisattvas lingering in meditative absorptions in thusness. (3) The third category, where all five of the entrenchments, plus obscuration of both principle and phenomena, constitute the afflictive hindrances, with the cognitive hindrances consisting only of dependently arisen cognition (i.e., discriminating cognition), is not identified in Wŏnhyo’s treatise, but it could probably be extrapolated from the general context of the AMF, as it is commensurate with the basic view in the AMF that any movement whatsoever of the mind is a move away from pristine enlightenment.

Huiyuan’s analysis precedes Xuanzang’s translations of the Yogācāra texts by a century, and ends up becoming—until the mid-seventh-century appearance of the FDJL and Wŏnhyo’s Ijang ūi—the definitive systematic discussion of the two hindrances of any kind in East Asia, since, as noted, none of the sutras or śāstras available at that time, in either the Tathāgatagarbha or Yogācāra traditions, contain any advanced discussion comparable to this. Thus, from the East Asian perspective, the fully developed Yogācāra/Weishi definition of the hindrances (in the FDJL, CWSL, etc.) actually appears almost a full century after that of the crystallization of the Tathāgatagarbha version in the form of Huiyuan’s above-introduced work.

This means that there is a rather large leap in detail and precision to be seen in the Yogācāra/Weishi articulation of the hindrances, going from the vague and sketchy passages in the Smīdh, YBh, and Mahāyānasamgraha, to the finely grained and highly systematic articulation in the FDJL and CWSL, as there is
no pure Yogācāra text known to us containing an intermediate level development of a hindrances system that would readily serve as a bridge between these two stages. Yet during this interim period, the model of the mental disturbances in the Tathāgatagarbha texts undergoes significant development in such works as the Śrīmālā-sūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga, Benye jing, AMF, and most importantly in the analyses of Huiyuan and Zhiyi.\textsuperscript{29} Given this fact, it seems possible that even if the masters of the Yogācāra/Weishi school did not directly apply the Tathāgatagarbha structure to their own articulation of the hindrances, they may well have felt pressure to flesh out their own argument to demonstrate an equivalent level of sophistication on the matter.

The AMF and the Composition of the Ijang úi: The Inexplicit Approach to the Hindrances

A century after Huiyuan, Wŏnhyo works out his own commentaries to the AMF, and in the process comes across the same terse and cryptic passage that introduces the hindrances—the passage that had pushed Huiyuan into an extensive exploration of the hindrances systems that were discernible to him in the literature available at that time. But when Wŏnhyo’s turn comes, the situation is considerably more challenging, since there is far more material available, most importantly, an entirely new, significantly different, and far more systematic map of the hindrances, which has emerged in the midst of the new Yogācāra translations of Xuanzang. Wŏnhyo had been immersed in the study of these Yogācāra texts (a fact that is obvious in his extensive citation of them throughout his commentarial writings, as well as in the Ijang úi). Since the AMF is concerned, more than anything else, with issues related to the origins and removal of affliction and nescience in the effort of attaining enlightenment, it is not entirely surprising that the two hindrances make their appearance within it. But the definition that the author of the AMF applies to the hindrances seems to be a sharp departure from the generic Yogācāra system that was introduced above—and that in fact also has no true precedent in the Tathāgatagarbha texts. The passage in the AMF that introduces the hindrances states:
Furthermore, the aspect of defiled mind is called the afflictive obstruction, because it is able to obstruct the intrinsic intelligence that cognizes thusness. The aspect of nescience is called the cognitive obstruction, as it is able to obstruct conventional spontaneously karmic cognition. (T 1666.32.577c20–22)  

The phrase that says “the aspect of the defiled mind is called the afflictive obstruction” is not problematic in the context of the generic Yogâcāra or first-tier interpretation of Huiyuan. But in the next part of the passage, the afflictive obstructions, rather than being presented in the standard manner as obstructing liberation, are said to obstruct the intrinsic intelligence that cognizes thusness—nothing less than the most fundamental manifestation of enlightened awareness. This kind of obstruction, in the context of the canonical Weishi texts, would clearly be seen as cognitive in character. Furthermore, the first part of this phrase, while not seeming problematic at first glance, does present difficulties in terms of the way it is further explained in the AMF. Rather than being constituted by the six primary and twenty derivative afflictions, with the reification of a self at their head, or in terms of the four/five entrenchments, the afflictive obstructions are identified as the six kinds of defiled mental states—the AMF’s first six movements of mind away from the pure condition of thusness. This description of a sequential degradation of the pristine mind has connotations unique (at least up to that point in time) to the AMF, and cannot be readily correlated to the way that the afflictive hindrances are described in any other text.

In the second sentence, we find the cognitive obstructions defined as “nescience.” This would not in and of itself be problematic, except for the fact that the nescience being introduced here does not obstruct the fundamental apprehension of tathatā. Instead, it obscures the functioning of the karmic, phenomenal, discriminating wisdom that one uses for everyday worldly activities. While this impediment does fall under the purview of cognitive functioning and thus no doubt belongs in this category, it could easily be seen as—at least on the basis of the brief description provided here—a relatively secondary problem. This means that the structure of the relationship between the two kinds of hindrances in the AMF seems at first blush quite different from the clearly defined roots-and-branches structure that is apparent in the original Yogâcāra
model, as well as from Huiyuan’s first-tier interpretation of the four and five entrenchments of the Śrīmālā-sūtra.

In fact, it even seems as if the positions on these two approaches to the hindrances are actually reversed in terms of fundamental and derivative, since the AMF’s afflictive obstructions obscure the cognition of tathatā, and the cognitive obstructions impede a relatively external phenomena-oriented form of awareness. The author of the AMF—no doubt aware of the differences between his account of the hindrances and the precedent versions—was moved to clarify:

What does this mean? Since, depending upon the defiled mind, one is able to see, manifest, and deludedly grasp objects, one’s mental function is contrary to the equal nature of thusness. Taking all dharmas to be eternally quiescent and devoid of the characteristics of arising, the nescience of non-enlightenment deludedly misapprehends dharmas. Thus, one has no access to the cognition of particular phenomena that is applied to all objects of the container world. (T 1666.32.577c22–25)³¹

Beyond this problem of the relative depth of the awareness being obstructed, there is also the difference to be seen in the fact that the afflictive obstructions in the AMF can also be seen as having strong cognitive dimensions. There is no mention of the traditional six primary or twenty derivative afflictions, nor even the Yogācāric origin of these—the reification of the views of “I” and “mine,” etc. Instead, the afflictive hindrances are seen as residing in an inability to perceive the fundamental equality of things. According to the teaching of the AMF, this results in the first movement of the mind, and that movement leads to a series of attachments, and eventually, every form of discomfort. The AMF’s cognitive obstructions, on the other hand, arise from the error of seeing only unity/equality, which makes one unable to properly function in the world, and by extension, unable to teach.

Both Huiyuan and Wŏnhyo, upon confronting this passage, felt compelled to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the known hindrances theories of their time. I think the reason for their motivation is clear: the characterization of the hindrances given in this passage in the AMF is cryptic, and not at first blush
readily aligned with known hindrances frameworks. In the case of Huiyuan, this is defined primarily by the Śrīmālā-sūtra and Ratnagotrabhāga. In Wŏnhyo’s case, it includes the framework of these two works, plus the Yogācāra system defined in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, FDJL, etc. In both cases, it is not easy to sum up the AMF’s hindrances in a neat and systematic format. The Yogācāra system is the more overtly systematic of the two, since its structure is made clear directly within the main canonical texts (thus the label “explicit approach”). In the case of the Śrīmālā-Ratnagotrabhāga, the system is not provided in the texts themselves—it must be imposed by the exegete (thus the label “inexplicit approach”).

The solution to the apparent discrepancies lies in grasping the AMF’s understanding of the relationship between the mode of cognition that apprehends thusness, and the mode that apprehends discrete phenomena, as there is a tendency to take the former as a kind of enlightenment, and the latter as a kind of ordinary discriminative function—and discrimination almost always has bad connotations in Buddhism. But here, discrimination of discrete phenomena implies “accurate” discrimination, a nonclinging, nonobscured form of discrimination. As is explained later in the AMF, it is prṣṭha-labdha-jñāna 後得智, the accurate discrimination that functions after enlightenment. This is what is being obstructed by the cognitive obstructions.

Another distinctive point of the framework presented in the AMF (immediately following the passage we have cited above) is that the nescience that is defined as the afflictive obstructions are distinctively causative, and their first manifestation initiates the downward spiral into error and suffering. Thus, it is an obstruction that “brings one down,” as it were. The cognitive obstructions—the inability to properly discern discrete phenomena, obstruct teaching, obstruct learning, and thus impede “the way back up.” Thus, Wŏnhyo says, “In this interpretation, ‘affliction’ is named as an error that acts to obstruct. Cognition is named as the positive [function] that is being obstructed” (HPC 1.790a9–11).

Furthermore, while both kinds of obstructions can be seen as extremely subtle in their function, the activity of the cognitive obstructions that muddy accurate discrimination would tend to be seen in the minds of those who are already availing themselves correct awareness. They affect advanced practitioners who need to be active as teachers in the world—bodhisattvas. The
afflictive obstructions would also have their primary deleterious effect on the person practicing calm abiding meditation (śamatha), whereas the cognitive obstructions would thwart the meditator doing contemplative analysis (vīpaśyānā). Seen in this way, the hindrances of the AMF and the Inexplicit framework with which they have been associated show less difference from the hindrances of the Explicit (Yogaśāra) framework. The substance of both hindrances is basically the same in both systems, as are their general functions. It is the style of the language that is used that differs. But this difference in language can at the same time be used to shed new light on the meaning of terms in both systems. In the Explicit framework, the cognitive hindrances are associated primarily with attachment to dharmas. In the Inexplicit framework, the cognitive obstructions are seen in “confusion regarding discrete phenomena.” In Buddhist philosophy of mind, what are dharmas, if not discrete phenomena, and what is “confusion” if not “attachment?”

In terms of overall feel, the Explicit system has more of a static, schematized feel to it, mapping things in terms of categories and connections, where the language of the Inexplicit system tends to be more dynamic, talking about mental disturbances spiraling down in a causal sequence, and cognitive problems as a state of confusion, errant discernment. This model resonates with a clear tendency, seen especially in the AMF, but also generally in the Sinitic Tathāgatagarbha tradition, of holiness, thusness, purity, etc., being associated with stillness 靜; and suffering, delusion, and impurity being associated with movement 動. This pattern in Sinitic thought can be gleaned in numerous pairs of concepts in East Asia summarized in the essence-function paradigm (ti-yong 體用, where ti is associated with stillness and yong is associated with movement), having its roots going all the way back to the Liji, where it is written:32

A man is born quiescent, as it is his inborn nature. His mind moves when affected by external things, which is the nature of desire. As he encounters things, he knows more and more, subsequently giving rise to the forms that are liked and disliked. When liking and disliking these are not regulated within, and his awareness is enticed to external things, he cannot reflect upon himself, and his inborn principle disappears. (Liji 禮記, Leji 樂記 7)
It seems that the Chinese had an intuition about this kind of soteriological structure long before the arrival of Buddhism.

**Wŏnhyo’s Reception of Huiyuan’s Thesis**

The fact that Wŏnhyo uses the exact same title as Huiyuan for his treatise, and his ready application of the Śrīmala entrenchments model for formulating his Inexplicit framework of the hindrances shows the significant degree of his usage of the earlier scholar’s work as a starting point. But he departs from his predecessor in an important way that goes beyond his vastly greater access to Yogācāra sources. The first is, where Huiyuan summarizes his work by defining three interpretations of the hindrances in an explicitly hierarchical order, Wŏnhyo is satisfied with two approaches. More importantly, however (and here I repeat the point made earlier), I do not believe that Wŏnhyo’s distinguishing of the two into Explicit and Inexplicit represents a judgement regarding either relative correctness or profundity—nowhere in the *Ijang uii* does he present them in this way. And as in virtually all of his other works, all differences in interpretation are ultimately shown to be differences in understanding regarding point of view. The distinction between Explicit and Inexplicit in the *Ijang uii* has absolutely nothing with making any sort of p’an’gyo type of value judgment. It is rather Wŏnhyo’s most complete and thorough exercise in hwajaeng available to us. He takes two very distinct traditions of soteriological discourse, two very distinct families of texts and shows us in a remarkably revelatory manner how they discuss the exact same phenomena in different vocabularies and forms of discourse. And at the same time, he shows us more clearly than any scholar—before or since—what the two hindrances are.

**The Legacy of the Hindrances in East Asia**

In East Asia, it seems as if the Tathāgatagarbha approach to the hindrances predominated at first, based on the influence of the works of Paramārtha, Huiyuan, and their colleagues (along with Tathāgatagarbha-influenced views
of Yogācāra categories), with the competing Yogācāra explanation only taking hold after the publication of Xuanzang’s translations of the *FDJL* and the *CWSL*. In discussions of the hindrances in East Asia subsequent to the demise of the Chinese Weishi School, Buddhist commentators and essayists in China and Korea tend to present the hindrances in a way that shows a gradual blurring of the distinction between the two systems. On the other hand, within the Hossō school in Japan, which maintained a distinct Faxiang doctrinal identity, the Xuanzang/Kuiji view of the hindrances becomes the standard model, no doubt based on the powerful influence of the *CWSL* and Japanese derivative texts such as the *Kanjin kakumu shō* 觀心覺夢鈔 (*T* 2312).

We do not see, in the subsequent Buddhist scholarship of any cultural tradition, a treatment of the hindrances comparable in thoroughness or magnitude to that by Wŏnhyo. The hindrances do resurface in the East Asian apocryphon, the *Yuanjue jing* (Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment, *T* 842; *[SPE]*) in its fifth chapter, that of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. The usage of the hindrances in that scripture makes for an interesting study, as it is apparent from the content of the discussion that the author of that text was aware of the connotations of the hindrances in both their original Yogācāra (“explicit”) meaning, as well as that of the “inexplicit” *AMF*. In constructing a new set of hindrances, the author borrows a bit from both perspectives, at the same time incorporating new elements derived from nascent indigenous East Asian Buddhist teachings, including both Huayan and Chan. The Huayan influence is seen the *SPE*’s framing of the hindrances within the principle-phenomena (K. *isa* 理事) structure. The Chan influence is seen in the inclusion of the perspective of sudden enlightenment, and in the practice-oriented reinterpretation of the cognitive hindrances into mistakenly reified enlightenment experiences.

The Chinese scholiast Zongmi, in his major commentary on the *SPE*, also devotes a couple of pages to explaining the hindrances, showing how the hindrances of the *SPE* are to be correlated with those of Yogācāra and the *AMF*. In a relatively brief summary, he distinguishes the hindrances into interpretive categories that are analogous to Wŏnhyo’s Explicit/Inexplicit arrangement, but it is not clear from the language he uses whether or not he was familiar with Wŏnhyo’s work.

The only other separate essay in the East Asian tradition devoted to the hindrances that I know of, is, interestingly enough, also done by a Korean.
This is the *Sippon kyŏngnon ijang ch’esŏl* 十本經論二障體說 (Analysis of the substance of the two hindrances through ten canonical texts) by the Chosŏn monk Ch’oensul 最訥 (1717–1790).35 Ch’oensul selects passages from a number of texts, nine of which are Tathāgatagarbha/AMF/Huayan works, with the only Weishi source being the *CWSL*, and no citations whatsoever from Indian sources. He analyzes the types of hindrances and compares them from four perspectives: (1) The broad perspective, wherein a single hindrance is seen as obstructing many forms of virtue; (2) the specific perspective, wherein each hindrance obstructs a single, specific virtue; (3) the perspective of commensurate relationships, wherein a subtle hindrance obstructs a subtle virtue, and a coarse hindrance obstructs a coarse virtue; and (4) the perspective of disjunctive relationships, wherein the coarse obstructs the subtle and the subtle obstructs the coarse.

**Abbreviations**

AMF = *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*

CWSL = *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論

FDJL = *Fodijing lun* 佛地經論

HPC = Tongguk Taehakkyo Han’guk Pulgyo Chŏnsŏ P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, ed. *Han’guk Pulgyo chŏnsŏ 韓國佛教全書* [Collected works of Korean Buddhism]. 14 vols. Seoul, 1979–.

*Smdh* = *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*

SPE = *Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment* (*Dafangguang yuanjue xiudului liao yi jing* 大方廣覺修多羅了義大般涅槃經)


YBh = *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*

*Z* = Zokuzōkyō (The Dainihon Zokuzōkyō; Kyoto: Zokuzōkyō Shoin)
Notes

1 For example, such works as Zhiyi’s *Mohe zhiguan*, or Xuanzang’s *Cheng weishi lun*.
2 For a lucid translation and study of Bhāviveka’s major works, see David Eckel’s *Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents* (2008).
3 I have discussed the implications of the term *hwajaeng* at considerable length in Muller (2015).
4 Translated by Cuong Nguyen in Muller and Nguyen (2011).
5 Mention is often made by scholars—especially in Japan—of the doctrinal classification scheme attributed to Wŏnhyo in Fazang’s *Huayanjing tanxuan ji* (T 1733.35.111a23–27). But we should be careful about taking this as an indication that Wŏnhyo was seriously involved in the work of doctrinal classification, as: (1) nowhere else in Wŏnhyo’s extant corpus do we find anything indicating his having created, or placed emphasis on, a doctrinal classification system—he never mentions this scheme in any of his extant works—and especially his most important commentaries where such a scheme might conceivably serve some useful role; (2) if we read Wŏnhyo’s works extensively, it would seem that his entire approach is antithetical to the work of compartmentalization; and, most importantly, (3) in the final lines of his *Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvana Sutra* 涅槃宗要 he says: “Yet, if you want to use the scheme of four teachings to categorize the scriptures, or use five time periods to delimit the Buddha’s intention, this is just like using a snail shell to scoop out the ocean, or looking at the sky through a tube!” 「而欲以四宗科於經旨亦以五時限於佛意，是猶以螺酌海用管聞天者耳。」 (T 1769.38.255c5–7). Implicit here is a criticism of Zhiyi, who is associated with the practice of doctrinal classification in the text quoted just above.
6 I use the term “mental disturbances” in the same sense that Wŏnhyo uses the term *hok* 惑, a catch-all term for all obstructions to enlightenment and liberation, including both the cognitive and afflictive hindrances. In many texts and traditions, such as Tiantai, *hok* is used more narrowly as a direct synonym for “affliction” (K. *pōnnoe* 煩惱; Skt. *kleśa*).
7 Yi P’yŏngnae (1996, 344–355), sees Wŏnhyo’s classification of the Yogācāra hindrances as explicit (*hyŏllyo*) and the Tathāgatagarbha hindrances as inexplicit (*ŭnmil*) as constituting a kind of *p’an’gyo* value judgment, indicating Wŏnhyo’s higher evaluation of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition. It may be the case that Wŏnhyo personally preferred the Tathāgatagarbha approach, but if one takes full account of the discussion in the *Ijang ŭi* itself, it is hard to see where the support for this
argument would come from. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that Wŏnhyo’s oeuvre as a whole—his entire career-long project of hwajaeng tends to work against the practice of a valorizing/devalorizing doctrinal classification, apart from this distinction made between “explicit” and “inexplicit,” there is no other language in the Ijang ŭi that lends itself toward indicating any kind of value judgment between the two systems. Furthermore, the attentive reader of the text will notice that Wŏnhyo cites from the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts to support the arguments of both approaches. He is not simply lining up one family of texts against another. Thus, I think it is better to simply take these labels of “explicit” and “inexplicit” at face value: The Yogācāra system of the hindrances as articulated by Wŏnhyo in the Ijang ŭi has a clearly articulated structure that is fully laid out in its source texts without requiring special interpretation, and is thus, nītārtha. The Tathāgatagarbha system, on the other hand, is at first glance in the AMF convoluted and paradoxical, and in the Śrīmālā/Ratnagotavibhāga, etc. not at all presented in the framework of the two hindrances, and thus, neyārtha. I will explain this more fully below.

8 Please see my discussion of Wŏnhyo’s usage of Yogācāra texts in his exegetical works in Muller (2007). Here, let me clarify a point that has apparently been misunderstood by some scholars: I am not proposing, nor have I ever made the claim, that Wŏnhyo was primarily a Yogācārin rather than a Buddha-nature believer—I have acknowledged Wŏnhyo’s personal preference for the AMF and his belief in innate Buddhahood in just about everything I have written about him. The emphasis to be seen in my writings on Wŏnhyo’s extensive reliance on the Yogācārabhūmi and other Yogācāra texts is for the purpose of rectifying what I see as an imbalance in the work of a predominance of scholarship to define him as a devoted exponent and patriarch of Huayan. Hence, I would ask scholars to pay due attention to his understanding, appreciation, and usage of Yogācāra—as well as Mādhyamika, Hetuvidyā, and other “non-Buddha-nature” approaches.

9 There was a fair amount of research done on soteriological doctrines during the 1970s and 80s, but it seems that after that period, this interest was lost before this area was thoroughly explored.

10 今造此論為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。生解為斷二重障故。由我法執二障具生。若證二空彼障隨斷。斷障為得二勝果故。由斷續生煩惱障故證真解脫。由斷礙解所知障故得大菩提。又為開示謬執我法迷唯識者。


12 I have gotten into the habit of rendering avidyā (K. mumyŏng 無明) as “nescience” rather than the more common “ignorance” with the intention of specifying it as a distinct technical term, especially within two hindrances discourse.
In Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriological discourse, the concepts of nescience (usually Skt. avidyā, K. mumyŏng 無明) and delusion (usually Skt. moha, K. chi 痴, muji 無知) are often indistinguishable, but in fine-grained discussions within systems of philosophy of mind, nescience refers to a more basic level of cognitive error, usually associated with the seventh (and sometimes eighth) consciousness, and delusion to a slightly derivative level of cognitive error, usually associated with the sixth (and sometimes also seventh) consciousness.

The problem of overlap between the hindrances is the topic of the discussion of a full article in Muller (2013b), also summarized in Muller (2014, 230–235).

I have discussed the process of the development of the hindrances system within the major Yogācāra works in Muller (2014).

Yoshizu Yoshihide questioned the accuracy of the attribution of Huiyuan’s authorship of this work in Yoshizu (1972) and was later supported by Hirakawa Akira (Hirakawa 1973, 399). The argument presented there is sufficient to concede that this commentary was probably composed after Huiyuan’s time. Nonetheless, no one disputes the probability that it was written by a person or persons intimate with his thought, quite possibly one of more of his students, and thus represents his essential teachings. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to this text as “Huiyuan’s Commentary.”

See T 1911.46.85b22–c22. The content of this discussion by Zhiyi has been treated by Paul Swanson (1983).

I have discussed Huiyuan’s treatise, along with its relation to Wŏnhyo’s Ijang ŭi in detail in Muller (2006a; 2013b), and fully translated it with annotations in Muller (2014). Sŏk Kiram (2010) criticized Muller (2006a) for my assertion that Wŏnhyo relied extensively on Huiyuan in the development of his characterization of the Śrīmālā model of the hindrances, by making the point that there are some differences to be seen between the two. In fact, I never claimed that Wŏnhyo copied Huiyuan verbatim. I merely pointed out the obvious fact that he had to have read Huiyuan’s treatise, and used it as a major point of departure for his own work. I pointed out differences myself in my original article.

As does Wŏnhyo, I start my explanation with the Yogācāra system because it is better known as it can be found explicitly articulated in the major Yogācāra works, even though its fullest systematization probably occurred historically after the completion of Huiyuan’s system. That is, the Tathāgatagarbha/Inexplicit system does not exist until Huiyuan creates it.

But this array of manifestations of these hindrances is not something we would so easily be able to put together ourselves without Wŏnhyo’s help.
This description is found almost verbatim in the *FDJL* (*T* 1530.26.323a29–b8), and resembles that given in the *CWSL* (*T* 1585.31.48c5). The fact that the citation is almost identical to a passage in the *FDJL* is of some interest, since he does not cite it as his source, nor does he cite it anywhere else in his extant corpus, except once, in his *Expository Notes on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* (*T* 1845.44.233b16). In his *Ijang ŭi*, Wŏnhyo is diligent about citing his scriptural sources. Whenever he cites the *Yogācārabhūmi, AMF*, or some other scriptural source, he clearly indicates the title. However, in the *Ijang ŭi* there are a number of lines that are identical to lines in the *FDJL*, but which are not cited as such. Why did Wŏnhyo use lines from this text without citing it? Perhaps portions of this text were circulating in East Asia prior to its publication, and he considered these to be the opinions of a contemporary scholar? It is an interesting question.

However, as Wŏnhyo explains at considerable length in the *Ijang ŭi*, this model is only true in a general sense, as certain types of cognitive hindrances must certainly be removed by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, and there are situations (such as that where the salvation of other sentient beings is at stake) where the bodhisattvas are more proficient than the adherents of the two vehicles at the removal of the afflictive hindrances.

The second chapter of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (*Pyŏn chungbyŏllon*) is often cited as a locus classicus for hindrances discourse. But while the two hindrances are invoked at the beginning and end of the chapter, the discussion that takes place in between does not lend itself to any systematic development of hindrance theory that can be readily mapped to the standardized format of the hindrances being explained here. Thus, it should be seen as an outlier for standard hindrances discourse. The *YBh* contains extensive discussions on the topics of both affliction and cognitive distortion, but not in a single place, in an organized fashion, under the heading of the two hindrances.

See for example, *T* 1579.30.495c5–8, 496c5, 562b26, 727c11–16.

The locus classicus for this structure is the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* (*T* 353.12.220a1–8).

The explanation given to this category, found both in the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* and in Huiyuan’s commentary, locates the two vehicle practitioners and the bodhisattvas in positions analogous to that found in the *Yogācāra* explanation, in terms of their ability to deal with the hindrances. See *T* 353.12.220a13–15.

Zhiyi’s work on the hindrances is introduced in Swanson (1983).
30 又染心義者，名為煩惱礙。能障眾如根本智故。無明義者，名為智礙。能障世間自然業智故。
31 此義云何。以依染心能見能現、妄取境界、違平等性故。以一切法常靜無有起相、無明不覺妄與法違故。不能得隨順世間一切境界種種智故。
32 I have investigated the origins of the essence-function paradigm, along with its roots in stillness-and-movement in Muller (2016).
33 For this discussion, see T 842.916b20–c7; HPC 7.146a; Muller (1999, 144–146).
34 I have also translated this portion of Zongmi’s Yuanjue jing dashu at http://www.acmuller.net/twohindrances/zongmi.html.
35 HPC 10.46–47; translated in Muller (2007).

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